Status Report

The 8 O’clock Report – Alpha Health & Status June 20, 2001 (GMT 171/00:00)

By SpaceRef Editor
June 20, 2001
Filed under , ,

The 8 O’clock Report

Alpha Health & Status

June 20, 2001 (GMT 171/00:00)

(The information highlighted in blue is update to yesterday’s report)

Overall Alpha System Status:


Russian Segment:


  • FGB Batteries- Incomplete Charge Mode

  • NO FGB Batteries in cycle mode

  • FGB battery 1 and 2 OFF

  • FGB RACU-6 is ON

  • SM Batteries – Incomplete Charge Mode

  • SM ARCU 23 ON

  • SM Batteries in Incomplete Charge Mode

  • SM Battery 6 Off

  • SM Battery 4 in cycle mode


  • Both channels fully operational

  • BGA 2B and 4B in Rate Mode

  • PCU 1 in Standby; PCU 2 in Discharge



Russian Segment:

  • Vozdukh – ON

  • Elektron — OFF

  • CKB-1 – OFF

  • [CPBK] – ON

  • БМП – On purification

Air Duct ПХО – ON

Air Duct ПРК — ON

  • RSOS Smoke detectors


  • FGB All Nominal


  • Cabin Fan – On

  • Aft Port IMV Fan ON

  • Aft Port, Fwd Port & Stbd IMV valves Open

  • SD-1 Enabled

  • SD-2 — Enabled, recovered

  • Stbd Hatch PPRV CAPPED

  • Cabin Pressure FDIR – Inhibited

  • FWD, AFT Hatches open

  • RAMV — Enabled


  • PCA: LAB PCA in Monitor, PPR Enabled

  • Rapid depress FDIR Enabled

  • IMV: AFT Valves open;

  • Aft Port Fan – ON;

  • Fwd Stbd Vlv – CLOSED;

  • Fwd Stbd Fan – OFF;

  • SD-PD1 Enabled

  • SD-D6 Enabled

  • SD-SD5 Enabled

  • SD-D4 Enabled

  • ARS: MCA is in IDLE – pump out required

  • LAB1S6 CCAA is off.

  • LAB1P6 CCAA is on.

  • CDRA-OFF (State-Failed)

  • D6 AAA-ON;

  • D4 AAA-ON

  • WRM: Initialized No Vent State

  • VS-VES – VES Inhibited & Vent vlv Closed

  • VS-VRS – VRS Inhibited & Vent vlv Closed

  • TCCS — ON

  • Aft Hatch Open

Payload Racks:

  • LAB1O2 AAA ON, SD Enabled

  • LAB1O1 AAA ON, SD Enabled

  • LAB1S2 AAA Off, SD Inhibited




Crew Support Group (CSG)

  • SSC 6A Network Reconfiguration complete

  • MACE Silo 1 test & checkout complete

Motion Control Group (MCG)

  • Att Control Mode: Thrusters Attitude Hold

  • Attitude: TEA is LVLH [(-10), (-7),0]

  • Propellant (fuel and oxidizer) was transferred today from Progress to FGB tanks, 170/08:10-08:31.


Russian Segment:

  • FGB external loop НГК 1 ON


  • SM КОБ 2 (4СПН2 -ON)

  • KOX1 — OFF



  • EETCS Loops A & B running on A pumps with FCV control enabled.

  • EETCS Loop A and B PFCS Line Heater 1 & 2 CLC Enabled.

  • IATCS is in Dual Mode with elevated LTL set-point.


Russian Segment:

  • ЦВМ: ЦВМ 1,2,3 Operating

  • [ТВМ]: 1 Operating. [ТВМ]-3 dropped out of the set @GMT 066/04:52:47 [ТВМ]-2 dropped out @ GMT162/15:50

  • FGB MDM: FGB-2 ON/FGB-1 Off


  • C&C3: primary (7A config), C&C1: backup (7A config), C&C2: Standby (7A config)

  • INT: INT-1 Operating/INT-2 OFF

  • N1-2 Primary/N1-1 Secondary

  • PV MDM: 4B Prime/2B Wait

  • GNC: GNC-2 Primary/GN&C-1 Backup

  • LA: LA-1, LA-2 & LA-3 operating

  • PMCU: PMCU-1 Operating/PMCU-2 OFF

  • PL: PL-1 Operating/ PL/CC MDM in PL-2 slot

  • APS-1, APS-2, PEHG-1 Operating

  • PEHG-2 off


Russian Segment:

  • Komparus IFM activities have been completed and system checkout activities from MCC-M are continuing.


  • S-Band is operating nominally in High Data Rate Mode.

  • Audio System performance is nominal.

  • Video Subsystem — VTR 1 is inoperative.

  • Ku-band is operating nominal with the auto track software patch in use.



Completed Maintenance Tasks:

Russian Segment:

FGB Smoke Detectors 1,3,4 & 5 replaced.

