The 8 O’clock Report – Alpha Health & Status – 19 June 2001 Part 1
The 8 Oclock Report Alpha Health & Status June 19, 2001 (GMT 170/00:00) (The information highlighted in blue is update to yesterdays report) |
Overall Alpha System Status:
ELECTRICAL POWER GROUP (EPG) Russian Segment: .
USOS:
| ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL GROUP (ECG) Russian Segment:
Air Duct ПХО – ON Air Duct ПРК ON
Node1:
USL:
Payload Racks:
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Crew Support Group (CSG)
| |
Motion Control Group (MCG)
| |
THERMAL CONTROL GROUP (TCG) Russian Segment:
USOS:
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COMMAND AND DATA GROUP (CDG) Russian Segment:
USOS:
| COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING GROUP (CTG) Russian Segment:
USOS:
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MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR GROUP (MRG) Completed Maintenance Tasks: Russian Segment: ·
USOS Designated Maintenance Items (DMIs): Russian Segment: · USOS: Node 1 · USL · – Sorbent Bed · – Mass Spectrometer Analyzer
CSA: · – Base LEE Camera Light Assembly
| STRUCTURES AND MECHANISM GROUP (SMG)
Completed S&M Tasks:
ROBOTICS CUP RWS – Active LAB RWS – Backup SSRMS Prime String – Off SSRMS Redundant String – Operational The Redundant String will be left Operational overnight for troubleshooting purposes. |
Visiting Vehicles:
- 2S docked on FGB Nadir
- Progress 4 docked SM Aft
Last 24 Hour activities
ISS Crew
- SM TV System (TBC LIV) Test
- Microbiological Analysis
- Video System Training [Complete]
- 7A Mission Overview
- PAYLOADS *
- CDR Interaction
- DOSMAP [Complete]
- ARIS R2 Activation
- ADVASC Video
- ICE SAMS
- Daily status checks [Complete]
- Task List (may be done at any convenient time)
- DOSMAP MDU Start Charge
- DOSMAP DOSTEL 2 Xfer
- 6A Transfer questions
- Node 1 P3 Midbay Closeout Seal Repair
- MACE II
- FFQ
- TVIS Weekly Inspect
- EVA Assessment
- NOD1D0 ELPS Install
- RED Cal
- Earth Obs
- NOD1S4 K bar install
* Payload activities involving Crew interaction. Other payloads are untended (except status checks) and not listed here. Upcoming Events at a Glance
Trajectory Status
Time: 06/18/01 169/12:30:00 GMT
- Ha x Hp: 394 x 368 km
- Have: 381 km
- Beta Angle: 10 deg (magnitude decreasing)
Non-Prop Consumables (US-Calculated values) as of Friday 06-15-01:
Item | Remaining | Predicted Rate | Contingency Redline [a] | Margin |
ТГК canisters | 160 | 3 units/day/3 crew | 135 | 8 days |
Oxygen Gas | 0 lbm | 5.3 lbm/day/3 crew | N/A [b] | 0 days |
Russian LiOH | 15 | 1.04 cans/day/3 crew | 9 [b] | 13 days |
US LiOH | 19 | 1.50 cans/day/3 crew | 9 [b] | |
Potable water | 2091 lbm | 6 lbm/day/3 crew [c] | 270 lbm [c] | 303 days [c] |
Technical water | 1336 lbm | 8.6 lbm/day/3 crew [c] | 387 lbm [c] | 110 days [c] |
USOS Condensate | 104 lbm | — | — | — |
(a) Basic 45 Day Skip Cycle Requirement. (b) Skip cycle requirement exemption due to availability of spare parts for Elektron and Vozdukh. Basic requirement of 15 days of LiOH capability. (c) Remaining quantity is based on reported on-orbit water, on predicted usage rate, and on performance of water reclamation systems. The water usage rates used in predicting on-orbit Nominal Capability are documented in ISS-4A / STS-97 CHIT 211 but are under assessment for revision. The current totals do not include 463 lbs of Rodnik water (Potable), 79 lbs of RS Condensate (Technical) and 102 lbs of EDV water (Unknown). |
Propulsive Consumables as of 06-14-01
Current Altitude: | 384 | km | |||
135 Day Alt: | 298 | km | |||
Total FGB Prop Avail | 2841 | kg | |||
Total SM Prop Avail | 764 | kg | |||
Total Progress Prop Avail | 856 | kg | |||
Total Prop Avail | 4461 | kg | Skip Cycle Prop | 80 | kg |
