Hearing Summary:FY2001 NASA Budget Request: Human Spaceflight”, hearing before the House Science Committee’s subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics

Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee Chair Dana Rohrabacher, in reading from a prepared opening statement, took aim at NASA’s Space Station budget. While noting that NASA’s budget had been increased, he cautioned that the “devil is in the details”. He reminded the committee that NASA’s ISS budget is based on the assumption that the program does not fall behind the schedule contained with in Rev E of the ISS Assembly Sequence. “We already know that the service module is months behind schedule.”

Rohrabacher noted that NASA’s Inspector General had recently issued a report which cited managerial and cost problems in the ISS program and with Boeing, the ISS prime contractor. He expressed some dismay in noting that Boeing is passing on costs to NASA (its ISS customer) while it does not follow this practice with its other (commercial) customers. He chided Boeing for this and characterized Congress’ suspicions regarding the cost management of the ISS program by saying that “accountability is the mother of responsibility”.

Rohrabacher moved on to the topic of the gas tanks Boeing sent to the Huntsville town dump and said “we need to know who is responsible” noting that throwing perfectly good hardware into the trash “has the appearance of a Keystone Cops movie”.

Next was the topic of Space Shuttle upgrades. Rohrabacher complained that NASA wants to spend $1.3 billion on upgrades but it cannot come up with a firm list of what it wants to spend the money on. He also expressed concern that he did not want to see NASA doing Shuttle upgrades in the name of safety when they might, in fact, be performance upgrades.

Rohrabacher moved to the recent NASA announcement that new hires would be brought into the Shuttle program. Noting that the work force levels seem to be affected by a pendulum swinging from downsizing to hiring, he cautioned NASA that these swings send out mixed signals. Two years ago, NASA was solidly behind the need for personnel cuts. Now, NASA says more people are needed. “What assurances do we have that this won’t happen again” he asked.

Ranking Minority member Gordon noted that 1999 was a year of mixed results for NASA. While the Shuttle did fly 4 times, the ISS is still at the same point in its assembly sequence as it was a year ago. He asked the NASA witnesses to address the issue of when the Service Module would fly and what NASA was doing to prepare for contingencies should not fly. Specifically, he asked if NASA had had any progress in bringing down the cost of the US Propulsion Module.

Rep. Rohrabacher took note of the presence of a NASA Select TV crew recording the hearings. He praised NASA for wanting to record and disseminate these proceedings in an open and public fashion. He then noted that NASA PAO has repeatedly denied press accreditation to NASA Watch and that such denials seemed to be done because of the content contained within NASA Watch.

He noted (as a former journalist himself) that sometimes those reporters who hold an editorial view not in agreement with an agency are the ones who often ask some of the best questions. He added that reporters see access to newsmakers as their lifeblood and that this apparent bias on NASA’s part (and denial of access via accreditation) was a First Amendment issue – one that was sending a message to other reporters.

Rohrabacher referred to the NASA Inspector General’s report regarding NASA Watch accreditation denial (which concurred with the observations made by the House Science Committee) and suggested that NASA err on the side of openness.

NASA Office of Space Flight Associate Administrator Joe Rothenberg began his prepared statement by recounting NASA’s past year and plans for the future. Specifically, he noted that job cuts had resulted in serious skill loss and that he had instituted hiring to ameliorate these problems.

NASA Ames Research Center Directory Harry McDonald (leader of the recent Shuttle Assessment Team) then read from a prepared statement and detailed the process whereby his team performed its study and presented its report. His team’s overall assessment was that there has been some serious erosion of the processes used to run the Shuttle program especially in the area of maintenance. He added that the Shuttle can indeed fly safely for perhaps 10-15 more years if there is an infusion of state of the art technology, attention to management issues, and attention paid to risk mitigation. He added later that the wiring problems discovered after STS-93 were systemic across the Shuttle fleet and that they were the result of collateral damage during routine maintenance.

NASA Inspector General Roberta Gross opened by making a specific point of praising the diligence and dedication of the NASA work force. She did this, in part, because she felt that so many people associated her efforts only with fraud and abuse that the she wanted it to be known that her office appreciated real strengths of the agency. Her office’s recent efforts have focused on safety, program management, and international relations.

Gross cited one example of things that aren’t working the way they should: the use of non-complaint and potentially hazardous materials by Boeing at KSC – specifically in O&C Building and the SSPF. After looking at the issue, NASA issued variances – but no safety people were involved in the variance issuing process. Moreover, she found that no risk assessment had been done before these variances were issued.

With regard to program management, Gross focused on the non-competitive procurement mechanism used to award the SFOC contract to United Space Alliance. NASA’s intent was to provide cost incentives to USA for performance while reducing overall government oversight. Now that the SFOC contract is in Phase 2, there is $10 billion at stake. Gross said that NASA needs to ensure that a thorough cost benefit analysis is done and that NASA needs to be very careful during the consolidation process to assure that skill mix is retained as people are let go from the work force.

