Statement of Daniel S. Goldin, Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, before the Committee on Science House of Representatives

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am happy to be here today
to discuss the reality, the promise and the challenges of the International
Space Station. As we meet together in this hearing room, the second Expedition
crew members are living and working in the International Space Station
above us. As 800 million people on this planet saw during the Academy Awards
program a week ago, the crew is in orbit; the International Space Station
(ISS) is in orbit; and, in no small measure, this Committee has played
a crucial role in making continuous presence in space a reality.

But that reality represents only the first step. When we finish, ISS
will be a premier, world-class laboratory in low-Earth orbit that promises
to yield insights, science, and information, the likes of which we cannot
fully comprehend as we stand here at the beginning. It was nearly 20 years
ago in his 1984 State of the Union address that President Ronald Reagan,
challenging America to follow our dreams and dare to be great, directed
NASA to develop the Space Station. Twenty years of flight experience with
the Shuttle. Twenty years of limited-duration microgravity research. Twenty
years of planning, defining, designing and, yes, redesigning and modifying
what the Space Station will be, how it will be built, and what nations
will participate.

Some would argue that it is 20 years too long, or $20 billion too much.
We have had those debates in this Committee, and on the floor of the House
and Senate. And we will continue to have them, perhaps even long after
the ISS has fulfilled its primary mission. For that is the way of public
policy and discourse in our Nation, and in this institution. Any program
which makes use of large sums of taxpayer dollars, as the ISS program certainly
does, must be subjected to the scrutiny of this Committee and the Congress
as a whole, as well as the White House and the general public. We at NASA
acknowledge the need for–and welcome–that scrutiny and debate, because
we believe that NASA holds a public trust for which we must be accountable,
and because it enables us to look beyond our computer terminals, machine
tools and assembly operations to our larger responsibility of efficiently
and effectively carrying out national policy.

That brings me to the challenge that we face as we begin this first
NASA-focused hearing of this Congress in this Committee–our projected
$4 billion cost growth for the ISS. We come to you as representatives of
a new Administration which, in response to large ISS cost growth, has established
a new budget for the International Space Station with strict requirements
and guidelines to manage within the stated budget while achieving priority
goals of the program. Let me make it very clear to anyone who may have
any doubt: we support the direction of this Administration regarding the
ISS budget levels and program content. And we accept the challenges that
the FY 2002 Budget presents us.

In the testimony that follows, I will describe those challenges more
fully and illustrate what we are doing to meet them and continue our progress
toward the goals of the International Space Station.

The NASA portion of the President’s FY 2002 Budget Blueprint addresses
projected cost growth in the Program, making necessary modifications to
U.S. plans to meet our responsibilities for the ISS program. The revised
plan will continue to support our high priority goals of: 1.) permanent
human presence in space; 2.) accommodation of all international partner
elements; and, 3.) world-class research in space. The ISS is funded at
$2.1 billion for FY 2002, virtually the same level as the budget for FY
2001. This is approximately $230 million more for FY 2002 and about $1
billion more for the ISS over the FY 2002-2006 period from what had been
planned in the FY 2001 ISS budget. This increase comes from transferred
CRV funding that was in the Science, Aeronautics and Technology appropriations
account.

After conservatively applying two years of actual operational experience
to eliminate many unknowns and significantly refine our cost estimating,
we have recently projected ISS cost growth to be potentially as high as
$4 billion over the next 5 years. NASA is making hard decisions in order
to curtail the projected growth while still supporting our high priority
goals. The FY 2002 Budget redirects funds from high-cost elements still
in the early stages of development, including the Propulsion Module, Crew
Return Vehicle (CRV), and Habitation Module. The budget also reduces funding
for U.S. research equipment and associated infrastructure commensurate
with the availability of on-orbit resources. Over the next several months,
we will evaluate the actions required to align research needs with our
on-orbit capabilities. This budget maintains a commitment to launch the
hardware which NASA has already built and maintains the current assembly
schedule until at least 2004.

NASA will not allow the projected cost growth to materialize unchallenged.
We recognize that we must restrain the projected cost growth and restore
credible cost estimates. We are working aggressively to meet those twin
challenges and place ourselves in a position to meet our long-standing
goals of seven-person crew and maximize the research capability within
the requested budget. We recognize that our philosophy and assumptions
regarding ISS operations are still conservative, in that they reflect our
experience on highly time-critical Shuttle flights. We believe that there
is considerable potential for instituting creative cost-cutting actions
which streamline processes, focus resources, and leverage the strengths
of our International Partners.