Priority 1&2 Prop | 73 | kg | Skip Cycle Margin | 4381 | kg |
Priority 1&2 Margin | 4388 | kg | Lifetime | 448 | days |
Priority 1 Propellant | ||
Next Docking Attempt | 33 | |
Shuttle | 5 |
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Progress | 33 |
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135 Days to 150 nmi | 0 | |
135 Days of Att Cntl | 0 | |
1 m/s COLA burn | 35 | |
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| |
Total Priority 1 Prop | 68 | |
Priority 2 Propellant | ||
Altitude Maintenance | 0 | |
Attitude Control | 0 | |
Shuttle Docking | 5 | |
Total Priority 2 Prop | 5 | |
Priority 3 Propellant | ||
Skip Cycle | 1175 |
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Adj. Skip Cycle | 80 |
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Total Priority 3 Prop | 0 | |
Priority 4 Propellant | ||
Science Budget |
| 0 |
Open Items for Investigation (IFIs)
(IFI status will be updated every Monday and changes will be reflected on Tuesdays report in highlighted blue. Newly opened IFIs will be reported on daily basis in highlighted blue)
COMMAND AND DATA GROUP (CDG)
- C&DH – (MER-0368)- C&C 3 MSD Inaccessible
During 6A on GMT 119/19:08:50, C&C3 was moded into Primary in response to a number of "MSD Inaccessible" flags being received from C&C2. C&C3 later malfunctioned, dropping telemetry and communication with the ISS. C&C2 was later brought up as primary. The C&C3 MSD was changed out and has been fully operational since. Investigation continues.
.
- C&DH – (MER-0408) PCS Reboots and Disconnects
Crew Reports that both PCS they are using have occasional spontaneous reboots and disconnects from the bus. PCS Log files have been dumped and are being analyzed by PCS team. CHIT ISS-0305 has been opened. The lack of CCS data makes it is impossible to troubleshoot further.
C&DH – (MER-0416) N1-1 MDM Power Cycle
ODIN completed load of INTSYS version 39 software to INT-1 MDM, then transitioned INT-2 to standby in preparation to bring INT-1 on as primary. While both INTs were in standby, a loss of comm with N1-1 was reported by N1-2 and CCS. N1-2 performed a power cycle of N1-1 and N1-1 returned to a nominal state as secondary node MDM. INT-1 is operating nominally with INTSYS version 39. INT-2 is in standby with version 38 still loaded. Several RPC’s appear to have changed states during this event.
PRACA PR# 2707 was generated to specifically track this issue.- C&DH – (MER-0424) Payload MDM PAR PLMMDM1-SW-0005
A loss of Payload Health & Status (H&S) Data, Broadcast Ancillary Data, and Payload Ancillary Data from the PLMDM-1 via KU-Band occurred at GMT 158:10:15. Indications were that the HRDL Card on the PLMDM-1 had locked up and stopped processing data. To recover the lost Ku-Band data a reset of the HRDL card was commanded and after an eight-minute wait, ODIN reported seeing the card resetting. As a follow up a HRL reset was commanded but a failure code "command function unavailable" was received. This indicates that the HRDL card received the command but could not execute it since it was non-operational. Per SPNs 15580 and 18649 the PL MDM HRDL Control State telemetry may be invalid during a HRDL reset and the HRDL reset does not always execute successfully. To recover from the failed HRDL reset the PL MDM power was cycled. The recycle was successful and the PL MDM fully recovered. All racks and payloads that were operational prior to this anomaly were successfully restarted and functioning nominally. POIC then successfully commanded the transfer of Payload Ancillary Data via Ku-Band. Cause of the original PL MDM HRDL lock up is still under investigation
- C&DH – (MER-0432) PL MDM Crash
Sequence of Events: 1. GMT 2001/164:22:40:38, the POIC requested a downlink of the Payload MDM Events Log via Ku-band.
