XA/EVA Project Office Weekly Activity Report 7 September 2000
ISS Plasma Contactor Units (PCU’s)
The EVA Project Office is evaluating the operational scenarios associated with post 4A EVA sorties should the ISS Plasma Contactor Units (PCU’s) experience a failure. A team of EVA community experts has been assembled and have identified a list of concerns that must all be addressed prior to safely conducting EVA’s in the event a PCU fails. This team is targeting resolution of issues prior to the 3A CoFR2.
Lab Acceptance Review Board (ARB)
The EVA Project Office supported the ARB for the Lab and 5A.1/6A Lab racks at KSC on August 29-31, 2000. Six EVA hardware actions were reviewed and action plans presented. The action plans will obtain final fit checks and flight bolt torques. In addition, XA received two actions: first, to establish a completion of the plan for external Lab fiber optic cable maintenance and, second, to present rationale for acceptability of Lab MM/OD touch temperature exceedances to the ISS VCB. EVA endorsed the Lab EVA outfitting at ARB and recommended acceptance of the Lab given that the open work is minimal and low risk.
Hydrazine Draeger Tube Reliability
The EVA Project Office sponsored test of the hydrazine Draeger Tubes was performed to validate whether or not the ground processing was causing contamination of the tubes. A set of processed tubes that showed no visible contamination were sent to WSTF for exposure to hydrazine. The results of the test are that the tubes are considered unreliable and will not be used on STS-106 and subs. The Draeger tubes are Crit III hardware and are therefore considered as a safety enhancement and are not required for flight. Operational plans are currently in place to deal with hydrazine exposure on an EVA crewmember. These plans have been developed and agreed upon by the Mission Operations Directorate, Space and Life Sciences Directorate, and the EVA Project Office. The EVA Project Office and the Engineering Directorate are currently pursuing an alternate technology for replacement of the hydrazine detection system as soon as practical.
EMU O2 Contamination Recovery Status – Update 9/6
The three EMUs slated for STS-106 with refurbished Secondary Oxygen Packages successfully completed “V1103” testing at KSC last week. This test functionally verified the interfaces for these specific EMUs to the Orbiter. A problem with the GSE at Hamilton Sundstrand led to a contamination of the 4th SOP in refurbishment. This contamination was caused by a failed diaphragm in a compressor. This SOP has been returned to Carleton for tear down and cleaning and another SOP is now at Hamilton ready to begin testing. Overhaul and cleaning of the test stands at Hamilton Sundstrand should be completed by 9/9.
EMU Executive Program Review
On August 31st and September 1st, the EMU Program conducted the 4th quarterly executive review of the year. The objective of this review was to provide a forum to discuss major technical, cost, and schedule issues related to the EMU Program. Major topics on the agenda included the recovery plans for the dropped SEMU 3018 and the O2 Contamination. In addition a general status on major development projects such as the Small Suit project, the new Caution and Warning System, and the ORU program were presented.
Original signed by:
G. Allen Flynt
Deputy Manager
for
Gregory J. Harbaugh
Manager
