Transcript of NASA Press Conference with Bob Daugherty and Mark Shuart (Part 2)
TELEPHONE CALLER: My question is for Bob.
As far as future space missions go and after reading the e-mails, I got the sense that you were concerned that you were not being — or the e-mails were not being taken seriously. When you hesitate in offering any other advice pertaining to any other future space missions after this?
MR. DAUGHERTY: Great question, and, you know, I guess the perception that I didn’t think my e-mails were being taken seriously, I frankly don’t know where that came from. I thought my e-mails were absolutely taken seriously by the EMAX folks, absolutely taken seriously, and so the answer to the second part was no, I wouldn’t hesitate in the least to do exactly the same thing because I felt good about our interaction.
MR. SHUART: This is Mark.
What I want to add to that is, in fact, earlier in the week when I found out that Bob was having some questions coming to him from the folks down at JSC, I asked him to keep me in the loop in the e-mails and things like that as to what was going on. I can assure you that everything that Bob Daugherty was sending was taken seriously by me and those above me.
TELEPHONE CALLER: To follow up, if the investigation finds that the cause for the disaster does have something to do with any of the suggestions you made, how will you react to the findings?
MR. DAUGHERTY: Well, you know, frankly, since these weren’t a prediction of what might happen — I had absolutely no foreknowledge, no reason to believe the analysis was wrong, whether it was right or wrong. So, if it just so happens that some of these “what if” scenarios happens to, you know, be anywhere in the ball park of what the board decides the problem — you know, concludes the problem was — and they will decide and conclude what the problem was — frankly I don’t see a link between the two.
MR. HENRY: Dale Dodding with WDC Norfolk.
TELEPHONE CALLER: Thank you, Keith. Can you hear me?
MR. HENRY: Yes.
TELEPHONE CALLER: A question regarding the research into the tiles and in-flight repairs. I seem to recall a recent local story where a retired researcher from Langley was being called back to look at research they had done in the ’70s and ’80s about the potential for in-flight repairs of damaged tiles, a period that was discarded I guess then as impractical and not very easy to carry out without EVAs and that sort of thing. Is there a look being given now to the possibility of in-flight repairs of tiles get knocked off during takeoff?
MR. SHUART: Dale, this is Mark Shuart. Let me answer that one because I am the one who asked Blan Stein [ph] who worked on the on-orbit repair work quite some time ago to please just gather some information for me so I would know what it was that we had done in the past.
By the way, there were a lot of folks that looked at several different concepts, not just people here at Langley, how to do on-orbit repair, and we are really not to that point where we are going to go anywhere with that information at this time.
TELEPHONE CALLER: Just one quick follow-up, is there research being done on a next-generation heat protection? Is there something beyond the tiles that have been used all these years that might be in the pipeline for future spacecraft?MR. SHUART: This is Mark again.
In fact, we do have research that is going on, on what one might call advanced thermal protection systems. We have been looking for many years at metallic thermal protection systems as well as looking at new concepts where the structures themselves are able to better withstand the heat without having thermal protection systems by themselves that absorb it.
TELEPHONE CALLER: Thank you.
MR. HENRY: Thank you, Dale.
WAVI TV, you are still on the list. Do you have a question?
TELEPHONE CALLER: No question. Thank you. No question. Thank you.
MR. HENRY: How about WTKR Norfolk?
TELEPHONE CALLER: No question. Thank you.
MR. HENRY: All right. Seth with Knight-Ridder.
TELEPHONE CALLER: Thank you, Keith.
This is for Bob. It is a two-parter. You talked about how this is to prepare them for “what if” situations, you know, if a situation occurs while they are in mission control, and, yet, when we talked to Teflin [ph] and Leroy Kane [ph], no one in the flight control area have this. The flight control directors didn’t have any of your documents during reentry. So doesn’t that kind of point to the fact that they weren’t taking you seriously, that they didn’t have your list of “what if” possibilities with them during real time?
And the second part of that is: Were you aware of the John Cowell [ph] e-mail which said that the analysis is giving a false sense of security on the thermal analysis?
MR. DAUGHERTY: Okay, thanks. Regarding the first part of that question, I believe they were prepared in the sense that they had to set up these e-mails, and I think if you go look at the press conference that Kling and others made, you will hear them say that they did have the results of our e-mail discussions with them in case they did have to make some decisions in real time. So it sounds to me like they were as prepared as they could be.
TELEPHONE CALLER: But not —
MR. DAUGHERTY: I am getting some feedback.
