Status Report

Minutes for January 30, 2001 EVA AIT

By SpaceRef Editor
January 30, 2001
Filed under ,

To: Distribution

From: XA/Nancy J. Patrick

Subject: Minutes for January 30, 2001 EVA AIT

The EVA AIT met at the Johnson Space Center on January 30, 2001. Boeing/Lou Ramon and XA/Nancy Patrick co-chaired the meeting. Representatives from CB/Flight Crew Operations, XA/EVA Project Office, NC/Flight Systems Safety and Mission Assurance, DX32/EVA Systems/Mission Operations, ES/Engineering Structures, OC/ISS Operations Office, OB/ISS Vehicle Office and Boeing-Houston (EVA, Safety, VIPER) were present. Representatives from the Kennedy Space Center and Boeing Development Centers supported by telecon. Copies of presentations can be obtained from XA/Bill Rollins, Building 1, room 661, (281) 483-1416.

1. Introduction/AI Review Boeing/Lou Ramon

XA/Nancy Patrick

The Following Decision Packages were dispositioned (distributed January 16, 2001):

CR 4886: EVA On-orbit Induced Loads on Umbilical Mechanism Assembly (UMA) Active Half

Decision: The EVA AIT approved this CR for EVA. The rationale for approval was that the UMA is only at risk when unmated. The UMA handle is rated for inadvertent contact loads, but he housing isn’t. If impacted, the UMA springs deform so that it probably won’t be able to mate with the passive half, however it poses no threat to the EVA crew from debris or sharp edges. For the MT, the active UMA is only unmated during MT translation when the EVA crew will not be in the vicinity. For the PAS and ULCAS sites on P3 and S3, the only time after S3/P3 assembly that the crew is in the area is for maintenance, so the exposure window is small. Also, if one is kicked and the site is no longer functional, you could move to another site until the UMA is replaced. The EVA AIT however deferred to the S3/P3 element manager and payload community as to whether the risk is acceptable for the PAS/ULCAS sites, and to the Robotics team as to whether the risk is acceptable for the MT.

The Following Action Items were reviewed:

AI-504: This action was CLOSED. Mr. Ramon reported that the list of OTD compatible WIFs was published in the last updated of OP-01, released on 10/230/00, in the generic Volume 7, the Systems Book. AIT members concurred that this was sufficient documentation for the WIF list.

AI-510: This action remains open and will be addressed again on February 13. OC/Ken Zingrebe (ISS Logistics and Maintenance) agreed to seek confirmation that Boeing updates OP-04 with test results and PIDS exceptions from his Boeing-Canoga Park counterpart for OP-04 procedures.

AI-511: This action remains open and will be addressed again on February 27. Ms. Patrick had not made any progress on the action.

AI-552: This action was CLOSED. Mr. Ramon provided a detailed history of the Dzus fastener problem and its resolution. An alert was issued after the problem first occurred on Node 1. Drawings are being updated as time permits. MOD and the crew are very much aware of this particular problem.

AI-555: This action was CLOSED. Mr. Ramon reported that the handhold meets the force requirement with only 7 of the 8 fasteners, with the appropriate margins and factors of safety. The VSIP directed that no paper be opened on the issue.

AI-560: This action remains open and will be addressed again on February 27. Mr. Gray and Mr. Price reported that the B-HB safety group has provided the latest list of EVA controls for which they have requested worksite analysis. The B-HB EVA group is reviewing that list against their worksite analysis. Mr. Gray also reported that the safety list doesn’t necessarily include all of the EVA controls, and no one present knew the criteria the safety group uses for requesting worksite analysis. Mr. Gray and Mr. Price agreed to get B-HB safety to provide the criteria they use.

AI-565: This action was CLOSED. Mr. Guirgis and Mr. Wolf reported that the 1" male QD operation (with both the QD and the tool unrestrained) is acceptable, however it is difficult as a one-person task. Mr. Wolf suggested that a BRT or possibly a second crewmember should be baselined for the task.

AI-568: This action was CLOSED. Ms. Patrick reported that the ESEL is capable of tracking the location and status of specific items/part numbers if they are reported. Mr. Looper reported that MOD would like to be able to track items individually by part number, but there are no EVA readable labels on the EVA hardware. A new action was issued to looking in to adding labels to items like APFRs for this purpose.

Action 579: Address adding EVA labels to EVA GFE external hardware that may experience on-orbit failures or performance problems for which MOD and the crew would want to be aware (e.g. APFRs)

Actionee: XA/Nancy Patrick

Due Date: February 27, 2001

Method for Closure: Report to EVA AIT

AI-569: This action was CLOSED. Ms. Patrick reported that the list of kick load PIDS exceptions/NCRs was sent on January 17.

AI-570: This action remains open and will be addressed again on February 13. See minutes below for detailed information.

