Minutes for June 19, 2001 EVA AIT

To: Distribution

From: XA/Nancy J. Patrick

Subject: Minutes for June 19, 2001 EVA AIT

The EVA AIT met at the Johnson Space Center on June 19, 2001. Boeing/David Read and XA/Nancy Patrick co-chaired the meeting. Representatives from CB/Flight Crew Operations, XA/EVA Project Office, NT/Flight Systems Safety and Mission Assurance, OM/ISS Mission Integration, OC/ISS Operations Office, OZ/ISS Payloads, EC/Engineering Crew and Thermal Systems, ES/Engineering Structures, Lockheed-Martin, and Boeing-Houston (EVA, Ops and Safety) were present. Representatives from the Kennedy Space Center, Marshall Space Flight Center and Boeing Development Centers supported by telecon. Copies of presentations can be obtained from XA/Bill Rollins, Building 1, room 661, (281) 483-1416.

1. SSAS Contingency Bolt Label and Utility PG1/Melanie Hodges, John Drees,

Mr. Ramos and various Huntington Beach representatives discussed the SSAS contingency bolts (no labels on the structure) and the utility rail labels (labels present but questions about visibility). The discussion then focused on label agreements and implementation and how to streamline the process.

Mr. Ramos and crew office representatives presented the case for adding labels to the SSAS contingency bolts. The crew office contended that if the contingency bolts had to be installed, and there were problems in the process of installing them, it will be important to be able to communicate specifically which bolt was not fully engaged. Mr. Ramos noted that label requirements apply to all EVA interfaces, including contingency interfaces. Huntington Beach contended that the bolts are only required in a contingency, and that if there was a problem engaging one of them it doesn’t really matter which one it is. The bolts require the same level of torque, so if one came up short it won’t matter in the failure resolution which one is short. Additionally, Huntington Beach believed that even if the bolt location is important, you should be able to adequately describe the location without confusion since there are only two bolts at each truss corner.

For the utility rails, Mr. Ramos described the operational scenarios surrounding the utility rails. The utility rails contain connectors that mate up to cables coming into the rails and out of the rails. The utility rails are not intended to be changed out nominally, but they are ORUs (they have gone back and forth between being classified as ORUs and non-ORUs). The rails would be replaced if the connectors within the rails fail, rendering the lines useless. The cables leading into and out of the rails are individually labeled and there are typically 6 to 8 cables on either side of the utility rail. The rails are also labeled, however they are engraved labels and therefore have virtually no contrast between the lettering and the background, making them virtually unreadable. The crew office position is that for the replacement rails only, there should be readable labels at each of the connectors indicating which cable connector mates to each location on the rail. Without readable labels, it would be very difficult to mate the appropriate cables at the appropriate utility rail connector when there are so many cables involved. Huntington Beach noted that the connectors are all keyed so it should not be possible to mate a cable to the incorrect connector. Huntington Beach indicated that the spare utility rails were somewhere in the procurement process and there may be an open CR to procure them. The new label requirement could be included in this CR if it is still open. Otherwise, a new CR is required.

Significant discussion not included in the presentation material:

The EVA AIT discussed low cost labeling options. Huntington Beach explained that each installation drawing references the label drawings and indicates which labels are required at which locations. Therefore additional labels require drawing changes that are expensive. Mr. Ramos noted that during SSCN 549 negotiations, to save money, agreements were made to redline drawings rather than use official drawing updates and this process was not being used. Huntington Beach responded that since that time, the drawing process has changed and electronic drawings are the only method for updating drawings. Therefore the full drawing update process is required to update electronic drawings.

Ms. Patrick then proposed an EVA AIT position for both label issues. Ms. Patrick proposed that EVA not specifically request the SSAS contingency bolt labels, but if other changes are approved that involve updating the affected drawings, that we "piggyback" the label addition on to the drawing change. For the utility rails, Ms. Patrick proposed that labels be added to the spares, since it would be difficult to mate the appropriate connectors should a rail require changeout. EVA AIT members accepted this proposal. PG1/Phil Peterson agreed to check into the CR status for the utility rail spares to determine whether a new CR is required.

Decision: The EVA AIT agreed to pursue new labels on replacement utility rails, however the SSAS contingency bolt labels will only be added if other changes necessitate drawing changes.

Action 616: Determine whether spare utility rail procurement CR is open and label additions can be added to the existing CR

Actionee: PG1/Phil Peterson

Due Date: July 24, 2001

Method for Closure: Report to EVA AIT

Ms. Patrick polled the participants to determine whether the next EVA AIT could be held on July 3 instead of July 10. EVA AIT members agreed to meet on July 3.