Allen Li from the General Accounting Office read from his prepared testimony which focused on safety issues associated with Russia’s participation in the ISS program. He said “although Russian elements have complied with the majority of space station safety
requirements, Zarya and the Service Module still do not meet some important requirements. According to NASA safety officials, significant areas of noncompliance include (1) inadequate shielding from orbital debris on the Service Module, (2) inability of Zarya and the
Service Module to operate after losing cabin pressure, (3) lack of verification for the design and service life of the Service Module windows, and (4) excessive noise levels in Zarya and the Service Module. NASA officials said that shortfalls in Russian funding, designs based on existing Russian hardware, and technical disagreements with Russian engineers are the main reasons these modules do not comply with safety requirements.”

Li said that NSA had told the GAO that the reasons why the Russian modules do not meet ISS safety requirements is lack of money, use of existing Russian hardware, and “technical disagreements” with Russia.

He noted that the Service Module is more or less identical to Mir’s Core Module. He then said that all Mir cosmonauts had suffered temporary hearing loss and that some crew members had suffered permanent hearing loss sever enough to disqualify them from future flights. US crew members experienced much the same problems when they were aboard Mir. According to NASA, hearing protection, baffles, and quieter fans will be used to cut down on the noise. However Russia has been slow to implement these changes due in great part to lack of funds. Still, NASA has approved some of these non-compliance’s by issuing waivers. Outstanding issues could threaten the launch of the Service Module if they are not addressed (or issued waivers).

Rep. Rohrabacher asked if NASA was lowering safety standards so as to make it easier for Russia to participate in the ISS program. Joe Rothenberg said that NASA is not treating the Russians any differently than they would a partner or a U.S. company. He said that waivers are part of the standard process. Before NASA issues any waivers on the noise issue, Rothenberg said that he wants to be certain that the crew would still be able to hear caution and warning alarms.

Rohrabacher asked if the crew could expect to suffer long term hearing loss. Rothenberg replied that they would not. He went on to cover the windows in the Service Module (also a concern) and told the committee that NASA now felt that these windows did meet existing NASA specs.

Rohrabacher then expressed a concern he has raised in the past: that the Administration (and NASA) has bent over backwards to help the Russians and that it has damaged the ISS program in so doing. Allen Li responded that much of the Russian hardware actually does meet or exceed many ISS requirements but that some remain unresolved such as the noise issue. When Rohrabacher asked if such accommodations would be made for a US company, Rothenberg said yes (again) and then added that it is the US-provided treadmill that is one of the biggest offenders when it comes to noise.

Rep. Gordon then focused in on the disposal of space-certified gas tanks that had been thrown out with the trash and the engine seals that were installed in Atlantis when these seals should have been thrown out in the trash. He asked if these events were part of a problem at NASA. Harry McDonald said that he thought it was interesting that the system was able to catch the fact that these seals were installed before the Shuttle actually flew. Gordon then asked what changes NASA needs to make. Rothenberg replied that NASA should not accept any problem and that it needed to fully understand the root cause of this event in order to prevent it from happening again.

It was then mentioned that the McDonald report made note of 33 “escapes” (i.e. events where a hardware problem was allowed to fly in space but did not cause a problem with the mission) and 16 “dive and catch” problems (technical problems that were caught before they were allowed to fly in space.) These events occurred between 1996 and 1999. Rothenberg noted that it was very important that the system had caught these items before they flew.

Rep. Weldon then asked if we have “oversold our capabilities” with regard to the Shuttle system. He asked whether these problems were the result of more people required to do things or just a mid course correction that was required to get the program back on track. Rothenberg replied that while there had been a 33% reduction in workforce the number of anomalies per flight had actually decreased from the level seen in the 1990-94 time frame – a time where there was a larger workforce in place. Allen Li added that NASA’s cuts were made at a time when similar pressures were being applied at all levels of the Federal government.

Rep. Bartlett brought up the fact that the White House had assured Congress in1994 during the space station redesign that Russia would nor be placed in the critical path of ISS development – but that this had happened none the less. He added that tensions have continued to rise between the US and Russia since Kosovo and wondered how all of these pressures were affecting the ISS program.

Rothenberg replied that NASA had a number of meetings with their Russian counterparts during the Kosovo conflict and that he had seen no evidence that they were treated differently – indeed, he said that he felt that all involved felt that they were working on something “for all humanity”. He added that he would not agree to do anything that would amount to a compromise in order to keep Russia in the ISS program.

Rep. Nethercutt Brought up the fact that NASA’s FY 1999 budget had $10 million allotted to a dedicated life sciences mission and that the FY 2000 budget had $40 million allotted. He said that NASA had asked to reprogram this money to cover Shuttle issues and that the Appropriations Committee has said no. He asked whether NASA really wants to fly this mission. Rothenberg replied that he wants to fly more science but that he has other priorities that take precedence. He went on to say that it does not make sense for him to focus on research before he had the people and the systems to do the research safely. He noted that STS-107 will have some science on it and that NASA has accelerated the launch dates for the ISS-5A and ISS-6 missions which support ISS science.

