Technology Transfer: Bringing Innovation to NASA and the Nation (Executive Summary)
National Academy of Public Administration
for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
November 2004
Technology Transfer: Bringing Innovation to NASA and the Nation
ADVANCE COPY
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
For the last half of the twentieth century, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was among the most successful organizations in history in developing new technology and making it available to both the private sector and other government organizations. Small computers; cellular communications; lightweight, heat resistant materials; telemedicine, and a broad spectrum of everyday products have all benefited from NASA research and development.
Technology transfer was mandated as a NASA responsibility in the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958. National leaders recognized that NASA would be heavily involved in creating technologies to achieve the agency’s ambitious missions and that these technologies could have enormous consequences for the nation’s economy. The NASA Administrator was required to provide the widest practicable dissemination of results of NASA’s activities and to protect inventions to which NASA has title. Since then, Congress has crafted legislation designed to further protect federally developed intellectual property while at the same time making these innovations broadly available to benefit the nation.
For a number of reasons, NASA’s current technology transfer programs are operating in a fundamentally changed environment from those earlier days and are not nearly as successful:
- The private and university sectors of the economy now conduct much more research and development (R&D) than the federal government, and often are the leaders in many of the technologies that NASA needs for its missions.
- The issues of technology and technology transfer are multi-national, and the development of space-related technologies has been globalized. The Apollo mission was essentially a U.S.-driven effort; today the International Space Station is an effort conducted by 16 nations.
- Small businesses are an increasing source of innovation for new technology.
- Congress, NASA, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) have different views about how to best accomplish technology transfer. This disagreement plays out through the budget process and has created significant uncertainty about the program throughout NASA’s technology transfer network.
- Organizations in the technology transfer network operate at the margins of the agency’s overall operations, lack executive support, and are likely to be at odds with each other.
- The technology transfer program has recently undergone major changes. In FY 2004, the Commercial Technology Program was terminated, and the program’s emphasis was changed from a primary focus on diffusion of technology to the private sector (“spin-out”) to a much greater focus on the infusion of technology into the agency to help meet mission requirements (“spin-in”).
In January 2004, the Academy was asked by NASA to conduct an independent review of its technology transfer function and this report is a result of that study. While the report speaks to technology transfer in a broad context, the specific organization at the center of this study is the Innovative Partnerships Program (IPP). The overall goal of the study is to give all the stakeholders a common understanding of how NASA’s technology transfer function *should be organized to obtain the maximum benefits for the nation.
The Panel and study team were impressed with the knowledge and commitment of the NASA staff they interviewed both in headquarters and in the field centers. Without their help, this study would not have been possible. An important overall observation from this study is that the technology transfer system in NASA has good people working in an environment that makes it very difficult for them to be successful.
After conducting a review of NASA’s performance in technology transfer, the Panel found that:
- Most technology acquired by NASA is done outside the IPP.
- NASA lacks a comprehensive strategy for identifying technology needs and commercialization opportunities.
- The IPP network is fragmented; roles and responsibilities of component organizations overlap and are unclear.
- There are few technology transfer output measures and no outcome measures, which blurs accountability for results.
- Programmatic uncertainty is adversely affecting the organization.
- The IPP is generally successful at administrative aspects of technology diffusion; there is more difficulty in other aspects, such as brokering technology partnerships with the private sector.
- The IPP appears to have a very limited role in technology infusion/spin-in.
- Stakeholders and NASA managers have expressed significant dissatisfaction with the complex and lengthy intellectual property process.
- The IPP faces significant constraints—low agency priority, conflicting stakeholder views, declining budgets and staffing, and more.
The IPP as currently structured is not as successful as it could be in obtaining technology to meet mission requirements or in identifying commercial opportunities for NASA-generated innovations. The ultimate outcome is a program that meets neither the agency’s needs nor stakeholder and public expectations. If NASA chooses to strive for excellence in technology transfer, major changes are needed.
The Academy Panel provides the following recommendations on the roles and responsibilities of the various entities involved with an awareness of the changes now underway at NASA. The Panel’s goal is to support these changes where it can and offer suggestions that may further enhance the chances of success:
Recommendation # 1: Leadership Commitment
The NASA Administrator should support an agency-wide technology transfer effort by establishing that technology transfer is a core element of the agency’s mission that requires the attention and support of NASA’s leadership team, relevant program officials, and major contractors.
Recommendation # 2: Organizational Location
The headquarters technology transfer office and the programs under it should be relocated to the Office of the Administrator in order to give special emphasis to this agency-wide responsibility and to begin holding executives accountable for this function.
Recommendation # 3: Roles and Responsibilities for Spin-In
The associate administrators for each mission directorate, supported by the center directors and program heads in the centers, should be held responsible for making better use of technology outside NASA—both through acquisition and through partnerships—to meet the agency’s mission needs.
Recommendation # 4: Roles and Responsibilities for Spin-Out
NASA should make the center directors responsible for the spin-out aspects of technology transfer, with the understanding that centers will support staffing and activities beyond those funded by headquarters.
Recommendation # 5: The External Network
The national network should be reformulated and streamlined to provide a more effective vehicle for program implementation.
Recommendation # 6: Websites and Information Systems
NASA should improve its websites and provide one easy-to-use portal for all technology transfer activities. The headquarters technology transfer office should also work with appropriate technical support to develop an integrated information system to automate its business operations, using an upgraded NASA Technology Transfer System (NTTS) as the base, and make it the standard means for information reporting and information management throughout NASA for technology transfer.
Recommendation # 7: The Timeliness of the Intellectual Property Process
The headquarters IPP office, in cooperation with the Office of General Counsel, should develop processing-time performance standards for patent applications, licenses, and partnership agreements.
Recommendation # 8: Performance Metrics
NASA should develop a comprehensive system for evaluating its technology transfer efforts that utilizes a balanced scorecard for measuring outputs, assesses the long-term economic and social impacts of NASA technology transfer, and establishes individual performance standards for all officials who have a role in technology transfer.
For most of these recommendations, the Panel lists in Chapter 4 specific actions NASA should take to implement them.