The Following Decision Packages were distributed for review July 3, 2001:

PG1-P3-2001-1: SARJ Launch Restraint and EVA Bolt Break Torque Requirement

PNCR-ISS-067: Stage 8A EVA Translation Path Protrusion Non-Compliance’s

Decision: The EVA AIT approved this NCR (note: MOD was not present)

May 8 Status: No report

June 19 Status: Still working on updates at Canoga Park and Huntington Beach. Inputs will be reviewed again on July 24.

NCR-PG2-002A: PV Module Protrusions Noncompliances

Decision: This NCR was approved. Canoga Park confirmed that the A-frame can take EVA handling and translation loads so it can be used to get around the protrusions.

The Following Action Items were reviewed:

AI-511: This action was CLOSED. Ms. Patrick reported that future kick load exceptions will be coordinated with element and launch package managers, however coordinating past exceptions is to low of a priority to address.

AI-543: This action was CLOSED as OBE. Since the EMU thermal capability is significantly better than anticipated when the action was assigned, formal reporting is not required beyond identifying issues when thermal analyses are presented to the CCB. MOD agreed to provide an assessment of extended contact tasks at the EVA CCB during the existing processes of EVA baselining, mid-flow and CoFR reviews.

AI-577: This action remains open and will be addressed again on August 21. The Actionee was changed to ES/Hung Nguyen. Mr. Nguyen reported prior to the EVA AIT that they are still working on the schedule for the qual and acceptance testing, from which this data will be derived.

AI-578: This action remains open and will be addressed again on August 7. Inputs are still in work from various parties.

AI-580: This action was CLOSED. PG1/Steve Gray and B-Hou/Boris Berezin reported that the EVA plan for the ETVCG is to take an assembled ORU from the internal volume out through the airlock, so the only possible EVA assembly required is installing the Luminaire on the ETVCG. This presumes that the ETVCG will fit through the airlock, which will be addressed in July in an NBL test of this and other ORUs and their transport bags. Since this is a scheduled test, the action is closed and issues from the test will be handled through the normal NBL CCR issue review EVA AIT sessions. The ETVCG has always been planned to be transported through the airlock, and was evaluated for that several years ago and accepted. However the filter box was added after that evaluation and neither NBL nor graphical worksite analysis has been done since that change. No new WSA was requested because the NBL evaluation is already planned. Ms. Patrick reported that she will approve the CR that removes the ETVCG from the robot compatible list if and when the NBL test shows that transporting the ORU through the airlock is acceptable, or if an adequate resolution plan is proposed for any issues that come out of the test.

AI-581: This action remains open and will be addressed again on August 7. Mr. Price and Mr. Gray reported that the analysis is required to support 9A FOR. The EVA AIT felt that this should be addressed prior to FOR, since very little training time will be left at that time to deal with a brand new procedure. Mr. Gray agreed to look into the schedule further and determine whether they can move up the analysis date.

AI-593: This action was CLOSED as OBE. Since the EMU thermal capability is significantly better than anticipated when the action was assigned, the EVA AIT decided that this level of detail is probably not required in the NCRs.

AI-598: This action was CLOSED. Ms. Patrick reported that no one is willing to make changes to the flight hardware at this point in the flow without drawing changes. Several vehicle representatives indicated that closer to flight it may be feasible but to start allowing these kinds of changes this early increase the risk of the configuration getting out of control. Ms. Patrick will pass the request on to the 8A team to address at the appropriate point in the S0 flow.

AI-599: This action remains open and will be addressed again on July 24. The heat transfer rate is still in development and should be ready soon. See minutes below for forward action plan for the global EMU/ISS thermal issue.

AI-600: This action remains open and will be addressed again on July 24. Now that the EMU capabilities and ISS thermal environments are fairly well known, the proposed plan will be reviewed with the flight director office and others.

AI-602: This action was CLOSED. DX32/Michelle Hollinger reported that the issue is being addressed by the ISSPO and the element manager is attempting to delete the requirement to tether the MT when unlatched without risking inadvertent release of the MT. The program will develop proposals for MT R&R through their forums and EVA AIT members will support it.

AI-608: This action was CLOSED as OBE. Handrails that violate existing touch temperature limits should be easily identifiable through OCADs, however it doesn’t appear that Boeing is actually reporting them. However other actions are in place to address identification of hardware that exceeds EMU extended contact temperature limits. See minutes below for additional information.

AI-609: This action was CLOSED. Ms. Patrick reported the meeting was conducted on June 15. See minutes below for the conclusions and open actions remaining.