Nethercutt then asked if it would actually cost $50 million (the amount allocated by Congress) for a dedicated life science mission. He replied that this was the marginal cost to fly that mission. Nethercutt reminded Rothenberg that Congress has been very clear on its wishes for this flight – especially the Science Committee. Rothenberg replied again that he’d do it if he thought there wasn’t safety risk.

Nethercutt referred to a report on NASA Watch regarding the dissolution of the IFMP contract between NASA and KPMG and asked the witnesses if they could comment. Rothenberg noted that this was outside his area of responsibility and that the NASA Comptroller would be the one to address it to it.

Allen Li from GAO confirmed what had been posted on NASA Watch and added that NASA had sent a “show cause” letter to KPMG expressing concerns about KPMG’s performance. He noted that GAO had identified contract management as a high risk area and that KMPG had been having problems meeting their goals. Li noted that the value of the IFMP contract thus far was around $10 million, but that the total contract value was much larger. The bulk of that money would have been linked to the delivery of hardware and software to various locations around NASA. (note: NASA Watch has since learned that this “show cause” letter was sent by NASA to KPMG in January and that KPMG was given 10 days to respond.)

Rep. Lampson asked for an update on TransHab. Rothenberg noted that the baseline aluminum Hab module had been taken off of Boeing’s contract but that he had now asked Boeing to do an analysis of the cost of putting it back into the program. A conference at JSC last Summer resulted in 6 commercial TransHab proposals being submitted to NASA. 5 of the 6 proposals were actually contracts that required NASA to bankroll their efforts. Only one according to Rothenberg was actually a commercialization proposal. He said that this contract is still being discussed. He said that if NSA decides to recommend acceptance that he will send it to the White House and Congress for review. He could not say when this might happen other than to say he hoped it would be “soon”.

Lampson then asked for an update on the scandal surrounding the Bank of New York and the handling of money being sent to Russia. Roberta Gross answered by saying that her office had performed two reports one on the apparent use of funds sent to Biopreparat which were thought to have been diverted for chemical weapons work (they were not) and the other to trace the path of money going from the U.S. to Russia. Gross said her office was satisfied that the money sent to Russia did end up where it was supposed to.

Lampson then asked for NASA comment on the money used for Shuttle upgrades. Rothenberg replied that the money has been used for safety upgrades only and not for performance upgrades. He added that NASA has scoped out the sorts of upgrades it needs but that he wants to do additional studies to set out priorities and to be assured that the budget is sufficient to implement the desired upgrades. He said that work already done had increased ascent reliability from a 1 in 438 chance of launch mishap to 1 in 970.

The two main upgrades – electric APUs and Shuttle Health Monitoring system are underway and that he needed to be certain that these two programs would be implemented so as not to eat up the remaining budget – one which as to cover the other safety upgrades.

Rep. Barton then suggested that if NASA is serious about helping Russia meet its obligations then it might be prudent for the US to simply “buy” the Russian space program. He admitted right off the bat that this suggestion might be somewhat off the wall. Rothenberg did not know quite how to respond to this but noted that none of the money being sent to Russia is to pay for things Russia is obligated to provide the ISS program. Rather, the said that the money was used to help ease the cash flow and to purchase goods and services from Russia that NASA needs.

Rep. Sanford then asked if U.S. astronauts would be safer if Russia was not in the ISS program. Allen Li responded by noting that there was no way that the current ISS program (as presently configured) could work without the Russians at this time. The ICM is only a partial solution, and the Russians are one of the main sources of logistics and resupply for the ISS program. This discussion went back and forth for a few minutes with a number of ‘what if’ questions. No firm ‘yes’ or ‘no’ was given by NASA.

Sanford then asked if the costs had been identified that represented additional expense that resulted from Russia’s participation in the ISS program. Li responded that NASA’s own numbers point to a figure of $3 billion. Rothenberg then suggested that this all “has to do with how you count” and that it could be argued that bringing the Russians into the program saved $2 billion with a net cost increase (therefore) of only $1 billion.

Rothenberg added that NASA had asked for $60 million a year ago for the purchase of Russian goods and services an that another request for $35 million was being presented to Congress this year. He added that NASA had spent $400 million on the Shuttle-Mir program and that this gave the US some badly-needed expertise in long duration spaceflight. Without this experience, Rothenberg suggested that the US might have had to discover some of these lessons (already learned by Russia) on its own.

Rep. Weldon then returned to close the hearings by addressing the issue of noise protection and asked if astronauts would have to wear permanent ear protection. Rothenberg replied that they would for a short period of time during the first 3 months until the upgrade items for the Service Module and FGB were placed aboard ISS.