NASA Lessons Learned: ISS Program/Solid Fuel Oxygen Generator (SFOG) Utilization

PLLS Database Entry: 1143

Lesson Info

• Lesson Number: 1143
• Lesson Date: 01-feb-2000
• Submitting Organization: HQ
• Submitted by: David M. Lengyel

Subject/Title/Topic(s):

International Space Station (ISS) Program/Solid Fuel Oxygen Generator (SFOG) Utilization

Description of Driving Event:

Utilization of Russian-Built SFOG May Pose a Safety Hazard Aboard International Space Station (ISS) Given Past Problems With the Solid Fuel Oxygen Generator (SFOG)

Lesson(s) Learned:

The Russian Solid Fuel Oxygen Generator (SFOG) is baselined as the backup oxygen supply system for the ISS. This device has experienced problems in its application on MIR and thus may be a potential safety hazard when operated on the ISS.

Recommendation(s):

Examine ways to eliminate the risks posed by the use of the Russian SFOG such as by determining the availability of a better, “off-the-shelf,” safety-proven SFOG or by initiating an R&D effort to produce a safer alternative.

Evidence of Recurrence Control Effectiveness:

NASA concurs with the ASAP recommendation. A joint NASA-Russian Space Agency (RSA) team has completed an investigation of the SFOG experience on MIR. The failure mode has been identified and has been reproduced and verified during ground tests. The position of the NASA-RSA team is that the MIR experience was an isolated incident. Units planned for use on the ISS have been subjected to lot testing and screening of manufacturing and quality records and test reports. A non-flammable containment system to prevent propagation of a fire has been developed and tested as an additional safety enhancement. The conclusion of a joint NASA-RSA engineering, safety and mission assurance, and program management team is that this system is safe for operation on the ISS.

A parallel effort to develop a commercial off-the-shelf oxygen generation system was initiated by NASA during the SFOG failure investigation. This system has been certified for use, if necessary.

Applicable NASA Enterprise(s):

• Human Exploration & Development of Space

Applicable Crosscutting Process(es):

• Manage Strategically
• Provide Aerospace Products & Capabilities: Implementation

Additional Key Phrases:

• Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
• Hazardous/Toxic Waste/Materials
• Medical
• Policy & Planning
• Research & Development
• Safety & Mission Assurance
• Spacecraft
• Test & Verification

Approval Info:

• Approval Date: 25-feb-2002
• Approval Name: Bill Loewy
• Approval Organization: HQ
• Approval Phone Number: 202-358-0528