Status Report

USA SAFER Panel Meeting Minutes October 26, 2000

By SpaceRef Editor
October 26, 2000
Filed under ,

The SAFER Panel met at JSC on October 26, 2000 in Building 1 room 421 at 10:00 a.m.

Meeting participants:

Panel Chair XA/Anh Huynh

Panel Secretary HSMS/ Anthony Hall

Panel Members EC(LM)/ David Farmer, Grant Bue

ER/ Kevin Lewis

NC/ Ron Cook, Chris Estrada

USA/ Armon Knight

The following items were discussed:

1. Flight Readiness

  • STS—92 (3A) Flight Support

ER/Kevin Lewis stated that the Launch/Landing Bags need to be shipped back to NASA/JSC. ER/Gail Steele will prepare the TPS.

  • STS—97 (4A) Manifest Support

The following will be flying on STS-97:

SAFER SED33105900-309, S/N 1005

SAFER SED33105900-309, S/N 1007

SAFER Battery SED33105907-305, S/N 1027

SAFER Battery SED33105907-305, S/N 1028

SAFER Battery SED33105907-305, S/N 1030

  • STS—98 (5A) Manifest Support

NC/Ron Cook stated the On-Orbit Stowage Bags need more testing to pass certification.

XA will not fly the bags until a subsystem manager is found to take over the responsibility.

2. FIAR/DR Closure Status

  • JSC-ER0028, Connectors P2 and P3 Inadvertently Switched in Avionics Box (Open 30 days)

FIAR JSC-ER0028 was dispositioned as not being a constraint for flight for STS-97 based on the following rationale:

"SAFER S/N 1006 is undergoing repair and retest to support STS-97 (S/N 1006 will not be used on STS-92). SAFER units scheduled for use on STS-92 have successfully passed testing to verify that all Avionics Assembly cable connections are correct."

  • DR TS0030076, SAFER S/N 1006 Failed Rate Check at 0 deg. F (Open 22 days)

No input from ER.

  • JSC-ER0030, SAFER Battery S/N 1026 Missing Fasteners (Open 27 days)

FIAR JSC-ER0030 was dispositioned as not being a constraint for flight for STS-97 based on the following rationale:

"During pre-flight processing for STS-92, Kapton tape was applied to the spare battery captive screws to prevent them from "backing out" and becoming loose and possibly lost. If any of the screws do become lost during flight, the screws from the replaced prime battery can be used as substitutes on the spare battery."

  • JSC-ER0031, SAFER S/N 1003 Open HCM Door during STS-106 Landing &

SAFER S/N 1005 Open HCM Door during STS-106 Landing (Open 27 days)

FIAR JSC-ER0031was dispositioned as not being a constraint for flight for STS-97 based on the following rationale:

"The SAFER stress analyst has determined that landing with the HCM stowage door improperly closed poses no risk to the SAFER hardware. Therefore, no damage was incurred by landing with the doors open on STS-106. The doors are verified closed when stowed for launch. This FIAR is no constraint to STS-97."

ER is still waiting for the official memo from the stress analyst.

  • JSC-ER0032, SAFER Battery Gauge Data Corruption (Open 27 days)

FIAR JSC-ER0032 was dispositioned as not being a constraint for flight for STS-97 based on the following rationale:

"The -305 Cert. battery recently passed this sleep current acceptance test with the same GSE set-up as mentioned above. The problem appears to be unique to S/N 1030 battery with this GSE set-up. The flight batteries to be used on STS-92 were built at the same time as the Cert. battery, which is passing this test. Additionally, the flight units passed all acceptance testing with no anomalies and flew on STS-106 with no anomalies. If this type of corrupted data were encountered during a self-rescue, it would not impact the battery’s ability to supply adequate power to the SAFER. Additionally, dual tether protocol will be used on STS-92."

  • JSC-ER0033, Failure to Detect NSI Condition (Open 25 days)

FIAR JSC-ER0033 was dispositioned as not being a constraint for flight for STS-97 based on the following rationale:

"Over thirty NSIs have been fired by various SAFER units. Only one instance of the software not identifying the circuit as being open has ever occurred. As part of the investigation, eight previously fired NSI (five still installed in spent pyro valves) were connected to SAFER avionics and all generated “NSI CIRCUIT OPEN” message during self test. The one spent NSI that produced the false reading continues to do so, indicating a physical phenomenon in the NSI is responsible.

The SAFER units for STS-92 were positively verified to have NSI intact prior to launch. Due to the potential for a false positive NSI status reading, the nominal IVA checkout procedures would not positively verify that the NSI had not been inadvertently fired subsequent to the launch. A simple modification to the check out procedure (i.e., opening the manual isolation valve pre-checkout and closing it post-checkout) that would provide an absolute indication of the NSI condition would also result in the loss of a small amount of GN2, if the NSI had been fired. Since a SAFER unit with an inadvertently fired NSI could still be able to support the EVA safely and successfully, the manual isolation valve will not be opened during IVA checkout in order to preserve the propellant level for EVA."