AI-571: This action was CLOSED. Mr. Pankratz reported that this is the final planned installation for the NTA, PMA and ATA, however the blankets can be modified without removing the ORUs. There will still be a cost and possibly a schedule hit, however it is less than that incurred if the ORUs had to be removed.

AI-575: This action remains open and will be addressed again on February 13. Mr. Ramos reviewed the document and provided comments, so the action is closed for CB. Mr. Ramos comments were sent to ER/Don Barron. There are no immediate actions required, however there are considerations for operations if the SSRMS has to be maintained prior to MBS delivery (and some considerations throughout the life of ISS). Mr. Adams did not report on the status of his review.

2. S1/P1 Pump Module Assy (PM-A) and Nitrogen PG1/Dan Pankratz, Sandra

Tank Assy (NTA) MLI interference during installation McKee, CA/Kevin Flautt, Chris Hardcastle

There was no presentation material for this topic. Mr. Pankratz reported that the procedure does not explicitly state that the blanket should be installed with the maximum deflection possible. Mr. Pankratz reported that the procedures don’t usually reflect that level of detail and expected that the crew and/or SVITO could request the appropriate configuration at the time of the test. The EVA AIT directed that this be investigated further because it could impact the test if there was disagreement about the proper blanket configuration. Mr. Pankratz agreed to propose adding it to the procedure. Mr. Pankratz reported that the installation activities have been deferred. The NTA will be installed during the week of February 2 — 5, the Pump Module Assembly on February 6, 7, and the ATA on February 8, 9.

Mr. Pankratz reported that this is the final planned installation for the NTA, PMA and ATA, however the blankets can be modified without removing the ORUs. There will still be a cost and possibly a schedule hit, however it is less than that incurred if the ORUs had to be removed. Mr. Pankratz reported that for the Huntington Beach Internal Review Board, he will schedule the discussion as soon as possible after the installation activities. Mr. Pankratz discussed NASA participation with Huntington Beach management, and Huntington Beach agreed to include NASA at the conclusion of the normal IRB. This way Huntington Beach can have the internal discussion first, and then discuss it with NASA representatives present. This was acceptable to the EVA AIT.

This topic will be discussed again on February 13, after the ORU installations are complete.

Action Item Closure: AI-570 remains open, 571 was CLOSED.

3. Upgraded Rendezvous Radar System Status B-Hou/Cole Pierce

Mr. Pierce reviewed the current concepts for the upgraded Rendezvous Radar system. He clarified the Ku-band antenna will be removed, however this hardware will not replace the communications function of the Ku-band. There is another separate development effort for that function. Mr. Pierce explained that there are still many options with the new system and that the development effort is currently in the requirements definition phase. The new system may use either Lidar or radar units, and may be single or dual string. They evaluated 11 locations for the units, and have narrowed down the options to 3. Option 10 provides that optimum sensor coverage, however appeared to be the least desirable for EVA interference concerns and payload envelope intrusion. The size of the unit depends on whether Lidar or radar units are selected (Lidar is much smaller) and whether single or dual string is selected (dual string is not an option with radar due to the size of the unit).

Significant discussion not included in the presentation material:

The EVA AIT evaluated each of the remaining options (designated option 7, 9 and 10) and agreed that there are no absolute showstoppers to any of the options, however depending on the actual size and configuration of the unit, there may be issues. Options 9 and 10 have the most likelihood of interference. The only task currently identified that may be impacted by the new unit is the contingency 96 bolt ODS release task. Mr. Pierce requested that NBL testing be done to determine whether any of the locations should be ruled out entirely. Their project preference was to have this evaluation prior to release of the requirements, which could be as early as March or as late as August. Ms. Patrick requested that he provide design information to the DX CCB to get mock up development started. CB/Dave Wolf suggested that the mockup be included in any of the 96 bolt skills runs for new EVA crewmembers to get a preliminary evaluation. Mr. Pierce agreed to start the process with the DX CCB.

Mr. Wolf suggested that handrails be added to the units to aid in translating around them, since they are in prominent locations around the ODS. Mr. Pierce agreed to include that in the design considerations.

Decision: EVA has identified no significant issues with any of the remaining options (7, 9 and 10) presented for the Rendezvous Radar locations. Further evaluation of the locations during the 96 bolt ODS contingency task is required to finalize approval of any of the locations.

4. CETA Cart Corridor Verification/Concerns EC5/Lora Bailey

Present concerns with the CETA cart translation corridor along S1 Truss — provide photo documentation of specific concerns with CETA cart clearance. Provide CETA cart verification information on how EC5 verified the CETA cart met the envelope dictated by the EVA ICD. Huntington Beach to address truss verification of the CETA cart envelope at future discussion.

Follow-up Action: Determine whether specific hardware does in fact violate the ICD translation corridor, and whether verification process is adequate or additional testing/demonstration/analysis is required

Ms. Bailey presented a number of concerns with the EVA ICD, ISS hardware design and interfaces to the CETA cart, and the overall verification program. Ms. Bailey is concerned that the ICD is neither accurate nor specific enough to preclude interferences during CETA cart translation, as well as problems between the CETA cart and the MT. Ms. Bailey also presented a "wish" list of verification activities that would alleviate her concerns.

