Prepared Statement of Dr. Matthew B. Koss: “The Future of Human Space Flight” (part 1)
Statement of Matthew B. Koss, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Physics, College of the Holy Cross, Worcester, Massachusetts
Before the Committee on Science, House of Representatives
October 16, 2003
Introduction
Mr. Chairman and members of the Science Committee:
Thank you for the invitation to come before you and participate in this hearing on the Future of Human Space Flight. I am honored by your request.
Like many Americans, I sat riveted to the television that Saturday morning when the shuttle Columbia and her crew failed to come home safely. I was both stunned and saddened as I sat and watched and wondered, “How could this have happened?”
As a scientist, I have participated in research experiments that flew on three of Columbia’s previous flights (STS-62 in 1994, STS-75 in 1996, and STS-87 in 1997), and thus I felt a special kinship to the Columbia and her crew. In a curious way, I felt that the Columbia was my shuttle. I had briefed and spoken with the crews of the three Columbia missions that I had worked on, and in doing so I had met Kalpana Chawla one of Columbia’s crewmembers who had just perished. I felt great sadness and sympathy for the families of the astronauts who died.
As I continued to watch the news coverage of the unfolding tragedy, I began to feel growing remorse and personal responsibility. STS-107 was a dedicated science mission, much like those in which I had participated. I asked myself if I, as a participating scientist in prior dedicated science missions, was in any way responsible for what had just occurred.
I thought back to my own time at the Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama. While monitoring and controlling my experiments, my colleagues and I spoke often of the extraordinary risks that the shuttle astronauts took each time they flew a mission. We knew that the astronauts understood the risks and accepted them willingly. As scientists, we believed we understood the risks, and we debated whether or not we bore any responsibility for the acceptance of those risks. Even though our experiments were part of the payload brought to orbit by the crew, and served as partial justification for the mission, we confidently concluded that we were not responsible for any of the risk. We reasoned that NASA created and maintains the shuttle program in support of NASA’s larger mission for the human exploration and development of space and not solely for the performance of laboratory science on orbit. Therefore, we concluded that we could not be responsible for the risks assumed.
Although our reasoning then may have been correct technically, our confident conclusion now seems utterly feckless and shamefully inadequate. That convenient, yet obviously hollow reasoning came crashing down to earth with the Columbia last February. As I sat and I watched, I realized that I must bear my share of the responsibility for the Columbia accident.
Unlike the astronauts who either conduct or bring these experiments to orbit, scientists like me, with the exception of a few Payload Specialists, never put their own lives on the line for the work that they do or the rewards that can follow a successful experiment. Is this then the source of the scientist’s culpability that we reap the rewards while standing on the shoulders of others who assume the risks? No, I think not. The scientist’s culpability stems from a conceit that we have long acknowledged privately but have not expressed publicly:
The vast majority of physical science experiments conducted in orbit simply do not require on-board human intervention or assistance.
As penance for quietly accepting the benefits of on-orbit experiments without sharing the risks or expressing the alternatives, I need to say publicly that the cost of using astronauts to perform science experiments in space is too high both in dollars spent and in lives lost. At the risk of incurring my colleagues’ wrath, I feel compelled to say that I, and the other scientists who reveled in the glory of conducting experiments aboard the shuttle, are not blameless. In that spirit, I wrote an article that subsequently appeared as an op-ed in the New York Times on Sunday, June 29, 2003 (see Exhibit 1, attached hereto).
Since the publication of that article, I have heard from many of my colleagues, both within and outside of NASA. Most of my fellow scientists who responded expressed their support and agreement with my article, but not all. I have engaged in lively discussions with many who have disagreed with the opinions I expressed in my article, and through those discussions, we are finding and forging common ground. My testimony here today has benefited from these discussions.
Answers To Specific Questions Submitted By The Chair
There are two types of on-orbit laboratory science experiments performed on the shuttle: (1) payload experiments and (2) laboratory experiments. Payload experiments are self-contained packages mounted in the payload bay of the shuttle. They run autonomously or are controlled remotely from the ground by the scientists and engineers who designed and built them. No human intervention is required for payload experiments. By contrast, laboratory experiments are conducted in the mid-deck or Spacelab module, and were generally operated by astronauts with teleoperational assistance from scientists on the ground.
Of the two varieties of experiments, payload experiments tend to be larger, more ambitious and robust, and historically delivered more useful data and results. Astronauts have limited time and capabilities to conduct elaborate experiments in space.