I was aware of John Cowell’s e-mails. That was one of the first set of e-mails that I received on Monday.
TELEPHONE CALLER: And did that disturb you?
MR. DAUGHERTY: Sorry. Again, I am having a lot of echoes.
Did it disturb me?
TELEPHONE CALLER: Mm-hmm.
MR. DAUGHERTY: No, I wouldn’t say it was disturbing. It simply told me in terms, you know, this is an unusual problem, difficult to get your arms around, and that there are a lot of people working hard on it. Certainly, there are differing opinions out there, and that is what you really need. If everybody has got the same opinion, you are going to miss something.
TELEPHONE CALLER: Is it fair to say that you don’t often have someone of Doug Dwoyer level mentioning the possibility of bringing something up to Bill Ready?
MR. DAUGHERTY: I would say that Doug — I have a lot of conversations with Doug, as you might expect. Sometimes he talked about moving things up to an associate administrator. Often, it is another one besides Bill Ready, but this was one that it is not unusual for Doug to make suggestions that where some information, if want to pursue it, ought to go.
TELEPHONE CALLER: Thank you.
MR. HENRY: Seth, I especially want to ask you now that you are done to mute your phone. Thank you. You have done well so far. Thank you, Seth.
Jeff Smith from The Washington Post.
TELEPHONE CALLER: Hi, Bob. Bob, what did you mean by “getting information is like the plague,” and also, with regard to the simulations, was there some resistance to doing the simulations? Could you explain what that was and why?
MR. DAUGHERTY: Good question. The comment about “getting information like the plague,” first of all, it was toward — between friends, and I tend to be a little more colorful when I am with my friends.
Again, it was frustration in a sense because there were simulations already going on and approved that were, in a sense, very similar to what we were after, but different enough that we couldn’t just jump in, in the middle of the astronaut training that was going on.
Again, I always want to get the information I am after immediately. So there was some frustration there about getting that information, and that comment was truly very specific just to the issue of trying to get the simulation runs.
Even though I mentioned it was, quote, “the wrong question,” if you did find yourself getting to a runway, if you did have problems with flat tires, we definitely wanted to be able to have that information and pass it along. So that is not a NASA-wide comment. It was directly referring to trying to get a few simulation runs.
And there was no resistance whatsoever at AIMS [ph]. They were very, very cooperative, very professional. It is just that we had not planned on getting such simulation runs when they set up the simulation schedule.
TELEPHONE CALLER: Well, I have to say that to a layman, when you say “getting information is like the plague,” it does sound as if there is some resistance to the idea, taking on additional information or doing additional research. I am still having trouble understanding. You are saying, your statement, there was no resistance?
MR. DAUGHERTY: Yeah. All I can say is, again, it was sort of the way I talked to my engineering buddies, and, frankly, I understand the difficulty with interpreting that, but that is kind of why we are talking today, to try to clear that up as best we can.
You know, the guys at AIMS, again, they were very receptive. I don’t want to paint them as unreceptive at all, but, again, when you break a training schedule, that is a big deal, and this was a couple of engineers wanting some information on the side. So, even though I was frustrated, I absolutely understood that you can’t just jump in the middle of things.
TELEPHONE CALLER: The initial answer from AIMS was that they couldn’t do it and then that was overcome?
MR. DAUGHERTY: No. It is just that these were simulations that had not been discussed prior when the entire SIMS [ph] schedule had been sent up. So, in a sense, these are unapproved, and you don’t just run around doing unapproved SIMS without a good reason. They are certainly not displacing the approved simulation schedule.
TELEPHONE CALLER: Can I ask you a question for Mr. Shuart without taking too much time?
MR. HENRY: Go ahead.
TELEPHONE CALLER: Mr. Shuart, is there another occasion in which e-mails like this have passed in and out of Langley during a flight and these has been some question about raising the issue to someone at the level of Mr. Ready? Is this an unprecedented event?
MR. SHUART: This was the first time it has happened that I know of.
TELEPHONE CALLER: Thank you.
MR. HENRY: Warren Leary, I assume you are still in a listening mode, but, Edward Wong, did you want to ask a question, from the New York Times?
[No response.]
MR. HENRY: Any question from the New York Times.
TELEPHONE CALLER: Yeah, I’m right here. Sort of following up on that last question, if this was the first time that that happened, can you explain in particular why this was the first time and whether in your opinion that that should have — because it was the first time, it should have gained more prominence and consideration?
MR. DAUGHERTY: The folks down at JSC, I am sure, will call whoever they feel like they need whenever an issue comes up and they want to discuss things.