NASA is determined to control ISS costs within the Human Space Flight
program and has already launched a comprehensive suite of specific management
initiatives at the Johnson Space Center, Kennedy Space Center, Marshall
Space Flight Center, and with our International Partners. These actions,
described in more detail in this testimony, are designed to curtail cost
growth, not only of the ISS program, but also of all programs within NASA’s
Human Space Flight program. I am confident that these initiatives will
create savings, some in the near-term and others over a more gradual or
phased timeframe. Although we are still in the process of assessing potential
management actions and program schedules, we will refine our plans, research
priorities, and general program restructuring strategy by this summer.
We will be pleased to outline our conclusions at that time before this
Committee.

ISS Operational Experience and Accomplishments

In order to put the current budget challenge in proper context, a review
of recent ISS accomplishments is in order. Since the Service Module launch
date was established in May 2000, we have collaborated with our partner,
the Russian Aviation and Space Agency, to execute 11 successful launches
and dockings to the ISS, with a net schedule slip of only 3 weeks. As a
result of this surge of program activity over the past year, we have grown
the ISS from the Unity and Zarya modules into a permanently crewed vehicle
and initiated the steps to build the premier research laboratory in space.
Among the elements now on-orbit are the Zvezda Service Module, Russia’s
keystone contribution, and the U.S. laboratory, Destiny, the most complex
and capable element of the entire ISS facility.

The ISS operations team has successfully activated and confirmed the
functionality of life support, power, control, communications, structural,
and Extravehicular Activity (EVA) subsystems. Remarkably, the operation
of equipment, such as the massive control moment gyros (spinning at 6600
revolutions per minute) and the largest spacecraft solar arrays ever deployed,
is proceeding superbly. Meanwhile astronauts and flight controllers have
been learning about the on-orbit ISS environment, including air quality,
acoustic levels, and electrical arcing hazards, helping to reduce the uncertainties
associated with operating the ISS.

The operations team has also demonstrated an ability to deal effectively
with a wide range of complex, often unpredictable events in a highly safe
and methodical manner in the two years since the first ISS element launched.
Although there have been some equipment anomalies (e.g. carbon dioxide
removal units, air conditioners, and exercise equipment), the program has
exhibited a robust capacity to deal with these problems by relying on an
effective combination of backup systems, engineering analysis, maintenance
procedures, and logistical support via both the Space Shuttle and Russian
Progress vehicles. I hope that the Committee shares my pride in the fact
that the present state of the on-orbit ISS is outstanding.

As ISS assembly proceeds overhead, vehicle development engineers are
working with the vehicle elements for the next 14 U.S. flights, all of
which have been delivered to the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) for testing
and integration. Three quarters of all U.S. hardware is now either at KSC
or deployed on-orbit. NASA’s decision to conduct Multi-Element Integration
Tests (MEIT), designed to reduce the technical risks of flight elements
before they launch, has been validated through the successful on-orbit
operations of the ISS to date. The second sequence of these MEIT’s is currently
underway. The Mission Control Center-Houston (MCC-H) expanded its real-time
support and, after the activation of Destiny in February 2001, assumed
responsibility from MCC-Moscow as the lead ISS control center.

The Expedition One crew arrived at the ISS via a Soyuz spacecraft in
November 2000, and executed an extremely productive 4-month tour on-orbit,
marked by the buildup of ISS functionality, early research, and good health.
Remarkably, all three members of the Expedition One crew walked off Discovery
after their 4-month stay. This is a testimony to the lessons we have already
learned in space. This pioneering crew handed over the keys to their successors
who arrived via the Space Shuttle on March 10. Today, James Voss, Susan
Helms, and Yury Usachev are in the early stages of their 3-month stay aboard
the ISS, preparing to employ the Human Research Facility and other equipment
to begin 18 NASA experimental investigations. What a difference a year
makes. The experiences gleaned by the Expedition crews, flight controllers,
logistics engineers, and test and verification engineers are providing
the ISS program with a rich operations knowledge base which will be invaluable
as we continue to seek more effective and cost-efficient methods of running
a space station.