Ms. Bailey’s concerns stem from several sources. First, she has received preliminary information on a number of ICD changes from Boeing. These changes are of concern because the CETA cart is complete and ready for delivery to KSC. Any changes to the CETA cart interface would be a major impact to the CETA cart. This is also a concern for the MT Energy Absorbers, which are currently in flight fabrication. These changes are the either errors or omissions in the current ICD, or actual hardware violations of the ICD envelope. Ms. Bailey feels that part of the problem is that many times, interface issues are typically worked with the MT ICD, but the CETA cart is left out of the discussion. This has resulted in very different interface envelope requirements for the CETA cart and the MT.

Further, Ms. Bailey noted that the verification for the EVA ICD relies primarily on modeling and analysis with approximations and assumptions that make the verification suspect. The complexity of the interfaces involved opens us up to more risk because there are probably more errors that have not yet been discovered. The fact that there is no physical verification makes it difficult to quantify the risk associated with the concerns.

The risks associated with the current situation that Ms. Bailey cited include the possibility that the tether shuttles could inadvertently release from the rails, inability for the CETA cart and MT to translate the truss as a unit without hanging up, late changes to hardware, and incomplete problem resolution.

Ms. Bailey then recommended a list of physical verification activities to address the concerns. The activities include new simulator/template development for the CETA cart and the truss and using them for CETA and truss fit checks (including the SARJ), fit checking the tether shuttles to all segments (including the SARJ), and translating both Class 1 CETAs, coupled to the MT, across a worst case SARJ mock-up.

Significant discussion not included in the presentation material:

The S1/P1 Launch Package Manager (OC/Robert Galvez) agrees with the essence of the issue and is shepherding it through the ISS program, starting with the T&VCP. Ms. Patrick suggested that Ms. Bailey include specific examples of likely interferences and hardware issues in order to justify the additional work to the ISS program. Ms. Bailey agreed and will work with Mr. Galvez and XA/Dale Roberts to address the issue with the program. No additional review is required through the EVA AIT.

Decision: The EVA AIT concurred with taking the CETA cart interface issues forward to the ISS program.

5. Female QD Plug Tool Concept & QD Vent Tool PG2/DaveFugleberg

Mr. Fugleberg reported on the status of a new tool that has been deemed necessary by the QD Issue Resolution Team (QDIRT). The new tool is required to plug an unmated female QD so that the valve is open while the QD is unmated. QD history indicates lower leakage rates with the valve open, and prevents formation of frozen ammonia crystals internal to the QD (a concern for future mating). PG2 has been tasked to initiate an SSCN to develop a Female QD Open Plug Tool.

Significant discussion not included in the presentation material:

There were no significant issues identified with the tool concept presented. The only question was the requirement for the tool. The EVA representative to the QDIRT was not available to confirm that the QDIRT conclusion was justified. The EVA AIT chair will investigate this informally and report back to the EVA AIT. Points of contact for design support were provided to Mr. Fugleberg.

6. Ink-Stamped Labels – Lessons Learned PG2/Scott Boller

Mr. Boller summarized the ink stamped label issues encountered during Z1 and P6 processing, and summarized the resolution measures adopted by PG1 for future cargo elements. Mr. Boller explained that the problems encountered were primarily misunderstandings and quality control. The problems included improper locations, poor quality markings, and incorrect lettering size. All issues were documented as crew squawks and worked through the KSC processing system. Mr. Boller noted that all of the PV Modules will use ink stamped labels because they use common drawings with the P6 module. However P5 and S6 short spacers will use regular labels since they do not require drawing changes to implement the preferred labels.

PG1 has adopted specific remedies to address the ink stamping issues for future modules. These remedies include adding the specific label implementation planned at PDRs and CDRs and including ink stamped labels during NBL testing so that the community is aware and can identify issues prior to hardware delivery. Other remedies include using technicians and manufacturing/integration leads who are familiar with the ink stamping risks during hardware processing to head off problems before they occur.

Decision: The EVA AIT concurred with the PG1 ink stamp label process improvements and agreed to accept ink stamped labels on PV modules.

7. 7A.1 Fit Check Matrix Review XA/Maria Tullar DX32/Rich Gauvreau

Mr. Gauvreau provided a draft of the 7A.1 fit check matrix for review. The list only includes the 7A.1 task list however, and is therefore incomplete for review. Ms. Patrick requested that EVA AIT members begin informally reviewing the task list, however no formal action will be issued until the matrix is complete.

8. Upcoming Events/Future Agenda Review XA/Nancy Patrick, All

Ms. Patrick reviewed the preliminary EVA AIT agenda for February 13, 2001. Presenters are requested to confirm agenda topics by COB Thursday, February 8.

SpaceRef staff editor.