  • SM Battery — 2 Changed out and functioning


Designated Maintenance Items (DMIs):

Russian Segment:

SM ПТАБ —6: Failed — Battery 2 inserted, slot 6 is Nonfunctional


Node 1

P/TV—Hasselblad Camera



– Sorbent Bed

AR Rack MCA:

– Mass Spectrometer Analyzer

    • Data Control Assembly



– Base LEE Camera Light



  • Lab Cradle Assembly (LCA) Heaters 1 & 2 Enabled

Completed S&M Tasks:

  • ELPS NOD1P1/P4/D0 installed


LAB RWS – Active

CUP RWS – Backup

SSRMS Prime String – Off (but powered)

SSRMS Redundant String – Operational (with version 3 of the patched diagnostic s/w)

All 4 VDUs are ON

The Redundant String is being left Operational between crew sessions for troubleshooting purposes.




Visiting Vehicles:

  • 2S docked on FGB Nadir

  • Progress 4 docked SM Aft

Last 24 Hour activities:

ISS Crew

  • 7A Mission Overview [Complete]

  • TVIS 6 Month Maintenance [Complete]

  • SM TBC (TV System) КУ110-120 Assembly [In Work]

  • Progress O2 Repress

  • PAO Event [Postponed, Crew used time to provide ground with video status report]



  • HRF Gasmap

  • Daily status checks

  • Task List (may be done at any convenient time)

    1. EXPCS file transfer [Complete]

    2. 6A-XFR-Questionair


    4. MACE II

    5. CEO-Obs

    6. CMS-RED-Cal

    7. CMS-TVIS Weekly-MNT

    8. CMS-EVA-Assessment

    9. HMS-FFQ

    10. NOD1S4 K-bar Instl

    11. NOD1D0 ELPS Instl [Complete]

    12. NOD1P3 Seal Repair

    13. LAB ELPS Inspect

* Payload activities involving Crew interaction. Other payloads are untended (except status checks) and not listed here. Task List items are not listed in priority order.


Upcoming Events at a Glance:

  • Flight 7A launch has been scheduled for July 12, 2001. Flight 7A.1 has been scheduled for NET August 5, 2001.

  • Trajectory Status

Time: 06/19/01 170/12:30:00 GMT

  • Ha x Hp: 393 x 368 km

  • Have: 381 km

  • Beta Angle: 6 deg (magnitude decreasing)

  • Decay Rate: ~300 meters/day


Non-Prop Consumables (US-Calculated values) as of Friday 06-15-01:




Predicted Rate

Contingency Redline [a]


ТГК canisters


3 units/day/3 crew


8 days

Oxygen Gas

0 lbm

5.3 lbm/day/3 crew

N/A [b]

0 days

Russian LiOH


1.04 cans/day/3 crew

9 [b]

13 days



1.50 cans/day/3 crew

9 [b] 

Potable water

2091 lbm

6 lbm/day/3 crew [c]

270 lbm [c]

303 days [c]

Technical water

1336 lbm

8.6 lbm/day/3 crew [c]

387 lbm [c]

110 days [c]

USOS Condensate

104 lbm

(a) Basic 45 Day Skip Cycle Requirement.

(b) Skip cycle requirement exemption due to availability of spare parts for Elektron and Vozdukh. Basic requirement of 15 days of LiOH capability.

(c) Remaining quantity is based on reported on-orbit water, on predicted usage rate, and on performance of water reclamation systems. The water usage rates used in predicting on-orbit Nominal Capability are documented in ISS-4A / STS-97 CHIT 211 but are under assessment for revision. The current totals do not include 463 lbs of Rodnik water (Potable), 79 lbs of RS Condensate (Technical) and 102 lbs of EDV water (Unknown).

Propulsive Consumables as of 06-14-01


Current Altitude:



135 Day Alt:



Total FGB Prop Avail



Total SM Prop Avail



Total Progress Prop Avail



Total Prop Avail



Skip Cycle Prop



Priority 1&2 Prop



Skip Cycle Margin



Priority 1&2 Margin






Priority 1 Propellant

Next Docking Attempt








135 Days to 150 nmi


135 Days of Att Cntl


1 m/s COLA burn




Total Priority 1 Prop


Priority 2 Propellant

Altitude Maintenance


Attitude Control


Shuttle Docking


Total Priority 2 Prop


Priority 3 Propellant

Skip Cycle



Adj. Skip Cycle



Total Priority 3 Prop


Priority 4 Propellant

Science Budget



Open Items for Investigation (IFIs)

(IFI status will be updated every Monday and changes will be reflected on Tuesday’s report in highlighted blue. Newly opened IFIs will be reported on daily basis in highlighted blue)



  • C&DH – (MER-0368)- C&C 3 MSD Inaccessible

During 6A on GMT 119/19:08:50, C&C3 was moded into Primary in response to a number of "MSD Inaccessible" flags being received from C&C2. C&C3 later malfunctioned, dropping telemetry and communication with the ISS. C&C2 was later brought up as primary. The C&C3 MSD was changed out and has been fully operational since. Investigation continues.


  • C&DH – (MER-0408) — PCS Reboots and Disconnects

Crew Reports that both PCS’ they are using have occasional spontaneous reboots and disconnects from the bus. PCS Log files have been dumped and are being analyzed by PCS team. CHIT ISS-0305 has been opened. The lack of CCS data makes it is impossible to troubleshoot further.