2. GMT 2001/164:22:41:50, the PL-1 MDM transitioned to Diagnostics Mode with the UAS Reported Hard Fail bit in BST A word 2 set.
3. GMT 2001/164:22:43:10 the Primary C&C MDM performed a retry on PL-1 which power-cycled the MDM and brought it back as the Backup PL MDM.
4. GMT 2001/164:22;47:19 the PL MDM was brought back to Operational State and switched to the logical Primary MDM. No further failures were seen.
5. Dumps of the PL-1 Error Ring Buffer and the CCS Command logs were performed.
Analysis of dumps from the PL MDM indicate that the MDM transitioned to diagnostics due to a task overrun. Specific cause of the task overrun is still under investigation.
ELECTRICAL POWER GROUP (EPG)
- EPS- (MER-0326) – High resistance on SM Solar Array Generator #3 Power Cable
The SM Power specialists reported that after analyzing the data obtained during the SM Solar Array Generator test on GMT 2001/093, they suspect that some cables or a part of the solar array/current regulator circuitry may be damaged. This assessment is PRELIMINARY. They will have to further analyze the data and possibly perform more tests to have a complete understanding of the problem. More data will be available as the SM power specialists provide it.
Significance to vehicle: Degraded power production capability in the SM.
Significance to operation: The degree of degradation has not been determined yet, but is not currently impacting SM nominal operations. Further investigation is underway by the Russians. Closure is currently under evaluation for the Russian Anomaly. PRACA PR# 2712 was generated to document this issue.
- EPS (MER-0405) – PCU Abnormal Transition to Shut Down Mode
On GMT 138/0603, PCU1 was transitioned from Standby with tubes at ~0mmHg to Shutdown. The process was expected to take 4-5 hours, as Latch Valve 1 Closes, Latch 2 Opens, and the gas between (initially at tank pressure) needs to bleed down to less than 1400mmHg (27PSI) before Latch Valve 2 Re-Closes. The expected tube pressure profile was that the pressure would remain at 2500mmHg (50PSI) for roughly 4 hours, then the pressure would exponentially decay to 0mmHg. Latch Valve 1 closed as expected and telemetry confirmed. Latch Valve2 opened, but closed within 10 seconds; the downstream pressure increased to ~2000mmHg (39PSI) confirming the valve did open, but we did not get telemetry feedback that the valve had opened (0.1Hz Tlm). Additionally, the ~2000mmHg was not the expected pressure, as the regulator regulates to approximately 2500mmHg (50PSI). The pressure began the exponential drop to 0 immediately. Analysis of the firmware shows that during the shutdown routine, valve 2 is commanded open, and the line pressure is checked immediately after. The valve has not had sufficient time to open, and therefore the pressure is less than the 27PSI set point. The valve is then commanded closed, without depressurizing the line between the two valves If it is desired to depressurize the line between the two valves, then the following procedure may be used: Command the PCU into Manual Mode, command valve 2 open, wait until the pressure drops below 27 PSI, then reclose valve 2. Power may then be removed from the PCU, or it may be recommended into Shutdown Mode. Safety to recommend a PRACA or a Firmware PR for this issue. Firmware does not properly execute the shutdown function. This is considered a known condition with an operational workaround. Safety to recommend a PRACA or a Firmware PR for this issue. Once tracking paper has been initiated, close this IFI
- EPS (MER-0423) – SM ZRU (EPS String) #6 Failure
On GMT 140 Russian EPS specialists noticed that the SM Battery 6 had stopped charging and discharging, so they disconnected ZRU #6. Troubleshooting repeated the problem on GMT 144:17:52. Russian EPS specialists believe the PTAB #6 has failed and will need to be replaced. PRACA PR# 2708 was generated to specifically document this issue.
