Status Report

Minutes for January 16, 2001 EVA AIT

By SpaceRef Editor
January 16, 2001
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The EVA AIT met at the Johnson Space Center on January 16, 2001. Boeing/Dave Moore and XA/Nancy Patrick co-chaired the meeting. Representatives from CB/Flight Crew Operations, XA/EVA Project Office, NC/Flight Systems Safety and Mission Assurance, DX32/EVA Systems/Mission Operations, ER/Engineering Robotics, ES/Engineering Structures, and Boeing-Houston (EVA, Ops, and Safety) were present. Representatives from Boeing Development Centers supported by telecon. Copies of presentations can be obtained from XA/Bill Rollins, Building 1, room 661, (281) 483-1416.

1. Introduction/AI Review Boeing/Lou Ramon
XA/Nancy Patrick

The Following Decision Packages were distributed for review January 30, 2001:

CR 4886: EVA On-orbit Induced Loads on Umbilical Mechanism Assembly (UMA) Active Half

The Following Action Items were reviewed:

AI-504: This action remains open and will be addressed again on January 30. There was no update.

AI-507: This action was CLOSED. The following information was provided for 4A external stowage configuration changes:

The P6 Aux Bag was installed on P6 and contains the Long Duration tie down tethers, BCDU and DDCU connector covers, and EPS jumpers (CCC, RACU restart and P6 secondary power feed).

The 1″ QD cap tool was added to the Node bag
The BRRM tool and the 1″ QD bale drive tool were added to th

e Stbd ETSD on 1 tool board

The Canon Connector handles (in a tool caddy) were added to the Stbd ETSD on the cheater bar panel

The on-orbit ESEL is in the process of being updated to reflect these changes.

The only external configuration change planned for 5A is to add the MMOD shield tools (on a tool board) to the tool stanchion stowed on an APFR on the Node.

AI-510: This action remains open and will be addressed again on January 30. There was no update.

AI-511: This action remains open and will be addressed again on January 30. There was no update.

AI-552: This action remains open and will be addressed again on January 30. There was no update.

AI-555: This action remains open and will be addressed again on January 30. There was no update.

AI-556: This action was closed for the 5A-6A critical maintenance tasks, but remains open for the 7A and 7A.1 tasks. It will be scheduled again for February 13. Mr. Adams reported that for 5A-6A, the only defined critical maintenance task is heat exchanger R&R, and the hx worksite does not violate the hot/cold envelope for these flights. The Fluid Line Anchor Patch (FLAP) is also delivered on 5A, however tasks with this hardware could take place along any fluid lines, therefore there is no way to determine whether the task can be done until a leak is identified and located. For the 7A and 7A.1 flights, Mr. Adams reported that he could not locate the thermal analysis. This assessment will be re-scheduled.

AI-560: This action remains open and will be addressed again on January 30. There was no update.

AI-565: This action remains open and will be addressed again on January 30. Mr. Wolf reported that the test was scheduled for January 17. Mr. Guirgis and Mr. Wolf will report the results on January 30.

AI-567: This action was CLOSED. Ms. Patrick reported that Mr. Chang had sent an email indicating that he had requested Lockheed submit the PIRN to the ICD Working Group for formal review.

2. TRRJ Flex Line CDR Issue (T1-067) PG1/Dan Pankratz

Mr. Pankratz explained that the CDR issue in question reflected a global fluid QD and fluid line concern and was written against the TRRJ stinger QDs and flex lines for the S1/P1 CDR. Mr. Pankratz requested that the specific concerns addressed in the CDR issue be transferred to an FCA issue if still open. This will clean up the paperwork for PG1 so that more effort can be spent addressing the technical issues and less in reporting paper closure.

Mr. Pankratz provided a draft of the new FCA issue, which he explained would be officially opened by CB/Dave Wolf. With Mr. Wolf as the initiator, the no one can close the issue without his concurrence. Mr. Pankratz suggested Mr. Wolf as the initiator since the original source of the CDR issue was the crew office, and Mr. Wolf is now the crew representative for S1 and P1. The draft issue Mr. Pankratz provided included the following open work for the FCA issue:

  • Investigate lubrication of the flex lines

  • Perform additional hardware testing to demonstrate task feasibility (HTV 10, pressurized line tests)

  • Provide approved options for control of the Female Interlock Defeat hazard for the 1-1/2″ QDs – determine specific option preferred for each QD/worksite.

  • Update maintenance planning to incorporate test results, crew inputs

    In addition to the open work Mr. Pankratz suggested be included in the new FCA issue, the EVA AIT identified two additional items to be included – an assessment of using non-compressible fluid in the pressurized line testing planned, and a comm analysis of the TRRJ maintenance task since both crewmembers are required for the line handling and QD actuation tasks. Huntington Beach agreed to look at using a non-compressible fluid for the test and report back to the EVA AIT if they could not accommodate that. The concern driving the comm analysis is that both crewmembers would be inside the truss and previous assessments indicate that no comm is available inside the truss. Current flight rules require that comm be maintained between the IV crewmember and each EVA crewmember, either directly or through a relay from one EVA crewmember to the other. Ms. Patrick requested that Huntington Beach perform comm analysis of the crewmember positions for this task, and that the JOP review the results and provide a recommendation on whether it’s acceptable.

    Mr. Pankratz reviewed the work that has been done to address both the generic fluid lines/fluid QD concerns and the TRRJ stinger specifically. This work includes:

  • HTV and pressurized line testing completed

  • Tools identified and in development

  • NBL evaluations that identified the task as a 2-person task

  • Development of approved options to control the FID issue for the smaller QDs with some of the preferred options identified at specific worksites.