C&DH – (MER-0416) — N1-1 MDM Power Cycle

ODIN completed load of INTSYS version 39 software to INT-1 MDM, then transitioned INT-2 to standby in preparation to bring INT-1 on as primary. While both INTs were in standby, a loss of comm with N1-1 was reported by N1-2 and CCS. N1-2 performed a power cycle of N1-1 and N1-1 returned to a nominal state as secondary node MDM. INT-1 is operating nominally with INTSYS version 39. INT-2 is in standby with version 38 still loaded. Several RPC’s appear to have changed states during this event. PRACA PR# 2707 was generated to specifically track this issue.

  • C&DH – (MER-0424) — Payload MDM PAR PLMMDM1-SW-0005

A loss of Payload Health & Status (H&S) Data, Broadcast Ancillary Data, and Payload Ancillary Data from the PLMDM-1 via KU-Band occurred at GMT 158:10:15. Indications were that the HRDL Card on the PLMDM-1 had locked up and stopped processing data.

To recover the lost Ku-Band data a reset of the HRDL card was commanded and after an eight-minute wait, ODIN reported seeing the card resetting. As a follow up a HRL reset was commanded but a failure code "command function unavailable" was received. This indicates that the HRDL card received the command but could not execute it since it was non-operational. Per SPNs 15580 and 18649 the PL MDM HRDL Control State telemetry may be invalid during a HRDL reset and the HRDL reset does not always execute successfully. To recover from the failed HRDL reset the PL MDM power was cycled. The recycle was successful and the PL MDM fully recovered. All racks and payloads that were operational prior to this anomaly were successfully restarted and functioning nominally. POIC then successfully commanded the transfer of Payload Ancillary Data via Ku-Band. Cause of the original PL MDM HRDL lock up is still under investigation

  • C&DH – (MER-0432) — PL MDM Crash

Sequence of Events:

1. GMT 2001/164:22:40:38, the POIC requested a downlink of the Payload MDM Events Log via Ku-band.

2. GMT 2001/164:22:41:50, the PL-1 MDM transitioned to Diagnostics Mode with the UAS Reported Hard Fail bit in BST A word 2 set.

3. GMT 2001/164:22:43:10 the Primary C&C MDM performed a retry on PL-1 which power-cycled the MDM and brought it back as the Backup PL MDM.

4. GMT 2001/164:22;47:19 the PL MDM was brought back to Operational State and switched to the logical Primary MDM. No further failures were seen.

5. Dumps of the PL-1 Error Ring Buffer and the CCS Command logs were performed.

Analysis of dumps from the PL MDM indicate that the MDM transitioned to diagnostics due to a task overrun. Specific cause of the task overrun is still under investigation.


  • EPS- (MER-0326) – High resistance on SM Solar Array Generator #3 Power Cable

The SM Power specialists reported that after analyzing the data obtained during the SM Solar Array Generator test on GMT 2001/093, they suspect that some cables or a part of the solar array/current regulator circuitry may be damaged. This assessment is PRELIMINARY. They will have to further analyze the data and possibly perform more tests to have a complete understanding of the problem. More data will be available as the SM power specialists provide it.

Significance to vehicle: Degraded power production capability in the SM.

Significance to operation: The degree of degradation has not been determined yet, but is not currently impacting SM nominal operations. Further investigation is underway by the Russians. Closure is currently under evaluation for the Russian Anomaly. PRACA PR# 2712 was generated to document this issue.

  • EPS — (MER-0405) – PCU Abnormal Transition to Shut Down Mode

On GMT 138/0603, PCU1 was transitioned from Standby with tubes at ~0mmHg to Shutdown. The process was expected to take 4-5 hours, as Latch Valve 1 Closes, Latch 2 Opens, and the gas between (initially at tank pressure) needs to bleed down to less than 1400mmHg (27PSI) before Latch Valve 2 Re-Closes. The expected tube pressure profile was that the pressure would remain at 2500mmHg (50PSI) for roughly 4 hours, then the pressure would exponentially decay to 0mmHg. Latch Valve 1 closed as expected and telemetry confirmed. Latch Valve2 opened, but closed within 10 seconds; the downstream pressure increased to ~2000mmHg (39PSI) confirming the valve did open, but we did not get telemetry feedback that the valve had opened (0.1Hz Tlm). Additionally, the ~2000mmHg was not the expected pressure, as the regulator regulates to approximately 2500mmHg (50PSI). The pressure began the exponential drop to 0 immediately. Analysis of the firmware shows that during the shutdown routine, valve 2 is commanded open, and the line pressure is checked immediately after. The valve has not had sufficient time to open, and therefore the pressure is less than the 27PSI set point. The valve is then commanded closed, without depressurizing the line between the two valves If it is desired to depressurize the line between the two valves, then the following procedure may be used: Command the PCU into Manual Mode, command valve 2 open, wait until the pressure drops below 27 PSI, then reclose valve 2. Power may then be removed from the PCU, or it may be recommended into Shutdown Mode. Safety to recommend a PRACA or a Firmware PR for this issue. Firmware does not properly execute the shutdown function. This is considered a known condition with an operational workaround. Safety to recommend a PRACA or a Firmware PR for this issue. Once tracking paper has been initiated, close this IFI

  • EPS — (MER-0423) – SM ZRU (EPS String) #6 Failure

On GMT 140 Russian EPS specialists noticed that the SM Battery 6 had stopped charging and discharging, so they disconnected ZRU #6. Troubleshooting repeated the problem on GMT 144:17:52. Russian EPS specialists believe the PTAB #6 has failed and will need to be replaced. PRACA PR# 2708 was generated to specifically document this issue.