AI-610: This action remains open and will be addressed again on July 24. The action was modified to address only extended contact tasks on the pressurized modules. See minutes below for additional information.

AI-614: This action remains open and will be addressed again on July 3. There was no report

3 EMU Extended Contact Thermal Capabilities and XA/Nancy Patrick, HSMS

ISS Thermal Environment — Issue Status LMES/Grant Bue, ISS Thermal, DX32/Bob Adams, CB/Joe Tanner, NC

There was no presentation material for this topic. Ms. Patrick summarized the results of recent meetings concerning the EMU extended contact with ISS structure issue. Hamilton Sunstrand presented the final proposal for the allowable EMU extended contact temperature range to the EVA CCB on June 8. The proposal allows for 1psi contact between the temperatures of -195ºF to +240ºF for up to 30 minutes. Additional work is required to develop time vs. temperature curves for temperatures outside of this range, and to develop a heat transfer rate for the EMU to allow contact outside this range for objects will smaller thermal mass. The EMU project is currently working to submit the paperwork required to update the EMU certification for this temperature range. There were some lingering questions about whether enough factors of safety are included in the analysis, however this will be evaluated during the change in certification process.

Ms. Patrick then reported on the splinter discussion with ISS passive thermal representatives to address the allowable temperature range and how well that covers ISS needs. Ms. Patrick reported that the splinter discussion was held on June 15 and the following people attended: ES/Marie Kowal and Jay Leggett, LMES/Grant Bue and John Iovine, DX32/Bob Adams, B-Hou/Joe Thomas, NT/Mirka Caros, CA/Joe Tanner and EC5/Scott Cupples and Mike Pantaleano. ISS Thermal reported that for the EMU extended contact range proposed, the only hardware that will violate that range includes ISS NZGL connectors, MMOD shields on pressurized elements, and handrails, and those will be a problem only on the hot side of the range. The truss will remain within the EMU temperature range, and it’s likely that the handrails on the truss will remain within those temperatures. The group determined that the connectors are probably not a problem because they typically in a position where it is difficult to sustain contact with them. The certification limits for the connectors are above the EMU hot limit, and there’s no easy way to determine how hot they can get. During thermal analysis, a connector was only evaluated for whether it stayed within its operating limits or not, and if not thermal protection was added as either a beta cloth "bootie" or thermal tape. The thermal protection only was added to keep it within its operating range, and no further analysis was done to show how hot they get. ES and LMES agreed to pull a story together to quantifiably support the conclusion that truss elements and the hardware on them, including handrails, are not a concern for extended EMU contact.

Ms. Patrick suggested that, in order to assure ourselves, the ISS Program and operations that we will be able to conduct EVAs on ISS when required, we have to be able to explain how often we will be constrained from particular operations on the hardware that can exceed the EMU contact range. This will involve describing which tasks are likely to require extended contact in areas where the hardware exceeds the EMU capabilities, how often the hardware exceeds those limits, and what operational constraints will have to be imposed to ensure the EMU is not exposed to temperatures for which it is not certified. One of the questions involves characterizing the amount of time and under what conditions (beta angle, attitude, incident sun angle, etc.) pressurized elements exceed the limits. LMES (ISS thermal and EVA thermal) agreed to look at additional analysis to adequately characterize the thermal situation for MMOD shields and handrails on pressurized elements. MOD agreed to investigate which tasks require extended contact with the MMOD shields and handrails on pressurized elements. Possible operations constraints include performing the required operations during night passes, adding attitude biases to protect the area of concern, or waiting until a more favorable beta angle to perform the task. Mr. Adams agreed to develop a list of tasks that require extended contact on the pressurized modules. Mr. Adams also agreed to provide the criteria he uses for assessing whether a task is an extended contact task, since some RMS based tasks and some free float tasks may actually require extended contact.

The EVA AIT agreed that the following items should be addressed when reporting back to the program at the conclusion of this issue resolution effort:

• Allowable EMU extended contact temperature range and testing and analysis used to develop this range


• ISS thermal environment — data supporting conclusions that only pressurized modules are a concern, and the typical thermal environment for the pressurized modules


• Task assessment criteria for determining whether a task is an extended contact task


• Tasks that are areas of concern based on location and meeting the extended contact range


• Process for identifying violations/incompatibilities and operational controls and workarounds

The group concluded if the answers from the remaining open actions support the beliefs to date (thermal environment and available operational controls), no further development effort is required to address EMU extended contact thermal concerns. While there is some risk that tasks may be required that result in extended contact during periods when the EMU temperature limits are violated, the process in place should be sufficient to identify those, and the operational constraints should be acceptable to support ISS operations. Flight/EVA time specific analysis will still be required to identify offending hardware and keep the EMU safe. This issue will be addressed again on July 24 to status the remaining open actions.