  • JSC-ER0034, Battery Thermistor Solder(Open 24 days)

FIAR JSC-ER0034 was dispositioned as not being a constraint for flight for STS-97 based on the following rationale:

"The thermistor of the certification battery also has this condition, yet it passed QAVT and QATT. All the flight units for STS-92 passed all acceptance tests, flew successfully on STS-106, and have passed ground checkout tests. Failure of the thermistor solder joint on orbit would only cause an incorrect battery temperature reading to be displayed on the HCM, which would not impair the battery’s ability to power SAFER during a self-rescue or during the planned DTO."

  • JSC-ER0035, Battery Current Variation (Open 23 days)

FIAR JSC-ER0035 has been dispositioned with the following non flight constraint rationale for STS-97:

"No remedial action is required. All the flight units for STS-92 passed all acceptance tests, flew successfully on STS-106, and have passed ground checkout tests. If these variations in current and voltage were to occur on STS-92, they would not impair the battery’s ability to power SAFER during a self-rescue or during the planned DTO.

Current variations will not be visible to the crew and will have a minimal effect on the % power remaining display on the HCM, because the current variations are averaged out in the calculation. Voltage variations may be noticed by the crew on the HCM, but these variations are small (+/- 0.3 Volts) and have no effect on the % power remaining calculation."

  • TS0030093 (USA FCE DR #SA033002), Engineering Unit Latch Failure (SAFER SED33109103-301, S/N 1001) (Open 17 days)

No input from ER.

  • JSC-ER0036, Pin on the Stud of the Electrical Cover Plate Assy. is Loose (Open 15 days)

No change.

3. Configuration Control

  • Hardware/Software Configurations

No change.

  • CR Implementation

    • CR H-0753 R1 Power Switch Guard Modification

No change.

    • CR H-0760 SAFER NBL & 1-G Hi-Fi Mockup Upgrades

Refurbishment and upgrades on Safer Mockup TSED33105900-303 S/N 1001 are in work:

    • Decals for hand controller are in place

    • Detents to hold hand controller are in place.

    • Hand controller umbilical upgrades are in work.

    • Hand controller tray repairs are completed.

    • Hand controller deployment in work.

    • CR H-0788, -305 SAFER Battery Design, Fabrication & Implementation

See FIARs JSC-ER0032, JSC-ER0034 and JSC-ER0035 above.

    • CR H-0865, SAFER Thermal Enhancements

All the thermal enhancements (-309 configuration) to the SAFER flight units have been completed,

except for s/n 1003 from STS-92.

Proposed CR’s

    • CR H-0749 R1, SAFER On-Orbit Trainer

On hold until funds become available this fiscal year.

    • CR H-0806,-307 Rechargeable Battery CR

On hold pending funding from XA this fiscal year.

    • CR H-0843, Latch Redesign

On hold until hi-fi mockup latches can be replaced with flight-like latches.

    • Extension of HCM Deployment Actuator and the Manual Isolation Valve Actuator

Review comments from the panel members are being incorporated into the CR.

    • IMS Labeling

CR draft in work.

    • On-Orbit Stowage Bag Modifications (Docking Loads)

Status of the On-Orbit Stowage Bag Modifications is discussed under STS—98 (5A) Manifest Support.

  1. Issues


5. Special Topics

Grant Bue, EC/LM and David Farmer, EC/LM presented the following pitch to the panel.

  1. EHB Presentation

  2. EP to present reduced battery acceptance test requirement (from lesson learned on S/N 1028) to EHB for information on 11/1/00.

  3. CCB Presentation

11/03/00 XA/Anh Huynh to present closure to action on delta V capability, and ER/Kevin Lewis to present closure to action of thermal capability. Charts will be reviewed at the Panel on 10/26/00.

  1. PRCB presentation


9. Action Items



Submitted by: Approved by:

(Original signed by) (Original signed by)

Theresa M. Elms Anh H. Huynh

SAFER Panel Secretary USA SAFER Panel Chairman








K. Lewis

Provide a video recording of 1) NSI/Pyro Valve firing, 2) dry valve seating, 3) wet valve seating, 4) dry valve self-test, and 5) wet valve self-test.

06/25/99: Assigned as action 02-03 at the STS-96 USA SAFER IFA Investigation meeting.

07/09/99: Transfer action to USA SAFER Panel.

08/05/99: Recording completed except for NSI/Pyro Valve firing. ECD of TBD, pending available opportunity.

10/26/00: Action to be performed when possible, not to be carried to EVA Tools Panel. Closed.


P. McCartney

K. Vassigh

Provide a video of the on-orbit trainer evaluation (SSC) as shown at the VRL and more technical information on the data rate specifications.

04/20/00: Assigned. ECD TBD.

06/15/00: DX will record on-orbit trainer evaluation (SSC) on video. ECD TBD. 10/26/00: Action will be assigned on CR.



K. Lewis

ER will determine the cost to build one more flight SAFER.

05/18/00: Assigned. ECD 06/16/00.

06/22/00: New ECD: TBD.

06/29/00: XA requests that ER look into getting a contractor to build another flight SAFER.

07/13/00: New ECD: 9/30/00.

10/26/00: No response from ER. Closed.


E. Darcy

F. Davies

Provide a work instruction for inspection of incoming electrical parts.