  • VI — (MER-0335) – MCA Error Code 33

At GMT 2001/104:10:43:39, a Zero Cal of the MCA was initiated. It was completed at GMT 2001/104:11:01:59. Subsequent to the Zero Cal and during a break in data between GMT 2001/104:11:09:35 and GMT 2001/104:11:11:009:55, the MCA failed passive BIT Filament (Error Code 33). This condition sends the MCA to STOP with an automatic restart. The MCA performed a successful Active BIT during STARTUP and came up to STANDBY. MOD dumped the MCA data associated with this and it looked fine (No FAIL indication; No C&W indication). BIT Fault data showed nothing. MOD placed the MCA back to OPERATE and it performed satisfactorily. This incident occurred when the Station was away from the South Atlantic Anomaly but during a period of high solar activity. Orbital Science (vendor for the MCA) reported that in the MCA ORU 2 (the MCA part of the MCA) there is a voltage/frequency converter that has a slight susceptibility to EMI. Orbital is concerned that this item may be the reason for the problems experienced by that ORU.

Occurred again at GMT 113/08:07. Same Signature, same status changes. Same nominal start-up after. High Solar activity also noted at this time.

Occurred again at GMT 114/18:55. Similar signature. This caused Brief shutdown of U.S. Element capability to measure O2, N2, CO2, H2O, H2, and CH4. 06/30/01: Plan is to replace MCA electrometer and electronics unit This addresses both problems (MCA electrometer saturation and EMI problems thought to have caused MCA shutdowns). Problem is believed to be leakage through swaged joints on FRIT (flow restrictor). MCA currently operating nominally on filament #2. Indications are that trend toward saturation has slowed significantly, perhaps stopped. Cause of problem either:

(1) Software thinking it has a problem with the filament (caused by EMI, South Atlantic Anomaly or solar flares).

(2) The buildup of oxidized metal in the ion pump; periodically flakes of this oxidized metal will break off and float into the ion beam and cause a reading that exceeds the limit and causes the MCA to shutdown.

For Cause (1) above, the solution would be to change the ion pump current limit.

For Cause (2) above, the solution would be a design change of a circuit card and a change out of the ORU. PRACA PR# 2681 has been generated.

  • VI — (MER-0386) — FOD in CPA Connectors

Report from 6A crew debrief:

When reinstalling the Nadir CPAs, specifically when removing the caps from the cable or CPA connectors (they don’t remember which), they noted at least two “EMI tabs” floated out of the connectors. These were very small (1 – 2 mm across) C-shaped pieces of metal. Crew thought they were broken off from an EMI-ring that goes on every connector (?). They captured two, put them on a piece of tape, photographed them, and put them in the “Lost & Found” zip lock bag. No operational impact, possible safety impact during demate due to FOD. Crew should wear eye protection during cable demate. PRACA #2702 has been generated.

  • VI – (MER-0381) – PVCA Numeric Constraint – Invalid Orbit Elapsed Time

On 127/06:38, a Numeric Constraint C&W was set. Data dump of the C&W associated data revealed the following:

5/7/01: The Numeric Constraint bits indicated two procedures have triggered the Numeric Constraint since the last time the associated data was reset. The two are Cmd Validation and Orbit Elapse Time. The Cmd Validation is an expected cause whenever a beta angle of 359.99- 360.00 is sent to the BGA (SPN 18844/1112). The second one has not been seen before. It occurs and is handled within the Determine Orbit Elapse Time procedure. No other algorithms are skipped at a result of this Numeric Constraint. The cause of the problem is tied to the Orbit Elapse Time holding at 6000 for a long time. If the difference between the current time and the Internal Base Start Time (what PVCA believes is the last sunrise) is greater than the defined type range (duration type, S18F14), the error will occur. The largest value the type would hold is 131,072 which is almost 22 orbits. Preliminary data shows the Orbit Elapse Time has been stuck at 6000 for about 24 hours. The Numeric Constraint will stop occurring when the Orbit Elapse Time resets to zero. The Last Orbit Targets Blind mode may not operate correctly, due to the Orbit Elapsed Time It is advisable to not use Autotrack BGA Mode, as the corresponding Blind Mode may not work. clock not counting correctly. It was recommended to PHALCON to place the 2B array in Rate Mode (was in Autotrack) and change the blind mode to Rate. 4B is in Directed Position, which is OK. Investigation:

5/8/01: Data dumps of various locations in the PVCA Memory were performed to give details of the Orbit Elapsed Time function:


1) The data dumped from PVCUs confirm that the Base Start Time used in the Orbit Elapsed Time calculation is not getting updated properly. The last rise acknowledged by the Orbit Elapsed Time (OET)

calculation was May 5 18:15:14. The calculated (once a second) difference between the Base Start Time and current time is causing the persistent numeric constraint error.