 

Nature and Origin of Cost Growth

Before I describe the source of the ISS cost growth, let me explain
the process by which we manage the ISS budget. The project management process
routinely identifies ISS budgetary risk items–so-called “liens” and “threats.”
The program manager assesses the risks for their probability of being incurred
based on program schedules, past cost performance, priority of requirements,
and program reserves. At any given point in time, there exists within the
ISS program a list of these budgetary risks, which may or may not materialize.
Generally, the total cost of these risks is greater than the available
program reserves. The status of this list of risk items is regularly briefed
to the Congress as part of the annual budget process. As the ISS program
assesses the need for and likelihood of incurring these risk items, those
that are deemed critical and inevitable are incorporated into the program
baseline and are then negotiated as specific contract changes. A series
of program control boards assesses all program changes and makes recommendations
to the Program Manager for approval. These control boards validate the
overall cost estimates of the changes.

Following the July 2000, Zvezda Service Module launch, unexpected high
monthly program spending rates prompted the ISS Program Manager to call
for a new assessment of budgetary risks. This quick-look assessment of
the entire program, completed and reported to the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) in November 2000, indicated a significant projected cost
growth for the FY 2002-2006 period relative to the FY 2001 budget. To better
understand the rising costs and clarify the program baseline, ISS Program
Manager Tommy Holloway and the NASA Headquarters Office of Space Flight,
led by Joe Rothenberg, jointly conducted a more in-depth “bottom-up” review
of the components of the ISS Program, excluding the Crew Return Vehicle,
which had been reviewed in the previous year, and Research.

Mr. Chairman, I am convinced that we will be able to present options
that meet this budget challenge. I am assuming, of course, that we will
encounter no major unforeseen problems during assembly. Our assessment,
indicating potential cost growth of approximately $4 billion, was completed
in late January and reported to the OMB immediately thereafter. The assessment
is based on conservative assumptions for operations, includes most known
liens and threats, including a number of low probability threats, and includes
about $800 million in reserves.

Now I would like to address why this projection in cost growth has occurred.
First and foremost, the cost growth is driven by the unprecedented technical
and management complexity of the ISS program. Approximately half of this
growth originates from identified liens and threats, for which reserve
levels had been assumed adequate to cover. With the surge of activity triggered
by the launch of the Service Module and preparation for the Expedition
One crew, the number and value of realized liens began to mount sharply,
and the level of available reserves dropped dramatically. This was a key
factor in prompting the Program to begin the recent reassessment of cost
growth potential.

Prior to the launch of the Service Module, delay-driven under-spending
in operations and other parts of the program, and a history of significant
year-to-year carryover led to an assessment, as recently as August, that
program funding was adequate but reserves were tight. As the pace of assembly
accelerated, the true cost of permanently-crewed operations was experienced,
carryover and reserve levels rapidly declined, and the full magnitude of
the potential cost growth became apparent. I am very proud of our team,
because as soon as we recognized the growth, we stepped up to face it and
we are doing what needs to be done to contain it. As part of our efforts
as an Agency to respond to this cost growth, we will ensure that lessons
learned are captured and applied, to help us avoid future cost growth on
ISS or other programs.

The remaining growth, in addition to some of the previously identified
liens and threats that have now materialized–is due to newly identified
risks, driven largely by a more mature understanding of operational and
training requirements gleaned from the last two years of actual ISS operations
experience. The areas affecting funding growth include the Propulsion Module,
the Habitation Module, advanced life support equipment, software production
and integration, mission operations, spares, and the workforce requirements
necessary to test, integrate and prepare elements for launch and assembly.
Within the past NASA appropriation, the annual budgets for the ISS were
expected to peak in FY 2000 and then decrease sharply in FY 2001 and subsequent
years. Due to continued workloads, the magnitude of program destaffing
will not be as great in FY 2001 and FY 2002 as originally projected; however
in subsequent years, decreases are still expected to be sizable.

Whether accounted for as established liens and threats or as newly-identified
items, the cost growth drivers can be characterized as a collection of
the following types: additional content (e.g. the Habitation module and
activities to verify that the hardware and software work together as designed);
schedule slips (including the Propulsion Module); underestimated complexity
(e.g. advanced life support systems, software integration, and Space Station
training facilities development); obsolescence (e.g. avionics and spares);
hardware failures (e.g. control moment gyro sensor repair); and over-ambitious
budget phase-down plans (e.g. Boeing development de-staffing, savings from
the Consolidated Space Operations Contract).

