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Another NASA Panel Speaks: Who Is (Not) Talking to Whom?

By Keith Cowing

April 16, 2003

Filed under General Story, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Another NASA Panel Speaks: Who Is (Not) Talking to Whom? — iss

Another advisory panel met at NASA recently to discuss the upcoming Expedition 7 mission to the International Space Station. When asked if they had spoken with the NASA safety panel which had studied the same topic last week, they said “No”. While the agency seems to be moving ahead in dealing with technical issues, they seem to be lagging behind when dealing with internal cultural problems.

A meeting of the ISS Operational Readiness Task Force was held at NASA Headquarters on Wednesday, 16 April 2003. As was the case with the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel’s (ASAP) meeting last week – this was a teleconference with all of the panel members calling in from remote locations to a room at NASA headquarters filled with staff and a few reporters. As was also the case with last week’s ASAP teleconference, the topic of this meeting was the upcoming two-person Expedition 7 mission to the International Space Station (ISS).

The ISS Operational Readiness Task Force is chaired by former astronaut Gen. Tom Stafford and is often called the “Stafford Commission”. Over the years, Gen. Stafford has chaired a variety of panels looking into both routine and contingency operations aboard the ISS and Mir.

In late March 2003, around the same time that NASA Administrator Sean O’Keefe tasked the ASAP to look into safety issues associated with a two person Expedition 7 crew, O’Keefe (and Rosaviakosmos Head Yuri Koptev) also asked the ISS Operational Readiness Task Force to take a look at operational issues associated with Expedition 7. The very nature of this examination would lead the Task Force to look at a number of things one could also identify as being ”safety” issues. More on this overlap in a moment.

In the course of conducting their assessment, Task Force members met for several days each in Houston (25-28 March) and Moscow (8-11 April) with representatives of each nation’ space agency so as to assess the operational readiness of both agencies to conduct the Expedition 7 mission. In addition to crew readiness, the Task Force also looked at the ability of Mission Control Center in Houston and Moscow to support Expedition 7. When the Columbia accident occurred, the Task Force received additional instructions with regards to a 2 person crew and the grounding of the Space Shuttle fleet.

Based on their meetings and deliberations, the Task Force determined that:

the Expedition 7 crew is medically certified and adequately trained for their long duration mission. Specifically, the crew will be “Board Certified” for crew operations for Soyuz TMA ascent and descent

U.S. and Russia flight control teams and mission control centers are ready to support this flight; and

the ISS is safe and operationally ready to support Expedition 7.

The Task Force’s briefings from NASA and RSA included: crew training status, Carbon Dioxide System removal and assembly; METOX canister status (recyclable Metox – metal oxide – canisters are used to remove CO2 and trace contaminants from both the Airlock when closed off from ISS and the EMU spacesuits); mission control issues; vibration analysis; acoustic conditions aboard the ISS; briefings from Expedition 5 and 7 crew members; software status; search and rescue plans for the return of the Expedition 6 crew (via Soyuz); and the impact of a 2 person ISS crew and possible impacts of an unmanned ISS.

The Task Force did have some concerns. With regard to the TVIS, the Treadmill Vibration Isolation System (used for crew exercise), the Task Force expressed some reservations about the robustness of repairing the treadmill and maintaining enough on-orbit spares and urged the U.S. and Russia to continue to work in this area. (see ISS On-Orbit Status 27 Feb 2002 and ISS On-Orbit Status 4 Aug 2002 for descriptions of on-orbit technical problems with TVIS)

Acoustic levels on ISS remain a concern to the Task Force. Specifically, these issues reside within the Russian Segment (Service Module and FGB) portion of the ISS (and to a lesser extent the U.S Lab module) and have been an issue for several years. Solutions to this problem include placing sound baffling in various areas. While RSA has provided plans to the Task Force for how they plan to deal with this issue, the Task Force feels that the planned schedule remains somewhat uncertain due to funding issues in Russia.

Perhaps the most pressing issue concerning the Task Force was the ability of the ISS to be supplied with logistics (food, water, and equipment spares) to support a 2 person crew for an extended period of time while the Shuttle fleet remains on the ground. While the present supply train of Progress and Soyuz vehicles can keep the crew supplied, there is an issue to be faced towards the end of the year. If at least one Progress flight, presently scheduled for early 2004, is not moved up by several months, there is a possibility that the ISS might have to be left unmanned.

Since leaving the ISS unmanned is a rather unattractive option that no one is particularly enthusiastic about, the Task Force has urged that discussions begin “now” to ensure that this Progress flight is moved up.

At issue is the so-called “Skip Cycle” cache of supplies that the ISS program tries to keep on-orbit as a contingency. While these supplies are there for the specific purpose of helping crews stay supplied in the event of an interruption in normal resupply, it is the ISS program’s intent that these reserves not be dipped into unless absolutely necessary.

After the teleconference was completed (the Task Force members having voted unanimously to agree with recommendations for forwarding, in letter form, to O’Keefe and Koptev) members of the press asked questions at NASA HQ. Scott Chandler, on detail to NASA HQ from KSC as Chief Engineer in the ISS Office, spoke about the need for moving up the January 2004 Progress flight – and the need for additional Progress flights thereafter.

According to Chandler, the ISS crew could be dipping into the Skip Cycle reserves – such that levels might be “below zero” before a scheduled late-January 2004 Progress flight date. This would of course signal a need for the crew to leave. Since that is not a desirable outcome, Chandler said that he’d like to see that January 2004 Progress flight moved up to Late November 2003.