2) The Rise and Set time appear to be updating correctly. Although, a comparison of ODRC values for

Rise/Set from GNC/C&C do not match Rise/Set values dumped from PVCU. They are off by 15 and 23 seconds, respectively. Very puzzling. However, since the Rise and Set times are updating, we can conclude that the Sunlight Status is correctly being determined. Only the Orbit Elapse Time (and those that use it) is affected.

3) The dump of the backup PVCU provided similar data. Both set of dumped data indicated the dumps occurred after a sunrise and before a sunset. Of note is a two second difference between the Rise time saved (and supplied via BAD) and that of the internally saved Next Orbit Start Time (NOST). The Rise time was later than the NOST. This would not cause a problem.

4) If the Rise time was earlier than the NOST, then when Rise time is passed the NOST would be updated. This would occur before the NOST was moved into the Base Start Time and effectively move the orbit rollover time further out (OET stuck at 6000). If this happened again and again each orbit, the OET will be at 6000 for multiple orbits. Note: On April 30, OET was stuck at 6000 for one orbit and then self corrected. We have not been able to find data to support getting from statement (3) to statement (4). The ODRC data show steady Rise Times, no Rise time fluctuations of a second or two after Set time and before the Rise time.

5/10/01: A continuous data dump of the memory locations is being requested to watch the data over two orbits. CHIT 7A-ISS0050 was written to give MOD a procedure to clear the Numeric Constraint Flag and provide advance warning should the same conditions occur that would cause the flag to be set again. CHIT was performed on GMT Day 158, and the Numeric Constraint Flag was successfully cleared.




  • PROP – (MER-0430) — Progress Thruster Firing Anomaly

HSG reported that all went well with manifold 2 but there were problems with manifold 1, either an over or under pressure in the thrusters caused them to shut down and automatically hand over to the SM thrusters. Investigation of this problem continues. SM thrusters will be used for now.




  • ECLSS – (MER-0316)- Elektron Unexpected Shutdown.

The Russians reported that the problem was the Elektron power supply (power cable). They reported that they would command reactivation during their next ground pass; they expected this to be successful; if not successful, there is a spare power cable onboard. At GMT 2001/088:06:41:16, the Elektron Fail indication was reset. During an LOS between GMT 2001/088:13:06 and GMT 2001/088:13:22, the Elektron was deactivated (the Progress vehicle was available for Oxygen supply). Elektron has been returned to service and has been operating satisfactorily for several weeks. Part number and serial number requested from MER Moscow/Sean Melody on GMT 2001/150. PRACA PR# 2710 was generated to document this unexplained anomaly.

  • ECLSS – (MER-0319)- High Cadmium Levels in Water

  • Water samples taken from the SVO-ZV crew ambient water dispenser on Flight 4A exceeded the SMAC levels for cadmium. Samples taken on 5A.1 were lower than the 4A samples but exceeded SMAC levels. Potable water source is contaminated with cadmium. Source of cadmium was determined by the Russians to be the dispenser that flows from the SVO-ZV to the crews drinking water. The dispenser contained cadmium, which was released into the water as it was dispensed. Russians have plans in place to remove the dispenser and use the SRVK sample adapter to hook up to the SVO-ZV to dispense water. This sample adapter has been used for previous sampling and has shown to not contaminate the samples with cadmium. Source of contamination has been found and an on-orbit workaround has been developed to prevent continual contamination. It is recommended that a PRACA (need P/N and S/N) be opened for this problem, and the IFI can be closed to the PRACA when repairs have been made and another water sample proves that the cadmium source has been removed. PRACA PR# 2711 was generated to specifically document this issue. Subsequently, a MAR (ECLSS-00016-BASIC) has been issued to manifest the repair parts.

    • ECLSS – (MER-0328)- SM BB2PO Fan Failure

    Crew reported the BB2PO fan failure at GMT 2001/94:20:29. The crew removed and inspected the fan. One of the fan blades was damaged. A 2.5 cm piece of debris was found in the vicinity of the fan when inspected. The debris is the most probable cause of the failure. Significance to vehicle: Loss of fan until replaced with another MO-1-5006 fan. Significance to ops: Crew is currently taking the BTK2 fan in the SM and installing it in the place of the failed BB2PO. A 2.5 cm piece of debris was found in the vicinity of the fan when inspected. The debris is the most probable cause of the failure. Fan has been replaced and is operating satisfactorily. To completely restore normal operations, a replacement fan for the BTK2 fan in the CKB2 side of the ventilation system. It is recommended that a PRACA be opened for this problem. P/N and S/N requested from MER Moscow on GMT 2001/150.

