- Status Report
- Jan 31, 2023
NASA STS-120 Execute Package FD 10
1. Former President George Bush and First Lady Barbara Bush will be visiting the JSC
Mission Control Center on Thursday.
Former President Bush had visited with JSC leadership and the flight control teams following the space shuttle Columbia accident. Bush Sr. had expressed his interest in returning to Mission Control when we returned to flight. Last year, Mr. Coats and Bush Sr. corresponded and Mr. Coats invited him to visit. It has taken a few missions to finally match up schedules.
His purpose for visiting is to hear a little about the mission and to express his support to the crew and to all of the people supporting the mission. We are not doing a full tour with briefings.
This is an informal visit. They will visit the Shuttle FCR, and via the Flt Director console, will make a call up to you and the crew. So far, the timeliners have scheduled only Pam and Peggy for the event, but you’re welcome to invite other crew members to participate if available. It’s appropriate to address Mr. Bush as “Mr. President.”
The plan is to conduct the crew portion of this event from the WFCR, with shuttle CAPCOM coordinating Bush Sr.’s call to you.
2. LiOH Changeouts
Starting with the pre-sleep LiOH changeout today, you will be using LiOH cans from STS-121 (Transfer List Item 720). As a reminder, these older cans will likely have more dust than newer cans, so don PPE when you perform the changeout. Masks and gloves are stowed in the LiOH volume, and goggles are located in the CCK (MA9N). Masks should only be used once and should be disposed of in the dry trash after use. If you find the masks insufficient, you may don a QDM for additional protection.
FD 10 MMT Summary
The MMT met to review mission priorities, mission progress and orbiter status. The MMT and the ground team greatly appreciate your patience with the additional day that is required to prepare and validate the procedures that you will use during EVA 4, now scheduled for FD12. The MMT did not receive a formal briefing on the task content of EVA 4. This detailed review was scheduled to occur just after the MMT meeting.
Robotic Operations for EVA 4: The MMT received a high level overview of the sequence of robotic events, currently planned for FD 11, which set up the initial conditions for EVA4. At the time of the MMT, it was estimated that the OBSS would remain unpowered for a total of 12 hours. The first 4 hours pertain to the timeframe where the MT/SSRMS has grappled the OBSS and is translating from WS 3 to WS 8. The remaining 8 hours pertain to the timeframe associated with EVA 4. Post-MMT, the operations team further refined the plan. OBSS will now be handed off to SRMS prior to MT translation to WS 8, and then handed back to SSRMS on the morning of the EVA. This will minimize the unpowered time to only that required to support EVA 4 (~ 8 hrs).
Attitude Timeline – The MMT reviewed the requirements that the mission operations team should use to determine trade-offs for returning from the current +XVV attitude to a more desirable -XVV attitude for MMOD risk optimization. The current attitude timeline is optimized for the expected lighting associated with EVA 4, which the MMT recognizes and supports as the first priority. There are many integrated constraints that must be balanced and the Mission Operations team will consider all of them before implementing changes to the timeline plan.
OBSS Grapple Position Anomaly: The Orbiter Project Office was able to identify the root cause of the OBSS grapple position anomaly that was initially seen on FD2. The problem was determined to be a blanket at the SRMS elbow joint (Figure 1) that was improperly installed, which affected the position encoder mechanism on that joint. This encoder position issue is exacerbated when the SRMS elbow joint is at an acute angle, which is why this problem appeared when the SRMS initially grappled the OBSS. During the course of the FD2 inspection operations, a data review shows that the improperly installed blanket has relieved and is no longer inducing a bias in the encoder readings. Under worse case assumptions, if this encoder positioning problem re-occurs, this problem will not cause any structural clearance concerns for late inspection.