A unique phase of the ISS program began last year, with the ISS partners
bearing the responsibilities for ISS development, integration, testing,
and operation simultaneously. At the initial signs of increased spending,
NASA took proactive measures to update its assessment of programmatic risks,
and identified the potential for significant cost growth. I would like
to thank the ISS team for having had the foresight and courage to identify
the trend, initiate this action and identify this budget challenge as early
as they did. The good news for the program is that we are now fully engaged
and addressing this problem. The following sections address our plan of
action.

Plan of Action -Redirection of Funding

While NASA and the ISS program are undertaking reforms to curtail cost
growth, it is clear that the total savings which can be attained will not
be known for a number of months, and actually realizing savings may take
considerably longer. The budget redirects funding in order to preserve
the highest priority objectives, notably the deployment of the International
Partner modules and further deployment of research capabilities. NASA has
redirected funding from capabilities that are not required to achieve the
primary ISS objectives. Future funding decisions to develop and deploy
any U.S. elements or enhancements beyond completion of the U.S. Core will
depend on the quality of cost estimates, resolution of technical issues,
and the availability of funding through efficiencies within the FY 2002
budget runout for ISS or other Human Space Flight programs and institutional
activities. The following sections address the strategy for propulsion
capability, U.S. crew return capability, habitation capability, research
capability, and cost controls.

Propulsion Capability – Various System Capabilities Being Demonstrated

In reassessing requirements in these areas, it is clear that the risk
associated with reliance on the Russian propulsion services has been significantly
reduced over the last year. We witnessed the successful launch and checkout
of the Service Module (SM); timely Russian ISS appropriations including
payment of past debts; and a continuing production stream of Progress and
Soyuz vehicles. The Space Shuttle has clearly demonstrated that it is a
viable means for ISS reboost and, over the course of several missions,
has provided reboost capability equivalent to that of an entire Russian
Progress vehicle. U.S. control moment gyros are now active, dramatically
reducing the propellant required for attitude control, and overall propellant
usage has been lower than predicted. The risk of inadequate ISS propulsive
capability has also been reduced by the progress on the development schedule
of the European-provided Automated Transfer Vehicle, that will be available
earlier than the most recent schedule for deployment of a U.S. Propulsion
Module.

As a result of our initial on-orbit operational experience, NASA is
more confident of the total propulsion capability and in redirecting planned
Russian Program Assurance funds to meet other ISS needs. We have stopped
work on the Propulsion Module and are continuing to store the U.S. Interim
Control Module (ICM) at the Naval Research Laboratory in Washington D.C.
The ICM, which provided limited protection (due to its short life) against
a SM launch failure, will continue to undergo specific testing and documentation
to preserve its call up potential. In the interim, NASA will also explore
possible options of ICM divestiture. Though our risk posture has improved,
NASA will continue to remain vigilant regarding overall contingency planning
and will continue to approach future risk mitigation as a responsibility
shared among all partner nations.

U.S. Crew Return Capability – Maturing the Design

The X-38 rapid prototyping effort is demonstrating a low-cost, rapid
design, development and testing methodology, producing results at a fraction
of traditional costs. Continuing on a steady path of progress, 6 X-38 atmospheric
flights of prototype vehicles have demonstrated numerous new advanced technologies.
Each of the landmark X-38 flights was performed with flight paths and velocities
that come progressively closer to matching an actual reentry from space.
The technologies being matured meet the rigorous standards of human-rated
spacecraft and will have direct application to the Crew Return Vehicle
(CRV) and other possible future projects.

However, the U.S. CRV has a significant set of design activities to
accomplish before we are ready to enter into a production contract. Just
last year, NASA’s Integrated Action Team, focusing on program management
excellence, concluded that technology risk reduction programs and design
definition must be concluded before committing to production contracts
to best insure that cost, schedule and technical targets can be realized.
Given the magnitude of planned funding dedicated to CRV and the remaining
definition work, funding allocated for the CRV production phase has been
redirected to help resolve ISS core content budgetary shortfalls. NASA
has initiated discussions with the European Space Agency (ESA) on a role
in the CRV project. Critical efforts such as X-38 atmospheric flight testing
and some preliminary CRV design work and linkages with CTV under SLI will
continue so as to maintain viable options for future CRV development. The
planned space flight test of the X-38 is under review as part of the program
assessment.