Although rarely the subject of popular media, most of the experiments in materials science conducted on orbit were payload experiments. This simple and irrefutable fact demonstrates that it is not necessary to have human participation to conduct orbital research in materials science.
While I do not profess to be an expert in fields other than my own, it follows that human participation has not been and is not essential to conduct orbital research in Fundamental Physics, as the majority of those experiments were conducted as payload experiments. In addition, and despite that the majority of experiments in both Fluids and Combustion were not conducted as payload experiments, I believe that the participation of people in space is not strictly necessary to conduct orbital research in either of these disciplines.
There are very few science experiments, save those on human themselves, that were conducted on the Space Shuttle or Space Station that could not have been conducted autonomously or remotely. At the outset, making on-orbit experiments fully autonomous or remote controlled will require more development time, and the experiment design would most likely need to be more complicated and involved, but it can most certainly be accomplished. Speaking immodestly, scientists and engineers are a creative and gifted bunch and are more than up to the task of finding new ways to conduct orbital research without on-site human assistance.
Nonetheless, with apologies to the Committee, I respectfully submit that we are asking the wrong question. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board concluded that the burden of proof must be reversed on any future shuttle missions. Instead of awaiting evidence that the shuttle might be unsafe to fly, on any future missions, NASA must instead affirmatively demonstrate that the shuttle is safe to fly. Given the grave risk to human life orbital research involves, scientific experiments ought to meet that same exacting standard. If a scientist proposes an orbital experiment to be conducted by astronauts aboard the Shuttle or the Space Station, he or she must demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence that human assistance is only reasonable way to conduct the given experiment.
Although some may believe me audacious for making such a sweeping statement, I submit here today that almost all the physical science experiments now conducted on the Space Shuttle or Space Station could be conducted autonomously or remotely. In addition, I believe that many life science experiments, save those using human themselves as subjects, could be conducted autonomously or remotely as well.
I have made a broad and bold assertion, and one that requires some additional explanation. To do that, let’s imagine a hypothetical “experiment” where we want to compare how water and milk freeze in ice cube trays. The easiest way to proceed is to get a freezer, some ice cube trays, a camera, some thermometers, and a computer. Then, one after another, fill the ice-cube trays, place them in the freezer, and record what happens. This is simple, fast, and completely human dependent. If we were to repeat this experiment in a dangerous environment, the needs and requirements of the human operator to exchange the ice-cube trays would be a major concern and complicating factor. If we were to repeat this imaginary experiment on orbit, the human operator is placed at extreme risk, and at a minimum requires significant infrastructure and support. In this imaginary experiment, the ease of conducting the experiment via human operators is clearly offset by the complexities and risk of getting the operators safely to orbit and back, and of sustaining them while in orbit. The added complexities, development time, expertise and effort to automate or remotely control the exchange ice cube trays and the recording of data is quite obviously the best way to proceed. This is very much the situation we are in with respect to human enabled experiments on the space shuttle or space station.
In the case of the Space Shuttle and Space Station, the infrastructure and facilities to support humans on orbit is already there. So it is certainly easier to design smaller experiments to operate in the laboratory mode with astronauts running experiments that are important and compelling. However, this is an efficacy and not a requirement. With sufficient development time, funding, and expertise, virtually all physical science experiments now conducted on orbit could be done either autonomously or remotely. In addition, doing so would be consistent with the Columbia Accident Investigation Board’s recommendation to separate humans from cargo.
It is easy to imagine the criticisms to this analysis from those who believe that direct on board human engagement is required. They might say that intelligent response is required to deal with unanticipated phenomena, or that a particular instrumental dexterity is required, or that humans are needed to troubleshoot and repair instruments and equipment, or that we need human involvement to realize serendipitous discoveries. To be sure, all of these criticisms have an element of truth, but in the end, they do not withstand detailed scrutiny.
The creative input of human intelligence to deal with unanticipated phenomena is a hallmark and a necessity of experimental science. Indeed in many experiments there will be contingencies that were not preprogrammed into an automated system. However the remote control of orbital experiments provides the necessary human intervention. The scientists on the ground who are most expert in the phenomena and the experimental apparatus are the most qualified to recognize the need for change, and to make that change. If a hardware or equipment modification is now called for, then a re-flight is the best way to make that modification.
