Summary: GAO-02-1020 Space Transportation: Challenges Facing NASA’s Space Launch Initiative
September 17, 2002
The Honorable Dana Rohrabacher
Chairman
The Honorable Bart Gordon
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics
Committee on Science
House of Representatives
In 2001, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) began
undertaking a new effort – the Space Launch Initiative (SLI) – to develop a
new generation of space transportation vehicles. SLI is expected to result
in the development of the second generation of reusable launch vehicles,
the space shuttle being the first generation. NASA plans to spend
$4.8 billion on the program through fiscal year 2006. SLI is part of a
broader program – known as NASA’s Integrated Space Transportation
Plan – to address future space transportation needs. Under the plan, NASA
envisions making upgrades to extend the life of the space shuttle and
undertaking longer-term research and development of future
transportation technologies and transportation systems, including space
vehicles that can reach orbit in just one-stage.
SLI is a highly ambitious program. It will require NASA to develop and
advance new technologies, such as propulsion and airframe systems,
which in turn can potentially be used by U.S. industry to create new
business opportunities in space. The undertaking will also require a high
level of communication and coordination between a range of partners,
including private-sector contractors, academia, and the Department of
Defense (DOD). Moreover, it will require effective controls and oversight
to reduce cost, scheduling, and technical risks. NASA’s previous attempts
to develop a new generation of space vehicles were unsuccessful largely
because NASA did not successfully implement and adhere to critical
project management controls and activities.
You requested that we assess NASA’s progress with the Space Launch
Initiative, particularly with respect to defining requirements and
implementing management controls.
NASA plans to define basic requirements for its second-generation
reusable launch vehicle – that is, what the crew size will be, what the
payload capacity will be, and what designs or architectures are worth
pursuing – by November 2002. But considerable challenges must be
addressed before NASA can accomplish this.
First, NASA has to complete a reassessment of its overall space
transportation plans. In doing so, it must decide whether it should
continue pursuing the development of second-generation vehicles as
planned, pursue alternative ways to develop the second generation in
order to more quickly replace the space shuttle, or postpone these efforts
altogether indefinitely until there is a major breakthrough in technology
that could vastly improve performance and reduce costs. This decision
will be difficult, given the uncertainties about the availability of
technologies needed to reduce costs and enhance performance for future
space flight.
Second, NASA is currently reassessing the future of the International
Space Station. The decisions it will make as part of this evaluation, such as
how many crew will operate the station, will have a dramatic impact on
NASA’s requirements for a second-generation vehicle. But they will be
difficult to reach, since they require NASA to come to agreement with
international partners who are concerned about planned cutbacks to the
station’s capabilities.
Third, NASA needs to decide whether the SLI program will be developed
jointly with DOD and, if so, how it can accommodate DOD’s requirements
for a reusable launch vehicle. So far, indications are that NASA and DOD
will share many of the same objectives for the vehicle, but there are
significant differences in priorities and requirements.
Until NASA finalizes its basic requirements for SLI, it cannot implement
management controls that are essential to predicting what the total costs
of the program will be and to minimizing risks with NASA’s planned initial
investment of $4.8 billion. These include cost estimates, controls designed
to provide early warnings of cost and schedule overruns, and risk
mitigation plans. Moreover, there are potential impediments to NASA’s
development and effective use of a detailed cost estimate, including the
lack of a modern integrated financial management system. Lastly, NASA
does not plan to develop several measures that are important to assessing
how the program as a whole is making progress toward achieving its key
objectives, reducing risks, and maturing technology.
Results in Brief
It is important for NASA to implement management controls for SLI as
soon as possible, so that it can provide its managers and the Congress with
the information needed to ensure that the program is on track and able to
meet expectations. We are making recommendations to NASA that focus
on the need to make decisions with regard to the future of NASA’s overall
space transportation plan, the future of the space station, and DOD’s
participation in the SLI program before setting requirements for SLI. We
are also making recommendations aimed at implementing management
controls for the SLI program.
In its comments to a draft of this report, NASA stated that it concurs with
the recommendations. NASA believes that much of the SLI program’s
success is directly related to the implementation of project management
controls and appropriate levels of insight. NASA’s response is included as
appendix 1.
