XA/EVA Project Office Weekly Activity Report December 20, 2001
STS-109, HST Servicing Mission 3B (SM3B) EVA CoFR1 Review
The EVA Project Office conducted a CoFR1 review for STS-109, HST SM3B. The review was conducted in preparation for the Orbiter Rollout Review. The EVA hardware launching in the payload bay was reviewed to determine the readiness for integration and rollout. None of the open EVA issues for the mission impact rollout and all will be resolved prior to FRR. There are currently 42 open fit checks relating to hardware stowed in the payload bay or Payload Stowage Assemblies. These fit checks will either be completed or dispositioned as acceptable risk by the EVA CCB. The EVA Project Office determined that there are no EVA constraints to orbiter rollout.
S0 EVA Hardware
The Mobile Transporter Energy Absorbers (MT EA) and EVA Portable Work Platform (PWP) hardware has been certified and delivered to KSC. All issues have been resolved and the hardware is ready for integration onto the S0 Truss Element. KSC schedules currently indicate MT EA integration will be Friday, December 21, 2001. PWP integration is currently scheduled for the first week of January.
NBL Training Reduction Tiger Team presentation
EVA Project Office personnel presented the results of the NBL training reduction tiger team activity to the SSPCB on December 11. The team’s recommendations included reducing the training ratios from 7:1 to 5:1 for all but the most critical or most difficult EVA tasks. The team recommended that further reductions for the ISS crew wait until we have some on-orbit experience with increment based EVAÕs. The SSPCB accepted the team’s recommendations, but requested that further evaluation of NBL training continue. The SSPCB’s hope is that task specific training can eventually be eliminated or at least greatly reduced, since crew training schedules for ISS crews are likely to be oversubscribed when maintenance demands peak, driving the number of scheduled EVA’s up significantly from where they are today. The EVA Project Office is developing a process to collect information on crew performance throughout training, in order to evaluate readiness for EVA execution and determine the right level of training required.
NBL SSRMS failure investigation
EVA Project Office personnel are supporting the NBL SSRMS failure investigation team. The NBL’s SSRMS experienced a structural failure in one of the wrist joints. Further investigation determined that this is a generic problem in the wrist joints (3 joints plus 1 spare). This failure does not cause any safety issue, but the NBL SSRMS cannot function until the failure is resolved. The team received initial materials testing results, and additional testing of the failed components are in work to determine root cause. A preliminary recovery plan has been evaluated that would return the NBL SSRMS to service on April 1, 2002. MOD is assessing the impacts to EVA training in the NBL and is reviewing options to modify the training plan to lesson the impacts.
EMU Processing
With three suits on board ISS, four suits required to support STS-109 (Hubble) mission in February, three suits required to support the STS-110 (8A) mission in March, and the impending holidays, this marks one of the busiest times in the EMU program for suit processing. In addition the program has recently experienced two hardware failures within the fleet that now requires several components to be swapped between suits. To ensure success Hamilton Sundstrand and USA are working together to implement new processing philosophies to allow quick turn around of the suits from STS-108 and expediting suits recently refurbished at the Windsor Locks, CT facility. The plan in place to meet the upcoming missions will also allow suit related personnel take a much-needed break over the holidays.
ISS-4 EVA Contamination Status
Discussion on the ISS-4 EVA contamination issue continued this week with both the ISS Program Office and the ISS Safety Review Panel. The EVA Project Office, along with representatives from Engineering, Astronaut Office, Space & Life Sciences, and Safety, briefed Mr. Mike Suffredini/OA on the risk of contamination to the crewmembers during the installation of both the Service Module Gas Deflector Units and Ham Radio Antennas. Additionally Mr. Suffredini was briefed on the risks of retrieving the Kromka Witness Plate. These tasks are currently scheduled for the Orlan EVA on January 24, 2001. Mr., Suffredini was brought up to date with regard to the issues as well as the planned forward work to either resolve them or mitigate the contamination hazard.
Representatives from the aforementioned organizations also supported the discussion on thruster contamination at the ISS Safety Review Panel (SRP). After reviewing the issue the SRP reached a consensus to maintain a 1-meter keep-out zone around the thrusters. A keep out zone would effectively make it impossible to perform the tasks associated with the Service Module Gas Deflector Units and the Ham Radio Antennas. The SRP went on to state, however, that if the ISS Program Office decides that the task is critical enough then the crew may proceed within 1 meter of the thrusters provided the EVA community works with the Russian EVA specialists to mitigate the exposure to the contamination. Additionally the SRP recommended that a long-term program be negotiated with RSC-Energia to obtain samples of the contamination to be returned for analysis.
G. Allen Flynt
Manager