    • ECLSS – (MER-0339)- MCA Error Code 33 with INT Stop Cmd

    John Carr (ECLS) reported the following: Error Code 33 occurred again. MCA went to RESTART. RESTART did not work. For some reason currently not understood, the INT sent a STOP command to the MCA and the MCA went to IDLE. MOD sent a STARTUP NORMAL command and the MCA went to OPEARATE with RAPID SAMPLING of the Lab (MOD did not want the MCA to lose its vacuum.). While in OPERATE, the MCA Location Accessible parameter went from YES to NO. At that time MOD commanded the MCA to STANDBY. The incident appears similar to the incident of last Saturday (GMT day 2001/104) except for the STOP command from the INT and the Location Accessible indicating NO. Problem caused by either:

    (1) Software thinking it has a problem with the filament (caused by EMI, South Atlantic Anomaly or solar flares).

    (2) The buildup of oxidized metal in the ion pump; periodically flakes of this oxidized metal will break off and float into the ion beam and cause a reading that exceeds the limit and causes the MCA to shutdown. Proposed solution – for cause (1) above, the solution would be to change the ion pump current limit. For cause (2) above, the solution would be a design change of a circuit card and a change out of the ORU. PRACA PR# 2682 has been generated. S/N#F0002.

    • ECLSS – (MER-0348)- VRS Leak rate higher than expected

    During 5A.1 with VRS Vent Valve open, VRS System Pressure was approximately 250 microtorr. This is significantly higher than was observed on 5A. After closing VRS Vent Valve, VRS pressure rise rate was observed to be approximately 218 millitorr/hour. (This compares to a pressure rise rate of approximately 1.86 millitorr/hour after VRS Vent Valve closure during 5A). The "spec" leakage rate for the VRS is 4 x 10exp-4 scc/second. With the spec leakage rate, the VRS System Pressure would rise at a rate of approximately 18.6 millitorr/hour. Pressure rise rate data suggests the VRS was leak-tight during 5A, but may now be leaking. Pressure rise rate of 218 millitorr/hour is roughly consistent with a leakage rate, which would produce 250-microtorr pressures at the VRS CCT with the Vent Valve open. When crew time available (e.g., during 6A stage) disconnect HRF Payload from VRS and cap the VRS QD at this location. Observe whether this eliminates the leak. There is no urgency to do this. There are no payloads, which need to use the VRS through at least 8A. (Although we should do this as soon as conveniently feasible, since if HRF is not the problem, we will have more time to resolve the problem).

    • ECLSS – (MER-0427)- Node 1 Smoke Detector Obscuration and Scatter High

    Node 1 Smoke Detector (SD) Obscuration & Scatter High. At activation after a lengthy shutdown, Node 1 smoke detector #2 had Scatter reading of 0.55 and obscuration reading of 8.55. Prior to the SD being shutdown, scatter and obscuration read 0.83 and 5.82, respectively.

    Node 1 suspect. Not enabled to produce fire caution/warning. Operation with SD 1 only is acceptable. As of GMT 2001/169:16:30:00, the SD remained powered, but inhibited from producing alarms. SD 2 ORU may have to be replaced. Under Investigation.

    • ECLSS – (MER-0428)- MCA Purge Time Override Failure and Loss of Synchronization with the INT MDM

    On GMT 163, the MCA INT status went to from Operational to Purge time override failed while sampling the Node. The Waiting Confirmation status changed to waiting and was frozen in that configuration. Due to this fact, the MCA would not accept commands to restore it to an operational status. The MCA was later power cycled to clear the waiting status. By this time, the MCA mass spec vacuum level had increased to the point where a pump-out was required. The MCA has an error code 24 for mass spec OOL. A temporary loss of U.S. Segment capability to monitor O2, N2, CO2, H2, and CH4 has occurred will remain until the MCA ORU R&R is complete and the MCA is reactivated. This same anomaly also occurred on GMT 118 following the C&C crashes.

  • ECLSS – (MER-0429)- Leaking CWCs

  • Crew reported five CWCs with fungus growth. Fungus cleaned with fungicide and CWCs moved to Node 1 for observation to determine which one(s) is(are) leaking. Crew later reported only one CWC appeared to be leaking and it’s serial number is 5093. It was also reported it was wet at the seam next to one of the two valves (the valve with black rubber around it). Outer cover of leaky CWC and nearby CWCs are wet and have mildew growth. Leaky CWC may have to be drained due to a hole in the CWC inner liner or connecting tubes. Under Investigation.



    • C&T — (MER-0259) – Echo on S Band (Ground).

    When CAPCOM is talking to the crew in the SM, the ground hears an echo. The ground hears a repeat of their voice. The ISS audio system was configured with S/G 1, ATU Lab 1, ATU Lab2, and RSA 1 in Public Loop1 and S/G 2 ATU Lab 1, ATU Lab 2, and RSA 2 in Public 2. It is probable that the SM audio system was configured in a way that the voice was looped back down the S/G channel.