When asked if this would ensure that things would be OK throughout 2004 using only Progress vehicles – or if additional Progress vehicles would be needed – Chandler demurred a bit. At first, he replied that this issue was “under discussion with the partners”. I asked him the question again, noting that since the issue of additional Progress vehicles was “under discussion”, one would assume that there was an identified need for additional Progress flights. With the proviso that NASA is expecting a return to flight for the Shuttle fleet (hence the chance that additional Progress flights might not be needed), Chandler agreed that not having Shuttle in service in 2004 would require an additional Progress flight for a total of 4 Progress flights in 2004. In making this assessment, Chandler said he was also counting on the flight of ESA’s ATV cargo transport next Fall to provide additional logistics support.

According to Chandler, the real limiting issue is water – not food. Average crew usage of water is 2 liters per day per crew member. Some water recycling is done on the ISS, but this water is not used for drinking. As such, water has to be resupplied periodically. While the Shuttle is normally assigned the task of lifting water to the ISS, the Progress is capable of doing so as well. When Chandler and Task Force Executive Secretary Lee Pagel were asked about costs associated with additional Progress flights Pagels replied that his was outside the purview of the Task Force.

Many of the things examined by the ISS Operations Readiness Task Force were also considered by the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel – at the exact same time as this Task Force was looking at them. Moreover, the specific issues associated with a 2 person Expedition 7 crew and a grounded Space Shuttle fleet were asked of both groups by NASA Administrator O’Keefe within a few days of each other.

In a similar teleconference with ASAP last week, I asked the ASAP panelists if Expedition 7 astronaut Ed Lu was certified as a Soyuz pilot given the short period of time he had to train for a 2 person stint aboard ISS. Despite three attempts at asking this question, the ASAP panelists and participating JSC personnel were unable to answer my question. NASA PAO managed to get me a quick reply later that day. Curiously, the ISS Task Force looked at this specific issue and made some unambiguous statements on it i.e. that both Expedition 7 crew members would be “board certified” Soyuz pilots. The Task Force also looked at issues surrounding an unmanned ISS, contingencies aboard the station with a 2 person crew, etc.

I asked the ISS Operational Readiness Task Force’s Executive Secretary Lee Pagel if the Task Force had consulted with the ASAP during the course of its deliberations. He said that he “did not recall” any such discussion. He said that in the past he has had cause to interact with Len Sirota, the Executive Secretary of ASAP, but when asked again by me if this included anything specifically to do with ASAP’s recent assessment, Pagel repeated that there had been no interaction.

I also asked Pagel et al about contingencies associated with possible Soyuz 5S unavailability as raised by the ASAP. They seemed baffled by my question – so I described the ASAP’s concern over the option of “serial” vs “parallel” flight sequencing between Expedition 7/Soyuz 6S and Expedition 6/Soyuz 5S usage and the possible impact that this would have vis a vis a possibly unmanned ISS if Soyuz 5S could not be used. (see “Panel Approves 2 Person ISS Crew; Uncertain About Crew Skills“). It was quite obvious that they were unaware of the ASAP’s deliberations – or findings – on this clearly relevant topic.

I was rather surprised that this Task Force was this uninformed about an equally visible ASAP activity held a few days back in the same building and discussed in the press. To be certain, the tasking by NASA Administrator O’Keefe to both panels occurred only a few weeks back and involved an expedited assessment of a process (preparation for Expedition 7) already underway. Indeed, Jim Lloyd, representing the Office of Biological and Physical Research at the Task Force teleconference, said that these independent paths (i.e. no interaction) had been taken “out of logistical necessity”.

Also, to be fair, members of the Task Force did not participate in this post-teleconference discussion, only the Executive Secretary and several NASA HQ employees. For all I know there was extensive interaction between ASAP and the Task Force members unknown to people at NASA HQ – which, were this to be the case, presents yet another problem.

I can understand the need for having two separate, independent assessments of issues, even if there is an overlap, but that does not seem to have been the intent here. Indeed, I know of no charter by O’Keefe to the ISS Operations Task Force and the ASAP specifically to do these analyses “independent” of one another. Instead, the panels simply did not interact because that isn’t how they do things. This happened despite the fact that the executive secretaries for both groups work in the same building 5 days a week.

Given the inherent overlapping nature of what both groups were working on, you would think that the sharing of information, findings, etc. would be the natural thing to do. This would seemingly be glaringly apparent when things are being handled in an expedited fashion on a task as important as the aftermath of the destruction of a Space Shuttle orbiter. Alas, this was not the case.

The incident at the ASAP teleconference wherein a basic question as to Lu’s certification could have been handled if the two parallel efforts had been interacting with each other – at least at the Executive Secretary level. The fact that no one on the ASAP knew such a simple question really floored me. If they don’t know that, what else don’t they know?

For those of you who are about to say “you just don’t understand” – yes I do. I used to work at NASA and saw this happen every single day. It has been the better part of a decade since I wore a NASA badge and yet nothing seems to have changed.

The current management theme at NASA is “OneNASA” – at whose heart is the idea that people work together as one agency and that inter-division and inter-center rivalries and duplications be torn down. Lee Pagel works for Code IH, NASA Office of External Relations – Human Space Flight and Research Division. Sirota works for Code Q, Office of Safety and Mission Assurance. Pagel sits in HQ room 7Y44 and Sirota is in room 5W85 – only two floors apart, on the same end of the building. They certainly have a phone book and email directories with which they could contact one another. If nothing else, they use the same elevators.

Keep this in mind the next time you hear someone wonder why NASA person A did not tell NASA person B about something – regardless of whether it is important or trivial. The technical issues associated with the Columbia accident will make themselves readily apparent and the fixes will follow in due course. How you fix a broken internal culture and get the agency to start acting in a non-cloistered, “OneNASA” manner is the hard part.

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