The 8 O’clock Report – Alpha Health & Status June 20, 2001 (GMT 171/00:00)

When CAPCOM is talking to the crew in the SM, the ground hears an echo. The ground hears a repeat of their voice. The ISS audio system was configured with S/G 1, ATU Lab 1, ATU Lab2, and RSA 1 in Public Loop1 and S/G 2 ATU Lab 1, ATU Lab 2, and RSA 2 in Public 2. It is probable that the SM audio system was configured in a way that the voice was looped back down the S/G channel.

Forward plan for closure:

OCA_1578 US/RS Comm Configuration procedure was uplinked to the crew to give them an integrated audio config procedure and integrated audio diagram to help them understand the system better. CATO believes that the audio echo is a product of how the RSA1 and 2 lines are connected to SM comm panel 3 and 2 respectively. CATO also wrote OCA 1652 — S-band Troubleshooting. The crew due to a full timeline has not performed it. It will be performed post 5A.1. C&T wrote 7A Chit ISS0089 to perform on board troubleshooting. This IFI will be closed based on results of this chit. Investigation continues.

The VBSP went to self test when commanded to equipment self test, and the equipment self test status was active, Self test was terminated by issuing a deactivate equipment self test command. Upon termination equipment self test, the VBSP did not go to default configuration because it did not start in its default configuration (when the correct self test command is sent to the VBSP, it is expected to return to its default configuration). Currently, the command sent to initiate the VBSP self test command is INCORRECT (see PR15876). In all of our testing, we always ran the self test right after the box was initially powered up – i.e. started in the default configuration, and when it was sent the deactivate equipment self test command, it just returned to where it started. We suspect that’s all it’s doing now returning to the state it started in.

We believe this IFI should be closed because the software will be fixed at Flt 8A with the CCSR2 load. We could probably do some investigative testing at ISIL with the DVTM but we don’t believe that’s really worthwhile because we have a debugging plan referenced above, and the s/w will be fixed at Flt 8A and this won’t be an issue anymore.

When MCOR Activation & Check-out procedure was being performed; on step 7, MCOR had to shutdown due to over temp. MCOR was activated at approx. 101:23:02GMT (6:23 pm CST??). Two minutes later we received heartbeat indication.

Steps 1-6 were completed from the procedures flawlessly. Commands accepted, RT enabled, verification of default configuration and health, documented memory configuration, initiation of BIT test and verification of BIT results. At the step 7 (enabling recording of input channels 4 and 8), the overtemp indication flag came up and MCOR had to shutdown. It happened approximately 45 minutes after activation. Investigation continues. ART will come up with the rational to close this IFI ECD 6/08/2001.

Working with Russians / MER Moscow. This IFI Under Investigation.

As reported by CATO, a “Ku-Band Radiating Beyond Mask” warning was annunciated at GMT 2001/156:18:27:30. As expected the Ku-Band TRC was powered OFF. CATO RTPLOT indicates that TRC PLC went to “Normal” at 156:18:27:31. The Ku-Band PWRL was at -57 dBm when the PLC went to “Normal”. The TRC Xmit Output voltage was at 0 volts (therefore, we did not radiate within the protected Mask. CATO performed CAFN576, Ku-Band Radiating Beyond Mask Corrective Actions, in order to recover the Ku-Band TRC. Investigation continues.

An attempt was made to record and playback on VTR-1 but symptoms remained. Also, VTR-1 cannot playback a tape which VTR-2 can successfully playback. Currently, we think that VTR-1 record and playback capability is lost. A procedure is being considered to swap VTR-2 into VTR-1’s location to confirm that the CVIU for VTR-1 is working correctly. Since successful video can pass through VTR-1 to the downlink, it may not be necessary to perform a VTR swap/test. VTR-1 may have to be replaced during a future assembly mission.

Under Investigation

Samples of ITCS fluid were removed from the two operating ITCS loops during flights 5A, 5A.1, and 6A and returned to ground for analysis. The 5A samples showed no ammonia contamination. The 5A.1 samples had an ammonia concentration of 0.03 to 0.05 ppm (estimated due to this level being at the boundary of the detectable limit) in the low temperature (LTL), and the moderate temperature loop (MTL) was 0.09 ppm. The 6A samples have a 0.096 ppm, MTL; and a 0.142 ppm, LTL. The concern is that the trace amounts of ammonia contamination are being introduced to the fluid streams by a “micro-crack” or fissure within the single barrier interface heat exchanger (IHX). A “micro-leak” is not a catastrophic hazard to the crew. Threats to the hardware ( both internal and external) are unknown at this time. Once all possible sources of ammonia contamination are investigated, and if it is determined that the ammonia contamination is from an IHX, then the deficient heat exchanger will need to be removed and replaced by EVA operations. Presently, a spare IHX is stored in the USL. Procedures will have to be developed to remove and replace the IHX. Ammonia contamination in the ITCS fluid could come from: 1) sample bag material/contamination; 2) cabin atmosphere; 3) ground laboratory processing; 4) microbial activity; and/or 5) interface heat exchanger “micro-leak”. A team of engineers/scientists has been formed under the leadership of Cynthia Cross (JSC-EC) and Steve Daugherty (Boeing Active Thermal Control Team). The team consists of representatives from System Safety, Materials & Processes, and Engineering, with specialists in fracture control, chemistry, and fluid hydraulics. A detailed plan is being formulated to investigate potential sources of ammonia contamination. Samples will be taken and returned to ground for analysis at 7A and 7A.1 for trend analysis. It is noted that the quantities of ammonia contamination are “trace” amounts. The ITCS soft materials were tested at an 8.87% ammonia solution by weight ( Reference: Test Report Nonmetallic Material Compatibility with Ammonia , issued by Materials and processes laboratory, Marshall Space Flight Center, date: 10/96) for time periods of 30 and 60 days with all materials in contact with the ITCS fluid showing no significant degradation. 05/30/01: JSC is currently investigating (designing and funding) a test with ITCS fluid in a FEP sample bag to confirm the adequacy of the bag material in preventing ammonia from being absorbed from the cabin atmosphere. Investigation Continues.

Power was removed from the ESP-1 secondary heaters at 2001/116:15:51 and they were left off until it was discovered on day 147. ESP-1 houses a spare PFCS and a spare DSCU. During flight 6A, NCS control was lost and RACU 6 was power cycled at 2001/116:15:51 to remove and reapply power to the N1-1 MDM in an attempt to regain NCS control. The RACU 6 power cycle caused power bus N1RS1 and all its loads to lose power. The 6A N1RS1 Power Bus Repower procedure was missing the ESP heater load on RPCM N1RS1-B RPC 4. Consequently, the ESP-1 secondary heaters were left off until it was discovered on day 147. Also during flight 6A, due to bad NCS data, the DDCU Z1-3B had an NCS software initiated trip at 2001/117:02:13. This caused power to be removed from power buses N13B and N1RS2 and all their loads. The 6A N13B Power Bus Repower procedure was missing the ESP heater load on RPCM N13B-A RPC 3. Consequently, the ESP primary heaters were left off until it was discovered on day 147. ART provided thermal analysis indicating PFCS violated acceptance and qual test levels ( lowest PFCS calculated temp was -72 F vs accep/qual limits of -45 F / -65 F ). Lowest calculated DCSU temp was -57 F vs. accep/qual limits of -45 F / -65 F. Issue transitioned to the SPRT for recommendation regarding R&R of these components.

Lab window cover was left open during Soyuz docking. Subsequent inspection suggested possible contamination. Further inspection was requested. The