    Forward plan for closure:

    OCA_1578 US/RS Comm Configuration procedure was uplinked to the crew to give them an integrated audio config procedure and integrated audio diagram to help them understand the system better. CATO believes that the audio echo is a product of how the RSA1 and 2 lines are connected to SM comm panel 3 and 2 respectively. CATO also wrote OCA 1652 — S-band Troubleshooting. The crew due to a full timeline has not performed it. It will be performed post 5A.1. C&T wrote 7A Chit ISS0089 to perform on board troubleshooting. This IFI will be closed based on results of this chit. Investigation continues.

    • C&T — (MER-0329)- VBSP Channel #4 Configuration did not go to Default

    The VBSP went to self test when commanded to equipment self test, and the equipment self test status was active, Self test was terminated by issuing a deactivate equipment self test command. Upon termination equipment self test, the VBSP did not go to default configuration because it did not start in its default configuration (when the correct self test command is sent to the VBSP, it is expected to return to its default configuration). Currently, the command sent to initiate the VBSP self test command is INCORRECT (see PR15876). In all of our testing, we always ran the self test right after the box was initially powered up – i.e. started in the default configuration, and when it was sent the deactivate equipment self test command, it just returned to where it started. We suspect that’s all it’s doing now returning to the state it started in.

    We believe this IFI should be closed because the software will be fixed at Flt 8A with the CCSR2 load. We could probably do some investigative testing at ISIL with the DVTM but we don’t believe that’s really worthwhile because we have a debugging plan referenced above, and the s/w will be fixed at Flt 8A and this won’t be an issue anymore.

    • C&T — (MER-0333)- MCOR (Medium Rate Comm. Outage Recorder) Upper Temperature Accidence.

    When MCOR Activation & Check-out procedure was being performed; on step 7, MCOR had to shutdown due to over temp. MCOR was activated at approx. 101:23:02GMT (6:23 pm CST??). Two minutes later we received heartbeat indication.

    Steps 1-6 were completed from the procedures flawlessly. Commands accepted, RT enabled, verification of default configuration and health, documented memory configuration, initiation of BIT test and verification of BIT results. At the step 7 (enabling recording of input channels 4 and 8), the overtemp indication flag came up and MCOR had to shutdown. It happened approximately 45 minutes after activation. Investigation continues. ART will come up with the rational to close this IFI ECD 6/08/2001.

    • C&T – (MER-0400) — Regul Acquisition of Signal Error

    Working with Russians / MER Moscow. This IFI Under Investigation.

    • C&T — (MER-0421) – Ku Band PLC to Normal in Mask

    As reported by CATO, a “Ku-Band Radiating Beyond Mask” warning was annunciated at GMT 2001/156:18:27:30. As expected the Ku-Band TRC was powered OFF. CATO RTPLOT indicates that TRC PLC went to “Normal” at 156:18:27:31. The Ku-Band PWRL was at -57 dBm when the PLC went to “Normal”. The TRC Xmit Output voltage was at 0 volts (therefore, we did not radiate within the protected Mask. CATO performed CAFN576, Ku-Band Radiating Beyond Mask Corrective Actions, in order to recover the Ku-Band TRC. Investigation continues.


    • C&T — (MER-0434) – Spare SASA RT Conflict

    The prime SASA and spare SASA share a common 1553 RT address. They also share a common 1553 bus. Heater power is applied to the spare SASA to ensure that its temperature is maintained above the non-operating minimum level, but operational power is not applied to the spare SASA. If operational power were applied to the SASA, loss of ISS S-band communications would result. This is because both the spare and prime SASAs would attempt to communicate with the controlling MDM over the same bus from the same RT address at the same time. If operational power is applied to the spare SASA, ISS S-band communication will be disrupted. This will result in loss of station commanding and audio. A flight rule that reads “Do not close the RPC that delivers operational power to the spare SASA” will be written.

    The future installation of the Early Ammonia Servicer requires the installation of a pair of “Y” cables to the connectors that provide heater power and operational power to the spare SASA. A procedure will be forthcoming explaining how to connect these Y cables to preclude the possibility of inadvertently applying power to the spare SASA. Under Investigation.

    • C&T — (MER-0435) – VTR-1 Operational Problem

    An attempt was made to record and playback on VTR-1 but symptoms remained. Also, VTR-1 cannot playback a tape which VTR-2 can successfully playback. Currently, we think that VTR-1 record and playback capability is lost. A procedure is being considered to swap VTR-2 into VTR-1’s location to confirm that the CVIU for VTR-1 is working correctly. Since successful video can pass through VTR-1 to the downlink, it may not be necessary to perform a VTR swap/test. VTR-1 may have to be replaced during a future assembly mission.