While funding for the CRV has been redirected, capability to support
a crew size of up to seven is under discussion with our International Partners.
Meanwhile, the X-38 project is advancing, continuing to reduce technology
risks to support a future decision to restore CRV production funding within
the President’s FY 2002 budget runout, if required.

Seven-Person Habitation Capability – Enhancing a Key Resource

Since shortly after the ISS redesign activity, the International Partners
have supported accommodating seven ISS crewmembers. In the past, we have
evaluated a variety of options to satisfy the crew size through utilization
of existing equipment other than the U.S. Habitation Module, such as Node
3. Faced with the current budget challenge, NASA is earnestly evaluating
potential options in detail. There are a number of options to increase
habitation capability, which may fit within the President’s budget runout.
The NASA team is assessing these, and will recommend an option to pursue
within a few months. We are also working with our International Partners
to identify any additional resources that they can provide to the program.

Research Restructuring- Maximizing Science Return

Conducting world-class research in space continues to be a top priority
for the ISS. NASA is on track to deliver the first 10 research equipment
racks to ISS as planned. In addition, we have already selected more than
100 specific experiments planned for the first 6 ISS increments. To maximize
research opportunities within the fiscal resources available, however,
NASA is restructuring the ISS research budget to align it with the on-orbit
capabilities and fiscal resources available. This restructuring activity
will take place over the next few months. The results of this restructure
will require adjustment to our current research planning. In consultation
with the research community, the program is prioritizing and time-phasing
research plans for internal lab-based biomedical, biotechnology and fundamental
research, as well as external truss and exposed platform Fundamental Physics,
Earth and Space Sciences research. The program will build multipurpose
research facilities to enable human research, fluids and combustion, materials
science, fundamental physics, and fundamental biology programs. In order
to ensure the research capability needed to achieve our priority science
objectives, NASA’s strategy is to grow to the needed complement of U.S.
research racks required to support our biological and physical sciences
program.

NASA is engaging the scientific community as part of its process for
prioritizing research areas on ISS consistent with available resources.
NASA’s Office of Biological and Physical Research (OBPR) has proposed a
framework, consistent with NASA’s commitment to safety, for prioritizing
ISS research. This framework will serve as the basis of discussion with
the scientific community.

OBPR’s proposed priorities for near-term research are: (1.) biomedical
research; (2.)biotechnology research; and, (3.)fundamental research. Within
each of these research areas, OBPR will pursue enhanced safety and performance
in space as well as contributions to Earth-based medicine and industry.
Biomedical research is primarily mission driven research focused on increasing
safety, ensuring health of astronauts, improving space craft environments,
and reducing risks associated with long duration space flight. Biotechnology
research includes fundamental and applied research such as Cellular
and Molecular Biology, Structural Biology, Genomics, and Biomolecular Physics
and Chemistry. More applied biotechnology disciplines include Tissue
Engineering, and Biomaterials. Fundamental research includes fundamental
biological, physical, chemical, and engineering research. Fundamental research
will lead to ground-breaking advances in atomic physics, evolutionary,
developmental, and integrative biology, combustion, materials science,
and engineering.

OBPR’s proposed framework includes an emphasis on interdisciplinary
research. Our approach will be based on flexibility in scheduling research
experiments, enabling OBPR to take advantage of opportunities as they occur.
NASA’s Office of Earth Science has proposed its SAGE-III experiments and
other peer-reviewed research as its highest priority. The Office of Space
Science plans to focus on peer-reviewed pallet based research opportunities.

The Expedition One crew initiated several U.S. research activities in
the areas of Earth observations, education seed growth experiments, crystal
growth of biological macromolecules, motion and vibration technology experiments
and human research data collection. With the delivery of the U.S. Laboratory
Module, Destiny, in February 2001, the stage was set to begin significant
levels of ISS research. Rack volume, power and crew-time are now available
to initiate scientific and commercial research. Lab outfitting began with
the delivery of the Human Research Facility following the STS-102 launch
on March 8, 2001, and two additional multipurpose racks will be delivered
on the STS-100 launch planned for April 19^th.