Action Item Closure: AI-543, 593, 608, 609 were closed

The following actions remain open: AI-599, 600, 610

Action 617: Provide data or rationale to support the conclusion that only MMOD shields and handrails on pressurized modules are of concern for EMU extended contact thermal limits. Indicate whether handrails on truss elements are a risk.

Actionee: ES/Jay Leggett, Marie Kowal, LMES/John Iovine

Due Date: July 24, 2001

Method for Closure: Present to EVA AIT

Action 618: Develop a set of analyses or data to adequately characterize how often and under what conditions MMOD shields violate the EMU allowable extended contact temperature range.

Actionee: LMES/Grant Bue, John Iovine

Due Date: July 24, 2001

Method for Closure: Present to EVA AIT

Action 619: Provide criteria used to decide whether a task may result in extended contact for the EMU (to evaluate whether the task assessments will identify all tasks that are a risk for EMU damage)

Actionee: DX32/Bob Adams

Due Date: July 24, 2001

Method for Closure: Present to EVA AIT

Present proposal for deadfacing BMRRM connectors for changeout. Indicate how the proposal does not meet the Safety Review Panel requirements for mating/demating unpowered connectors. Provide rationale for accepting the proposed non-compliance. Provide NCR for signature.

Mr. Carlton and Mr. Dix described the Bearing, Motor and Roll Ring Module (BMRRM) change-out scenario in work and the safety non-compliances associated with the change-out. The BMRRM has experienced some high current indications during some operations and therefore is suspect. An Anomaly Resolution Team (ART) has been convened to address various aspects of the anomaly, and Mr. Carlton and XA/Ed Mohr were assigned to lead the team to develop the BMRRM change-out procedure. The subject for NCR PG2-011 is the dead facing power to the BMRRM from the IEA

The BMRRM is in the circuit between the Sequential Shunt Unit (SSU) and the Integrated Electronics Assembly (IEA). During solar insolation, the SSU and the BMRRM are powered by the arrays, however during eclipse they receive power from the IEA. De-mating connectors is required on either side of the BMRRM. To de-mate the connectors on the IEA side requires disconnecting P1/J23, a connector where the power terminates in the pins. This requires 2-fault tolerance, or 3 upstream inhibits. The proposal for the NCR was to use only 1 DCSU RBI as the only inhibit to avoid powering down an entire channel for BMRRM change-out.

The gyst of the rationale for the NCR is that except for the fact that power terminates in pins rather than in a socket, the proposed operation meets the safety requirement. The inhibit is verifiable and the downstream load is only 115 watts. The connector is keyed and a scoop-proof coonector. While demated, it will be installed on a dummy connector plug to cover the pins. The only exposure to the hazard is during the time it takes to remove the P1 plug nad install the dummy connector. The alternative to accepting this risk is powering down channel 4B, resulting in single string for all ISS critical functions. The EVA AIT agreed that the risk to the EVA crewmember is very small and very controllable with the single inhibit. The EVA AIT approved the NCR.

Decision: The EVA AIT approved NCR-PG2-011

5 EVA Evaluation of Temporarily B-Hou/Dennis Harless,

Mr. Harless reported that the graphical analysis showed no interference problems with the MISSE sites evaluated on Z1. Mr. Harless and Mr. Boller also reported that the 7A.1 crew evaluated the MISSE installation during an NBL run and reported no problems. The 7A.1 team believes that the task can be added to their timelines if required. B-Hou/Mr. Read noted that the SGANT gimbal locks were not shown in their on-orbit location on Z1 in the graphic from Mr. Harless and questioned whether they might interfere with MISSE installation. No one present knew whether the gimbal locks were in place for the NBL evaluation. Mr. Harless agreed to look into the gimbal lock location, and Ms. Patrick agreed to pass along the concern to the 7A.1 team for resolution. The EVA AIT concluded, however, that if the gimbal locks do not interfere with MISSE installation, there are no concerns with temporarily stowing them in this location on-orbit.

Decision: The EVA AIT concurred with the proposed temporary stowage locations for MISSE on Z1 should 7A.1 fly prior to when the airlock is installed.