VEHICLE INTEGRATION (VI)
At GMT 2001/104:10:43:39, a Zero Cal of the MCA was initiated. It was completed at GMT 2001/104:11:01:59. Subsequent to the Zero Cal and during a break in data between GMT 2001/104:11:09:35 and GMT 2001/104:11:11:009:55, the MCA failed passive BIT Filament (Error Code 33). This condition sends the MCA to STOP with an automatic restart. The MCA performed a successful Active BIT during STARTUP and came up to STANDBY. MOD dumped the MCA data associated with this and it looked fine (No FAIL indication; No C&W indication). BIT Fault data showed nothing. MOD placed the MCA back to OPERATE and it performed satisfactorily. This incident occurred when the Station was away from the South Atlantic Anomaly but during a period of high solar activity. Orbital Science (vendor for the MCA) reported that in the MCA ORU 2 (the MCA part of the MCA) there is a voltage/frequency converter that has a slight susceptibility to EMI. Orbital is concerned that this item may be the reason for the problems experienced by that ORU.
Occurred again at GMT 113/08:07. Same Signature, same status changes. Same nominal start-up after. High Solar activity also noted at this time.
Occurred again at GMT 114/18:55. Similar signature. This caused Brief shutdown of U.S. Element capability to measure O2, N2, CO2, H2O, H2, and CH4. 06/30/01: Plan is to replace MCA electrometer and electronics unit This addresses both problems (MCA electrometer saturation and EMI problems thought to have caused MCA shutdowns). Problem is believed to be leakage through swaged joints on FRIT (flow restrictor). MCA currently operating nominally on filament #2. Indications are that trend toward saturation has slowed significantly, perhaps stopped. Cause of problem either:
(1) Software thinking it has a problem with the filament (caused by EMI, South Atlantic Anomaly or solar flares).
(2) The buildup of oxidized metal in the ion pump; periodically flakes of this oxidized metal will break off and float into the ion beam and cause a reading that exceeds the limit and causes the MCA to shutdown.
For Cause (1) above, the solution would be to change the ion pump current limit.
For Cause (2) above, the solution would be a design change of a circuit card and a change out of the ORU. PRACA PR# 2681 has been generated.
PRACA PR# 2681 has been generated. S/N#F0002
- VI (MER-0386) FOD in CPA Connectors
Report from 6A crew debrief:
When reinstalling the Nadir CPAs, specifically when removing the caps from the cable or CPA connectors (they don’t remember which), they noted at least two “EMI tabs” floated out of the connectors. These were very small (1 – 2 mm across) C-shaped pieces of metal. Crew thought they were broken off from an EMI-ring that goes on every connector (?). They captured two, put them on a piece of tape, photographed them, and put them in the “Lost & Found” zip lock bag. No operational impact, possible safety impact during demate due to FOD. Crew should wear eye protection during cable demate. PRACA #2702 has been generated.
- VI – (MER-0381) – PVCA Numeric Constraint – Invalid Orbit Elapsed Time
On 127/06:38, a Numeric Constraint C&W was set. Data dump of the C&W associated data revealed the following:
5/7/01: The Numeric Constraint bits indicated two procedures have triggered the Numeric Constraint since the last time the associated data was reset. The two are Cmd Validation and Orbit Elapse Time. The Cmd Validation is an expected cause whenever a beta angle of 359.99- 360.00 is sent to the BGA (SPN 18844/1112). The second one has not been seen before. It occurs and is handled within the Determine Orbit Elapse Time procedure. No other algorithms are skipped at a result of this Numeric Constraint. The cause of the problem is tied to the Orbit Elapse Time holding at 6000 for a long time. If the difference between the current time and the Internal Base Start Time (what PVCA believes is the last sunrise) is greater than the defined type range (duration type, S18F14), the error will occur. The largest value the type would hold is 131,072 which is almost 22 orbits. Preliminary data shows the Orbit Elapse Time has been stuck at 6000 for about 24 hours. The Numeric Constraint will stop occurring when the Orbit Elapse Time resets to zero. The Last Orbit Targets Blind mode may not operate correctly, due to the Orbit Elapsed Time It is advisable to not use Autotrack BGA Mode, as the corresponding Blind Mode may not work. clock not counting correctly. It was recommended to PHALCON to place the 2B array in Rate Mode (was in Autotrack) and change the blind mode to Rate. 4B is in Directed Position, which is OK. Investigation:
5/8/01: Data dumps of various locations in the PVCA Memory were performed to give details of the Orbit Elapsed Time function:
5/9/01:
1) The data dumped from PVCUs confirm that the Base Start Time used in the Orbit Elapsed Time calculation is not getting updated properly. The last rise acknowledged by the Orbit Elapsed Time (OET)
calculation was May 5 18:15:14. The calculated (once a second) difference between the Base Start Time and current time is causing the persistent numeric constraint error.