Eighteen NASA experiments are scheduled to become operational during
Expedition Two. The early experiments will include a wide variety of experiments
in human life sciences, physical sciences, commercial space product development,
Earth observation, as well as education and technology demonstrations.
NASA will continue to maximize the research content within the available
resources. The ISS International Partner research laboratories will be
delivered in 2004-2005, each containing 5 racks of international research
facilities and 5 rack locations for additional NASA research hardware.
Limited crew time for supporting on-orbit experimentsódue to the reduction
in permanent crew size from 7 to 3–will be the major resource constraint
for research activities. We are exploring options for enhancing crew time
at the ISS for research support, using both permanent and non-permanent
crews. One option for doing this is using Shuttle crews when the Shuttle
is docked to the ISS. Longer Shuttle stays and full Shuttle crews could
provide some increase in capability for selective research areas.
Our goal is to increase the time spent by permanent crew to enhance the
research program and to deploy the needed major research facilities.

Cost Control Actions

I want to be candid with the Committeeóachieving the necessary savings
requires difficult decisions. We have started to do that now be redirecting
funding from new developments, and we will continue to make tough decisions
as we reassess the program in the coming months in order to solve our current
budget problems. This is a challenging budget. I cannot tell you today
that ISS funding problems are behind us. Although our confidence is growing
with the maturity of the hardware, its successful performance, and our
operational experience, I am sure that we will continue to face challenges.
But the roadmap is clearóas we confront potential cost growth, we will
have to make decisions within the ISS program, and within the other Human
Space Flight programs, on content, capabilities and schedule that allow
us to achieve our commitment to living within our means.

As described in the President’s Budget Blueprint, NASA is initiating
reforms and developing a plan to ensure that future ISS costs remain within
the President’s 2002 Budget plan. Future funding decisions on our current
program, as well as our ability to develop and deploy any U.S. elements
or enhancements beyond completion of the U.S. Core will depend on the quality
of cost estimates, resolution of technical issues, and the availability
of funding through efficiencies within the 2002 Budget runout for ISS or
other Human Space Flight programs and institutional activities. We are
rapidly moving out to meet the challenge. Some of the reform actions being
executed through early summer are detailed below.

H.R. 1654 specifies an ISS budget cap of $25.0 billion with an additional
$5 billion flexibility in case of emergency. The intent of the cap language
is certainly to force content trades instead of increased funding. This
budget inherently does that. In fact, this budget plan indicates that the
program will be within the $25 billion cap when the U.S. Core Complete
is achieved in FY 2004. How the cap language should apply to elements that
are considered enhancements is an issue that we must work with the Congress.

Conclusion

Since 1993, I have seen the ISS mature from a paper design to become
humanity’s premier platform for exploration in space. It is proving its
promise with each successful day of operation. The accomplishments of NASA,
our contractors, and our International Partners in building the ISS are
no less than historic. These accomplishments are the direct result of diligent
preparation, continued attention to safety, and a great deal of dedication
and hard work. However we cannot rest on our laurels, and the current budget
challenge reminds us that we must live within our means. The FY 2002 budget
reflects the Administration’s determination to contain cost growth in all
Federal programs while applying sound, proactive management principles.
NASA and the ISS program are embracing this philosophy by identifying potential
cost growth in advance, initiating necessary reforms, and focusing resources
on the top priorities: 1.) permanent human presence in space; 2.) accommodation
of international partner elements; and, 3.) world-class research in space.

Considering the technical and management complexity of the program,
we have made incredible progress. Let me assure you that NASA will continue
to strive to control ISS program costs, for our success in doing so is
critical to the future of the Unites States Human Space Flight program.
In fact, it is not unreasonable to assume that the extent to which NASA’s
performance overcomes this budget challenge in the coming years will strongly
influence the direction and vigor of future human space endeavors.

While NASA retains its hopes of expanding our human exploration activities
beyond low-Earth orbit, at this time NASA’s Human Space Flight program
is completely focused on two priorities: flying the Space Shuttle safely
and completing the construction, assembly and operation of the ISS. The
Administration’s direction to NASA provides the flexibility to build back
to the current baseline capabilities over time, provided it can be done
within the resources gained through other efficiencies and subject to Administration
approval. As such, we will continue to manage risks and priorities, while
exercising fiscal restraint and executing cost control efforts. As we enact
reforms or review requirements to control cost, safety will remain NASA’s
first priority.

I welcome the opportunity to discuss our progress, and I remain confident
that with the continued support of this Committee, the entire Congress
and the Administration, we will meet this challenge and build on the tremendous
success that the International Space Station has achieved to date.