For the issue of instrumental dexterity, clearly humans are better at some tasks while computer or technology is better at others. However in experimental science there is no single correct way to accomplish a particular task. There are many ways that work and the job of the experiment designer is to find a way that works. That way may require the unique abilities or advantage of a human operator and may indeed be the simplest and most straightforward way to accomplish a particular task. However it is extraordinarily unlikely that it is the only way. The challenge of the design team is to figure out a way to accomplish the task that does not require human dexterity.
Troubleshooting or repair of apparatus and equipment is most definitely an area where humans excel as compared to autonomous or remote control systems. However I know of no experiment so important that it is required that it be successful on the particular flight it is manifested. It seems to me that in such cases where repair is necessary, that the repairs could take place post flight and the experiment could be re-manifested and flown in due course.
Advocates for an on board human role in physical science experiments often claim that the serendipitous discoveries that are vital to the continuing advancement of science require a human being with all five senses activity involved in the experiment. I certainly agree that serendipitous discoveries are vital to a healthy science. Today’s directed research questions often came from yesterday’s serendipitous discovery. However the key to these discoveries lies in the mind of the scientist and not in the sense instruments. In addition, who is more likely to make a serendipitous discovery? The astronaut, who no matter how extraordinary, or well trained, has many experiments and tasks to monitor and is not an expert in the particular experiment. Or the science team on the ground comprised of the experts who designed the experiment and are engaged with the tele-metered data full time? Clearly the scientists on the ground are better prepared to make serendipitous discoveries.
In addition, of the five human senses, only taste and smell cannot be bettered via instruments. We certainly don’t want astronauts using their sense of taste or smell in performing experiments on orbit. To protect the astronauts, we rightly require that every experiment be carefully contained and confined to ensure no breeches or leaks that could be inhaled or ingested. Furthermore, the apparent weightless environment affects the astronaut’s sense of smell and taste and serendipitous discoveries come from the superior sensitivity of cameras and sensors that record precise data at high data rates. Thus, many of the subsequent unanticipated discoveries come later, and these discoveries are made by the science teams who even years later are still studying and analyzing the data from a flight experiment.
To be sure, with a broad and sweeping statement such as “almost all the physical science experiments now conducted on the Space Shuttle or Space Station could be conducted autonomously or remotely” there will be exceptions. I thank the many scientists who took the time to discuss their concerns with me following the publication of my article. However, because I believe these situations will be the exception rather than the rule, it goes without saying that we need a well-designed rubric to determine when an exception is warranted even if it has been demonstrated with a preponderance of evidence that human tending is absolutely required.
First, is there sufficient probable value in the results of the given experiment? If it were probable, or even reasonable possible, that the human tending of a given experiment would yield key or irreplaceable results on the path to curing cancer then that experiment would be worth the established costs and risks. For such a seminal experiment even I would be able to overcome my fear of flight to participate in such an endeavor. However, revolutionary results of that dimension are extraordinarily rare in science and should not be the basis of policy. Science grows and develops by innumerable small and hesitant steps, and its power comes from, as the great philosopher of science Alfred North Whitehead said, “…the entire transformation of human habits and human mentality produced by the long line of men of thought from Thales to the present day, men individually powerless, but ultimately the rulers of the world.”
Second, as discussed above, scientists must be made to demonstrate that human tending of their experiment is vital to the success of their experiment. Put bluntly, the experiments of scientists who are unwilling or unable to state why their experiment could not be designed to run autonomously or remotely ought to not receive access to precious orbital research time, money, and space. Or alternately they affirm that the flight and the risk are bourn for other reasons and the human tended science experiment is a valuable add on. As the Challenger and Columbia tragedies have made all too apparent, science must be accountable for the high costs and substantial risks human-tended experiments entail. We scientists should no longer be given a free ride on these issues.
This very change in philosophy of on-orbit scientific pursuits has already begun in the field of astronomy. NASA has chartered a panel to review agency plans for the phase out of the Hubble Space Telescope to the transition to James Webb Space Telescope. The Hubble Space Telescope however could still be further enhanced and its life extended by Space Shuttle servicing missions. Naturally such missions are both risky and expensive. Not being an astronomer, I take it as axiomatic that such missions would significantly contribute to astronomy, and that in any reasonable near term such a mission could not be conducted robotically or remotely. The question then that the panel must answer and take ownership of is “is the further enhancement and use of the Hubble Space telescope worth the risk and the expense of a shuttle servicing mission?”