2) The Rise and Set time appear to be updating correctly. Although, a comparison of ODRC values for
Rise/Set from GNC/C&C do not match Rise/Set values dumped from PVCU. They are off by 15 and 23 seconds, respectively. Very puzzling. However, since the Rise and Set times are updating, we can conclude that the Sunlight Status is correctly being determined. Only the Orbit Elapse Time (and those that use it) is affected.
3) The dump of the backup PVCU provided similar data. Both set of dumped data indicated the dumps occurred after a sunrise and before a sunset. Of note is a two second difference between the Rise time saved (and supplied via BAD) and that of the internally saved Next Orbit Start Time (NOST). The Rise time was later than the NOST. This would not cause a problem.
4) If the Rise time was earlier than the NOST, then when Rise time is passed the NOST would be updated. This would occur before the NOST was moved into the Base Start Time and effectively move the orbit rollover time further out (OET stuck at 6000). If this happened again and again each orbit, the OET will be at 6000 for multiple orbits. Note: On April 30, OET was stuck at 6000 for one orbit and then self corrected. We have not been able to find data to support getting from statement (3) to statement (4). The ODRC data show steady Rise Times, no Rise time fluctuations of a second or two after Set time and before the Rise time.
5/10/01: A continuous data dump of the memory locations is being requested to watch the data over two orbits. CHIT 7A-ISS0050 was written to give MOD a procedure to clear the Numeric Constraint Flag and provide advance warning should the same conditions occur that would cause the flag to be set again. CHIT was performed on GMT Day 158, and the Numeric Constraint Flag was successfully cleared.
- VI – (MER-0433) – Debris in MPLM IVA Volume
STS-102 crew reported seeing “lots of small bits of foil floating” inside FM-1 MPLM on ingress. When the MPLM was inspected on de-integration at KSC, a significant amount of debris was observed covering the Air Return Grid (ARG) screen filters. The particles, ranging in size from 1 to 1900 microns, were found to be 30% metallic, 18% organic, 45% organic fiber, and 7% miscellaneous. The fraction of metallic particles is in excess of that found from debris collected after Spacelab missions.
During STS-100, the crew again reported seeing metallic particulate inside FM-2 MPLM on ingress. Upon to return to KSC, ARG screens were again sampled. The amount of particulate was less than for STS-102, but the metallic particle fraction of the contaminant was 45%. The metallic particulate was mostly aluminum for STS-102, and all aluminum for STS-100.
During debriefing, after returning from the ISS, the STS-102 Crew described seeing "lots of small foil floating" inside the FM-1 MPLM on ingress. When the MPLMs Hatch was opened at KSC an abundance of debris was observed covering the Air Return Grid (ARG) Screen Filters. A PR was taken and all eight (8) screens were cleaned using a flight vacuum fitted with a new filter. Note: these screens were cleaned before M&P visually inspected them but digital images were taken and are on file. The collected debris was submitted to the NASA Lab for analysis to determine its composition.
Results of the Labs analysis showed the composition of the debris to be: metallic (30%), red (1%), white (5%), black (1%), white clear (T), amber (T), green (T) and blue (T) materials, along with organic (18%), and organic fiber (45%). The metallic particulate consisted mainly of aluminum alloy. Note: the specific aluminum alloys (6061, 7075, etc.) were not defined. The red materials were composed of RTV and primer. Green and blue materials were paint chips. The black material was composed of 1) carbon steel corrosion products, 2) calcium-chlorine-silica-carbon rich, and 3) molybdenum-sulfur rich materials. White and white clear materials included paint chips, aluminum-chlorine-silica rich and calcium-silica rich materials. The amber materials were made up of aluminum-oxygen rich materials. The particle sizes ranged from 1 to 1900 micrometers.
Debris was also observed on the duel Hatch Seals. It was collected and analyzed to determine its composition. Results showed it to be comprised of basically the same components as debris cleaned from the ARG Screen Filters.