    • C&T — (MER-0436) – Prime and Spare SASA (S-Band Antenna Structural Assy) RT Address Conflict

    Under Investigation



    • TCS — (MER-0403) – Ammonia Contamination of Lab ITCS Fluid

    Samples of ITCS fluid were removed from the two operating ITCS loops during flights 5A, 5A.1, and 6A and returned to ground for analysis. The 5A samples showed no ammonia contamination. The 5A.1 samples had an ammonia concentration of 0.03 to 0.05 ppm (estimated due to this level being at the boundary of the detectable limit) in the low temperature (LTL), and the moderate temperature loop (MTL) was 0.09 ppm. The 6A samples have a 0.096 ppm, MTL; and a 0.142 ppm, LTL. The concern is that the trace amounts of ammonia contamination are being introduced to the fluid streams by a “micro-crack” or fissure within the single barrier interface heat exchanger (IHX). A “micro-leak” is not a catastrophic hazard to the crew. Threats to the hardware ( both internal and external) are unknown at this time. Once all possible sources of ammonia contamination are investigated, and if it is determined that the ammonia contamination is from an IHX, then the deficient heat exchanger will need to be removed and replaced by EVA operations. Presently, a spare IHX is stored in the USL. Procedures will have to be developed to remove and replace the IHX. Ammonia contamination in the ITCS fluid could come from: 1) sample bag material/contamination; 2) cabin atmosphere; 3) ground laboratory processing; 4) microbial activity; and/or 5) interface heat exchanger “micro-leak”. A team of engineers/scientists has been formed under the leadership of Cynthia Cross (JSC-EC) and Steve Daugherty (Boeing Active Thermal Control Team). The team consists of representatives from System Safety, Materials & Processes, and Engineering, with specialists in fracture control, chemistry, and fluid hydraulics. A detailed plan is being formulated to investigate potential sources of ammonia contamination. Samples will be taken and returned to ground for analysis at 7A and 7A.1 for trend analysis. It is noted that the quantities of ammonia contamination are “trace” amounts. The ITCS soft materials were tested at an 8.87% ammonia solution by weight ( Reference: Test Report Nonmetallic Material Compatibility with Ammonia , issued by Materials and processes laboratory, Marshall Space Flight Center, date: 10/96) for time periods of 30 and 60 days with all materials in contact with the ITCS fluid showing no significant degradation. 05/30/01: JSC is currently investigating (designing and funding) a test with ITCS fluid in a FEP sample bag to confirm the adequacy of the bag material in preventing ammonia from being absorbed from the cabin atmosphere. Investigation Continues.

    • TCS — (MER-0411) — ESP Survival Heaters Off Since 6A

    Power was removed from the ESP-1 secondary heaters at 2001/116:15:51 and they were left off until it was discovered on day 147. ESP-1 houses a spare PFCS and a spare DSCU. During flight 6A, NCS control was lost and RACU 6 was power cycled at 2001/116:15:51 to remove and reapply power to the N1-1 MDM in an attempt to regain NCS control. The RACU 6 power cycle caused power bus N1RS1 and all its loads to lose power. The 6A N1RS1 Power Bus Repower procedure was missing the ESP heater load on RPCM N1RS1-B RPC 4. Consequently, the ESP-1 secondary heaters were left off until it was discovered on day 147. Also during flight 6A, due to bad NCS data, the DDCU Z1-3B had an NCS software initiated trip at 2001/117:02:13. This caused power to be removed from power buses N13B and N1RS2 and all their loads. The 6A N13B Power Bus Repower procedure was missing the ESP heater load on RPCM N13B-A RPC 3. Consequently, the ESP primary heaters were left off until it was discovered on day 147. ART provided thermal analysis indicating PFCS violated acceptance and qual test levels ( lowest PFCS calculated temp was -72 F vs accep/qual limits of -45 F / -65 F ). Lowest calculated DCSU temp was -57 F vs. accep/qual limits of -45 F / -65 F. Issue transitioned to the SPRT for recommendation regarding R&R of these components.

    • TCS — (MER-0418) – EETCS FCV Transient Transition to By-pass

    On GMT 2001/152:08:54 and approximately 6 seconds after the Primary Node 1 MDM detected a loss of sync with the Primary PVCU MDM, the EETCS Loop A Flow Control Valve (FCV) went to the full bypass position and stayed there for approximately 10 seconds and then returned to its nominal expected position in closed loop control. The EETCS Loop B FCV carried out identically the same actions, but did so less than 1 second after the Primary Node 1 MDM detected a loss of sync with the Primary PVCU MDM. This was a one time transient event that did not affect the nominal operations of the hardware. There are currently no identified impacts to safety, hardware/software or operations. Investigation continues. Actions assigned to CP ( Kevin Graves ) to analyze and identify cause. Telemetry data and event description have been supplied to CP GMT159. ECD for analysis is GMT 173 ( 2 weeks ). Under investigation.

    • TCS — (MER-0431) – ESP Primary heaters failed to come on.

    On GMT 2001/147:12:58 RPCM N1RS1-B RPC4 which controls the ESP-1 secondary heaters was closed. The amperage of RPCM N1RS1-B showed an increase that indicated 3 of 4 ESP-1 secondary heater elements came on. There are 2 secondary and 2 primary heater elements for both the PFCS and DCSU ORU’s. Predicted temperature of the PFCS and DCSU indicate that all of the secondary heater element should have come on when the RPC4 was closed. ART to meet 6/18/01 1 PM. Under Investigation.



    • S&M – (MER-0367)- Lab Window Contamination

    Lab window cover was left open during Soyuz docking. Subsequent inspection suggested possible contamination. Further inspection was requested. The

    SpaceRef staff editor.