XA/EVA Project Office Weekly Activity Report July 19, 2001
STS-104 EVA 1 and EVA 2
EVA 1, the first of three scheduled EVA’s on STS-104 was conducted on flight day four. This EVA was conducted to prepare the ISS Joint Airlock for installation and to connect electrical umbilicals to the airlock once installed on ISS. The EVA was 5 hours and 59 minutes long. Preflight estimates for the EVA were 7 hours and 5 minutes. All planned objectives were accomplished as well as three additional get-ahead tasks.
EVA 2, which lasted 6 hours and 29 minutes, was conducted on flight day seven. This EVA was conducted to install a pair of high-pressure gas tanks (one oxygen and one nitrogen) on the exterior of the ISS airlock. All nominally planned EVA tasks were successfully completed; additionally the second O2 tank was installed on the airlock. The crew also installed four trunnion pin thermal covers plus one flight releasable grapple fixture (FRGF) thermal cover.
EVA 3 is scheduled to install the final nitrogen tank on the exterior of the airlock.
Zvezda TIM
Representatives from NASA’s EVA Project Office, Engineering Directorate, Hamilton Sundstrand, and Zvezda met in Moscow at an EVA Technical Interchange Meeting (TIM) to discuss Orlan suit topics. The agenda for the TIM included topics related to certifying EMU items in the Orlan, clarification of availability and use of Orlan suit consumables, clarification of Orlan schematic drawings, a discussion of leaks in the Orlan-M-HL (NBL suit), future use of the Orlan-M-HL, clarification of the failure of the biomed harness during the Orlan EVA to relocate the docking cone on ISS, and a discussion of concepts for launch restraints for the Orlan SAFER hardware in the orbiter. The TIM was concluded with the approval of a signed protocol, and initial plans are underway to meet again during the EVA TIM that is planned in October 2001, at Energia.
Node 2 Fluid Line Routing Test
On June 20 and July 2, 2001, the EVA Project Office conducted an unsuited test of the Node 2 Heat Exchanger Ammonia Lines in Building 32 high bay. Four aft end cone lines were tested on June 20 and the remaining two aft end cone lines and six forward end cone lines were tested on July 2. The primary objective was to verify that line routings provide adequate flexibility during heat exchanger changeout. During test, several astronauts manipulated the lines at incremental pressures up to 360 psia as expected on-orbit. Most line routings appeared adequate although two lines on the forward end cone had 45-degree bends that caused difficulty and must be addressed in the crew consensus report. The testing also revealed that clamp launch brackets should be made EVA removable to allow increased hand access. In addition, minor clamp reorientations were suggested. Once the crew consensus report is released, the EVA Project Office will work with the International Space Station Vehicle and Program Integration Offices, and Marshall Space Flight Center to incorporate test findings into Alenia’s Node 2 design.
Battery Leakage on STS-104/7A
Following the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) checkout on flight STS-104/7A, it was found that one of the Increased Capacity Batteries (ICB) had leaked Potassium Hydroxide. The leak was found when a crewmember removed the Contaminant Control Cartridge (CCC) from EMU 3 (crewmember Helm’s suit) to verify its serial number. The suspect battery functioned properly during the EMU 3 checkout, as did the other two batteries in EMU 1 and EMU 2. The ICB’s in EMU 1 and EMU 2 have successfully powered the EMU’s through the first two EVA’s on flight 7A. An additional two ICB’s, which are locker stowed, were inspected and found to not be leaking. Two ICB’s, including the leaking ICB, will be returned on 7A and three will be left on board ISS. Because of contamination concerns, EMU 3, which was originally planned to be left on orbit, will also be returned. EMU 3 was stowed for launch on the middeck ceiling, placing the suit, and the ICB inside it, in an inverted position on the launch pad. The leak is thought to have occurred because of this orientation, some time after V1103.01 testing and prior to launch. A full root cause investigation is planned for the battery design upon receipt of the battery post landing.
Original signed by:
G. Allen Flynt
Acting Manager