Note: a comparison of FM-1 MPLM debris composition was consistent with the analysis of debris collected from Space-Lab missions. The only exception being the percentage of metallic particulate. This could be attributed to the last minute work done inside the MPLM installing Racks knee braces.
During STS-100 the crew reported also reported seeing metallic particulate inside FM-2 MPLM. Upon return to KSC, M&P performed a visual examination of FM-2s ARG Screen Filters during ingress. FM-2s ARG Screen Filters appeared to be similar, though not as dirty, as what was witnessed in the FM-1s digital images. Another point of interest was the four (4) ARG Screen Filters, adjacent to the install two (2) RSR Racks, contained more debris than the four (4) ARG Screen Filters located by empty bays.
After examination, all eight (8) of FM-2s ARG Screen Filters were cleaned and the collected debris analyzed like in FM-1. The results were basically the same with the exception being that the percentage of metallic contamination was higher (Ref. 45% vs. 30%) and organic contaminants lower (Ref. 45% vs. 63%) than in FM-1.
An inspection and contamination analysis was also preformed on debris collected from the RSR Racks currently installed in FM-1 for STS-105. All the collected metal particulate sampled turned out to be aluminum alloy. The rest of the debris consisted of black Molybdenum-sulfur rich materials (i.e. dry lube), gray silica-calcium rich materials and yellow paint particles.
All of the samples mentioned above are in M&Ps possession if needed for further analysis. Copies of all NASA Lab analysis are available upon request.
Some potential sources for the contamination found inside the MPLMs could be:
? Migration into the modules from inside installed RSP, RSR, and Express Racks
? Transfer into modules on orbit from ISS elements/environment
? Present inside the modules from the original fabrication
? Generated during Rack modification &/or routine processing inside the modules
? Created during GSE floor installation/removal
? Migrating in on protective padding, personnel, other GSE
? Coming in from rotation stands/RID during rack installation
? Created by Rack installation/removal during ground processing or on orbit
To my knowledge M&P was never involved in a "base line" cleanliness inspection inside FM-1 or FM-2 MPLM. It should be also be noted that M&P Engineering was not included in the closeout inspection process of neither MPLMs internal bays nor the installed Racks on STS-102 or STS100 missions.
Due to the contamination concerns, KSC M&P Engineering has implemented a weekly OMI R6900 cleaning inside FM-1 Module. This has already made a noticeable difference in the cleanliness level inside the MPLM. Well do the same for FM-2 after de-integration is completed. Weve also asked that cognizant Systems Engineers included us in the closeout inspection process on internal bay and Racks. PRACA PR# 2716 was generated to specifically track this problem. This IFI is CLOSED as 0f 06-15-01.
MOTION CONTROL GROUP (MCG)
- GN&C – (MER-0399) SM-Y (Nadir) Kurs Test Failure
Same problem as IFI MER-253 and PRACA 2634. Exp 1 did some cable re-config to disconnect the SM Kurs-P avionics box from the SM forward port (to support FGB-SM docking) and connect it to the SM nadir port (to support DC1 and UDM dockings). Initial self-tests showed a failure of one Kurs set (led to IFI MER-0253 and PRACA 2634). They tried adjusting and re-tightening several connectors, but still saw failure of one set. Additional troubleshooting indicated a bad cable, so the Russians sent up a replacement cable on Progress 4P.
Exp 2 replaced the cable, but then both Kurs sets began to fail the self-tests (led to IFI MER-0399). They tried adjusting and re-tightening several connectors, but still saw failure of both sets. Additional analysis by the Kurs specialists indicated a bad cable configuration left over from previous testing. The crew connected the proper Kurs-P 4AO antenna to the Kurs-P avionics box on 6/6. A Kurs self-test on 6/7 had successful results, with both sets passing the self-test. PRACA 2634 has been written. This IFI is CLOSED as of 06-15-01.
- PROP – (MER-0430) Progress Thruster Firing Anomaly
HSG reported that all went well with manifold 2 but there were problems with manifold 1, either an over or under pressure in the thrusters caused them to shut down and automatically hand over to the SM thrusters. Investigation of this problem continues. SM thrusters will be used for now.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL GROUP (ECG)