Report to Congress on the Solid Rocket Motor Industrial Base Sustainment and Implementation Plan Redacted Version (Excerpt)
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics May 2011
Based on the analysis and findings of the Interagency Task Force, the DoD concludes:
1. The Department must preserve the scientific, engineering and design skills and production capabilities necessary to support both large- and small-SRMs. The DoD cannot allow the SRM industrial base to shut down until DoD determines its next generation requirements because the potential expense and schedule delays of restarting the industry would be too great. The SRM production capabilities are needed to support the MM III through 2030 and the D5 through 2042.
2. The Department relies on SRMs to meet many of its national security requirements. SPecifically, the DoD must have large SRMs for propulsion of strategic missiles, as well as for heavy space launch applications, which are vital to its national security strategic deterrence mission.
3. Industry must better align its capacity with the Department’s current and future large-SRM market demand.
4. The Military Services and Defense Agencies need to better define future needs for SRMs beyond the FYDP, at least through 2030, and then communicate those needs to the supplier base. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) needs to work across program and Service/Agency lines and remain involved in the deliberate management of this vital industrial sector.
5. Production activities alone will not be sufficient to protect and/or restore critical technical and creative skills necessary for future missile development and current missile sustainment, regardless of what company or what facility executes the production. Research and development programs, such as the Air Force ICBM Demonstration and Validation program, are required to preserve SRM science and technology, engineering and design teams and their critical skills.
6. The most efficient business model for the large-SRM industry is competition with continued rationalization. The upfront requalification and facilitization costs associated with natural monopoly or a government-owned/contractor-operated model are prohibitive.