6 Fixed and Adjustable Grapple Bars — Launch B-Hou/Andy Wright

Mr. Wright provided background information on the fixed and adjustable grapple bars required for change-out operations for TCS ORUs. At least some of the grapple bars are required on-orbit starting at flight 12A.1 (activation of the TCS) to support change-out of ORUs for which there are on-orbit spares (pump module and FHRC). In addition, grapple bars are required for LON ORUs (TRRJ) and Resupply ORUs (Ammonia and Nitrogen Tanks). Currently there are no program provisions for launching or stowing grapple bars on-orbit. Mr. Wright requested EVA AIT assistance in defining the on-orbit requirements for the grapple bars and preferences for where and how to stow them both for launch and on-orbit.

The pump module and the FHRC are launched on ULF-1 on the ESP2. A fixed grapple bar (FGB) could be stowed on the pump module on ESP2, and an adjustable grapple bar (AGB) could be stowed on the FHRC, but only once on-orbit. The pump module ORU can’t take the launch loads with an FGB installed, and the AGB can’t take the loads if installed on the FHRC for launch. The fixed grapple bars can be stowed on either of the in-place ammonia tanks, one on S1 and one on P1, but again, only once on-orbit. There is no other on-orbit ORU on which an adjustable grapple bar can be stowed.

Mr. Wright reported that they are looking at stowing the grapple bars in the TSA for launch. Further evaluation is required to determine whether and how many will fit in a TSA. Another option is to provide FSE to launch and stow some complement of the grapple bars on the ESP2. This requires modification of the ESP2 and takes up space that could otherwise accommodate ORUs. An option for on-orbit stowage is to modify the S1/P1 utility trays to accommodate stowage of AGBs This requires modifications to S1 and P1.

Significant discussion not included in the presentation material:

The EVA AIT addressed the EVA on-orbit requirements for grapple bars and the possible options and the pros and cons for each for EVA.

The EVA AIT determined that two FGBs and two AGBs are required for on-orbit operations. Both of the FGBs are required to support ORU change-out for a pump module ORU. The EVA AIT determined that two AGBs are required for ATA or NTA change-outs. This is required to avoid having to move the AGB back and forth from the new tank to the old tank as they are moved from launch to on-orbit parking spot to installed spot to landing position. Therefore the EVA AIT recommended two FGBs and two AGBs be stowed on-orbit.

Launching the grapple bars in the TSA is acceptable but requires additional EVA time to retrieve them and install them in their on-orbit location. Stowing grapple bars on the on-orbit spares on ESP2 is acceptable since the grapple bars are required on those ORUs when a change-out is required. Stowing grapple bars on the ATAs on S1 and P1 is acceptable, however this would result in additional EVA time to retrieve the grapple bar from the ATA that was not failed/emptied to support change-out of the ATA that was (a special trip from S1 to P1 or vice versa). However without adding stowage provisions to ESP2, there are only 3 possible on-orbit stowage locations (Pump Module and both ATAs), so at least one of the ATAs would have to be used.

Conclusion: The EVA AIT concluded that the optimum launch and on-orbit stowage location for EVA for all the AGBs and FGBs is the ESP2. This way EVA would not be required to relocate the grapple bars to on-orbit stowage locations. The second best option for EVA, if launching the grapple bars on the ESP2 is not acceptable but on-orbit stowage for at least 2 grapple bars on ESP2 (1 FGB and 1 AGB) is launching all of the grapple bars in TSAs and stowing them on-orbit on ESP2 and the ORUs on ESP2 (1 FGB on Pump Module, 1 AGB on FHRC). The least favorable option for EVA is providing no launch or on-orbit stowage capability on ESP2, since that requires stowing them on S1 or P1. This option is acceptable however. Currently there is no on-orbit stowage capability for the second AGB. (Note: after the EVA AIT, under closer examination, it appears that only one AGB is required if the second can be launched on the flight with the replacement ORU. This would then require no hardware changes for on-orbit stowage for any grapple bars.

Mr. Wright is presenting the issue to several ISS program forums to get input on which flights can accommodate launching the grapple bars and recommendations for resolving the on-orbit stowage locations. The EVA AIT will follow the plans as they are presented to the program and adjust EVA plans accordingly.

Ms. Patrick reviewed the preliminary EVA AIT agenda for July 3, 2001. Presenters were requested to confirm agenda topics by COB Thursday, June 28, 2001.

Report results of EHB action to address re-certification of the Torque Wrench to provide ±10% accuracy for certain torques under certain thermal conditions. Indicate operations constraints to provide the accuracy requested, and indicate what work (analysis or testing) would be required to alleviate the operations constraints proposed. (EHB action was due June 15). Indicate when CARD revision and modification to PIRN 79 were/will be submitted. Boeing – indicate whether the proposed torque accuracy is sufficient for planned operations. MOD, Crew office address proposed operations constraints.