08/03/00: Assigned. ECD 09/11/00.

08/17/00: New ECD: 09/01/00.

09/07/00: New ECD: TBD.

09/14/00: Work instruction is in review with ER management.

09/21/00: New ECD: 10/26/00.

09/26/00: New ECD: 11/02/00. FIAR will be re-opened if action is not closed by 11/02/00.


K. Lewis

Provide a ROM on the following new latches:

1 — set of Class I tower latches

3 — sets of Class III tower latches

08/17/00: Assigned. ECD TBD.

09/07/00: New ECD: 09/14/00.

09/28/00: New ECD: 10/05/00.

09/26/00: New ECD: 11/02/00. Close on 11/02/00 if no response is received from ER.


K. Lewis

A. Knight

ER/Kevin Lewis and USA/Armon Knight need to develop a fitcheck plan for STS-97 (4A).


08/24/00: Assigned. ECD 09/07/00.

09/07/00: A fitcheck plan for STS-97 (4A) will be determined after the fitchecks for STS-92 have been completed.

10/19/00: USA stated that PLSSs 3011, 3013, and 3016 will be available for fit checking with flight SAFERs the week of 11/06/00-11/10/00. ER will deliver the SAFER S/Ns 1005, 1007, and 1006 (ground spare) by 11/06/00. New ECD: 11/6/00. (Note that 1005, 1006, and 1007 had already been fitchecked with 3011 and 3013 previously. Hence, only fitchecks with 3016 are necessary).

10/26/00: Fitchecks with PLSS 3016 will be performed the week of 11/06/00-11/10/00. Closed.


E. Darcy

EP management will meet with NX, ER, EV, and SR&QA to decide what needs to be done to certify the —305 battery for 100 missions.

09/21/00: Assigned. ECD 10/06/00.

10/12/00: NX, ER, EV, and SR&QA met on 10/05/00 to determine the 100 mission certification criteria of the —305 battery. EP agreed to add a current limiting resistor to the —305 battery gauge board design. EP will present the 100 mission certification criteria to the panel on TBD.

10/19/00: EP will submit a CR to add the current limiting resistor to the battery gauge design. New ECD: TBD.

10/26/00: ER is solely responsible for all actions required to obtain the full certification of the battery. Closed.


K. Lewis

ER will recommend a redesign of the captive fasteners that will provide a permanent solution to the problems of lost fasteners.

09/28/00: Assigned. ECD TBD. 10/12/00: New ECD: 11/12/00.

10/26/00: ER is solely responsible for the FIAR permanent closure. Closed.


A. Knight

USA will set up a meeting to discuss the transfer of battery fabrication to USA.

09/28/00: Assigned. ECD 10/04/00.

10/26/00: USA to work with EP outside the Panel. Closed.


E. Darcy

EP will present the reduced battery acceptance test requirement (from lesson learned on s/n 1028) to the EHB for information.

09/28/00: Assigned. ECD 10/25/00.

10/26/00: EP will present the reduced battery acceptance test requirement at the 11/01/00 EHB. If not presented on 11/01/00, then action will be transferred to the EHB for closure.


K. Lewis

Determine if a CHIT would be helpful in assisting the crewmembers to determine whether the quarter-turn fastener holding the inhibit plug in place is loose and what corrective action is necessary if it is found to be loose.

10/12/00: Assigned. ECD TBD.

10/26/00: ER sent a memo to DX on 10/14/00. Closed.


K. Vassigh

R. Cook

DX and NC will present a recommendation on how to document damage to sliders from EVA tools.

10/12/00: Assigned. ECD TBD.

10/26/00: NC recommended documenting the damaged to the sliders with a DR. Closed.


K. Lewis

ER will update the SAFER Verification Matrix for both configurations —307 and —309.

10/12/00: Assigned. ECD TBD.

10/26/00: New ECD: 11/22/00. Transfer to EVA Tools Panel.


G. Morgan

K. Lewis

Provide the Launch/Landing Bag configuration for STS-106, STS-101 and STS-96.

Review and compare the configurations to determine how this affects the way the SAFER would experience vibration within the Launch/Landing Bag.

10/12/00: Assigned. ECD TBD.

10/26/00: New ECD: 11/02/00. To be closed if not performed by 11/02/00. Troubleshooting is ER’s responsibility.


G. Morgan

Schedule a fit check of the SAFER (SAFER S/N 1005 or the Cert. Unit) to the STS-106 foam.

10/12/00: Assigned. ECD TBD.

10/26/00: Fitcheck with STS-106 cushion to troubleshoot for FIAR closure is ER’s responsibility. Closed.


K. Lewis

Draft a CR to use Kapton tape and/or flight bag for SAFER spare battery stowage for STS-97 (4A).

10/12/00: Assigned. ECD TBD.

CR # 0894 has been drafted to use the Kapton tape for STS-97. Closed.


C. Mooty

Prepare an additional ROM for Class I tower latch acceptance testing.

10/12/00: Assigned. ECD 10/26/00.

10/26/00: HSMS provided XA with an additional ROM on 10/25/00. Closed.


SpaceRef staff editor.