I essentially sent something through my organization asking if we had ever gotten calls in the past, just in anticipation of a question like this, and what I heard back was that we never have been contacted during a mission. We often talk with the folks down there about shuttle issues, but this was the first time we had ever been discussed during an issue, during a mission.
Now, whether or not — I didn’t say that just because it is the first time that we ought to treat it sometimes special. It is an engineering issue. It was something that we felt like we needed to deal with. It looked like it was being handled appropriately.
TELEPHONE CALLER: Okay, thanks.
MR. HENRY: Ted Brytus from AP?
TELEPHONE CALLER: Can you hear me, gentlemen?
MR. DAUGHERTY: Yes.
TELEPHONE CALLER: For Mr. Daugherty, can you tell me to what extent you were familiar with the findings and any of the underlying support for the Boeing analysis at the time that Mr. Campbell made the phone call on January 27th?
And you have alluded to the phone call, but can you describe kind of the tone and content of exactly what Mr. Campbell was seeking?
MR. DAUGHERTY: Okay, Ted. Prior to that phone call, I had not seen anything with regard to the analysis at all. Mr. Campbell did send me a couple e-mails that I guess you can see in some of the e-mail traffic that has been released, and did forward me a couple of pitches on the debris analysis and so forth.
Now, as far as the analysis, I absolutely am not a tile expert nor a thermal analyst, really don’t have any expertise at all in that area. So, you know, with regard to the analysis, I, like anybody else who is not an expert, can simply read it and look at its findings.Carlyle and I talked at length about this issue, and we both agreed that not talking about whether we believed the analysis or not, what was a good prudent thing to do in the area of expertise that he and I are in, and that is, well, let’s play devil’s advocate, what if that analysis were wrong, what kind of issues could we add value to this situation.
TELEPHONE CALLER: Just to follow up, on the 27th as you ar doing this “what if” thing, you described the possibility in a conversational thread with Mr. Carlyle about a space walk, possibly going out looking at tile and that could possibly have caused any more damage than what we are already talking about, and that was in response to Mr. Carlyle’s note regarding the use of a spy telescope to get some DOD imaging. Were you aware at that point, and to your extent that you knew whether Mr. Carlyle was aware that NASA had days earlier withdrawn a sort of unofficial request for DOD imaging?
MR. DAUGHERTY: I do believe that Carlyle did mention that he had heard — and again, he is not a telescope guy nor am I. I do believe he mentioned that at this point in time, I hadn’t heard about all the prior traffic regarding the telescope, but I believe he mentioned that there at that point was not any telescope work being done, and he and I agreed that, you know, good engineering practice from our standpoint would be put your eyes on the problem. I mean, every engineer would think that as a lay person without having the knowledge about the analysis that the experts did.
So I would also say I am not an EBA expert, but sort of my generic engineering experience said, “Boy, it would be great to get your eyeballs on that problem,” and hence, the comment.
TELEPHONE CALLER: Okay. Thank you, gentlemen.
MR. HENRY: Okay. Leela Aboud, Wall Street Journal?
TELEPHONE CALLER: I will pass for now. Thanks.
MR. HENRY: Either Gwenith Shaw or Robin Siriano from the Orlando Sentinel.
TELEPHONE CALLER: It is Robin Siriano. Can you hear me?
MR. HENRY: Yes.
TELEPHONE CALLER: Bob, I guess I need to kind of go back to the beginning a little. Who is it, then, that called you from JSC? Was it Carlyle Campbell, and did you have discussions with anyone else at JSC beyond e-mails?
MR. DAUGHERTY: It was Carlyle that called me, and, again, we were friends and colleagues. And prior to the e-mail to David Lechner [ph], which you have seen, of course, Carlyle was it from JSC.
Notwithstanding one of the other — one and the other engineers at JSC who happened to be at AIMS, of course, we were talking about simulations with him.
TELEPHONE CALLER: And as far as phone calls?
MR. DAUGHERTY: Again, that was it until I had written that e-mail to David, and, of course, David called back thanking us for the input.
TELEPHONE CALLER: Since the accident, did someone from JSC contact you about the e-mails, or what happened after the accident occurred and all this interest in these e-mails came up?
MR. DAUGHERTY: Well, goodness, there hasn’t been any interest in the e-mails.
No. Really, since everybody has been so busy with the accident, other than talking to — you know, I continued to talk to Carlyle all the time, as we always do, but really haven’t had much phone traffic at all, or e-mail traffic, since then.