    The EVA AIT requested that the CDR issue remain open until the FCA issue was finalized and officially opened.

    Decision: The EVA AIT concurred with closing S1/P1 CDR issue T1-067 when an FCA issue is opened that reflects all of the open work remaining on the TRRJ QDs/fluid lines

    Action 574: Assess the TRRJ R&R tasks that require both crewmembers inside the truss simultaneously. Present to the JOP and determine whether this operation is allowed given the predictions that comm will not be available with either crewmember during this part of the task.

    Actionee: DX32/Bob Adams, Chris Looper

    Due Date: March 13, 2001

    Method for Closure: Report to EVA AIT

    3. SSRMS Maintenance prior to MBS delivery ER/Don Barron

    Mr. Barron presented a brief description of a document produced by CSA that outlines the SSRMS maintenance tasks while the SSRMS is based on the Lab (i.e. prior to MBS arrival). Mr. Barron indicated the questions that the robotics team has on the procedures and requested EVA AIT review of the procedures. The EVA AIT concurred with the ER comments, but felt that none of them were unworkable. The Crew and MOD EVA AIT representatives agreed to review the document and identify any EVA issues with SSRMS maintenance prior to MBS arrival.

    Action 575: Review the SSRMS maintenance prior to MBS arrival procedures and report any significant concerns, especially any that must be addressed prior to SSRMS launch.

    Actionee: CB/Fernando Ramos, DX32/Bob Adams

    Due Date: January 30, 2001

    Method for Closure: Report to EVA AIT

    4. Segment-to-Segment Attach System (SSAS) PG1/Berta de Leon
    Contingency Bolt Worksite Analysis

    Ms. Deleon presented some initial worksite analysis results for accessing the SSAS contingency bolts. Huntington Beach has not changed their position that the SSAS will remain as an automated function for the nominal, but installing the contingency bolts is a workaround procedure provided by Huntington Beach in case the automated bolts fail. Ms. de Leon provided worksite analysis for only the S0 to S1 contingency bolts at this time. Ms. de Leon requested EVA AIT review of the work done to date before additional worksite analysis is conducted. Additionally, Ms. de Leon wanted to address a requirements violation for all the contingency bolts that was uncovered during the worksite analysis for the S0 to S1 bolts.

    The contingency bolts require a torque of 84ft-lbs to meet on-orbit loads. Ms. de Leon explained that the required force to install the bolts to that torque is 42 lbs, based on the use of the torque wrench (required to meet accuracy requirements for the bolts). This exceeds the load limit requirement of 35 lbs for the EVA crewmember. Ms. De Leon requested an EVA AIT position on the requirement violation.

    Significant discussion not included in the presentation material:

    Ms. de Leon explained that the contingency bolts are 5/8″ bolts and that she had mimicked the crew body position used for the RTAS bolt installation on STS-97, since that was found to be acceptable. The crew and MOD noted that the RTAS bolt body position is not necessarily optimal and requested that other body positions be investigated for the SSAS contingency bolts. The crew also noted that there is only one size 5/8″ socket extension available. The tool geometry, along with the force required to drive the bolts, necessitates that the crew have one hand on the end of the torque wrench and one hand on the socket/bolt interface. The crew indicated that because of this, the best position would probably be facing the bolt, centered near it. Several AIT participants noted that since this also means that the task is a two-handed task, it should be done from a structure or CETA cart based WIF. This is because with both hands tied up, there is no means to react the load, and the high load required would probably backdrive the SSRMS. If WIFs are not available for a given set of contingency bolts, specific SSRMS position analysis would have to be performed to ensure the SSRMS could handle the load. For all the S0 to S1 bolts, acceptable WIFs were found but that was based on using the RTAS bolt body position. Ms. de Leon agreed to take these inputs into account in future analysis efforts.

    The EVA AIT then addressed the torque tolerance required for the bolts (since Huntington Beach indicated that the torque wrench is required due to the torque tolerance). Huntington Beach stated that the torque required is 84 ft-lbs, ±10%. OB/George Gafka felt both the torque number and the accuracy cited might be incorrect. The EVA AIT noted that the guaranteed tolerance for the torque wrench is ±20%, and any requirement for better accuracy had to be reviewed specifically. Mr. Gafka and Huntington Beach agreed to look at the torque requirement more closely and inform the EVA AIT if better torque tolerance is required.

    Mr. Gafka also noted that the hardware redesign is still in progress, so specific requirements for the number of contingency bolts required at each position, and the allowed activities with 1 nominal bolt not engaged, are still undefined. As these questions are answered, the contingency planning for when the contingency bolt task can be performed, and how it can be performed (e.g. can the crew work from WIFs on the arriving element to drive the contingency bolts), will be better defined.

    The EVA AIT made the following recommendations for evaluating the SSAS contingency bolt EVA task:

  • Continue worksite analysis for all the SSAS contingency bolts

  • Base the task from a structure or CETA cart based WIF due to the high torque required and two handed task requirement

  • Look for a body position that puts the crewmember as close as possible to facing the bolt and centering on the bolt interface.

  • Investigate the bolt torque and the torque tolerance required. Try to provide a bolt torque that allows for no tighter than a ±20% tolerance.

    PG1/Larry Price agreed to develop a plan for conducting the worksite analysis and Mr. Gafka agreed to review the torque and torque tolerance required. Ms. de Leon requested points of contact to investigate acceptable body positioning and to provide assistance during worksite analysis development. CB/Dave Wolf and DX32/Chris Looper agreed to be points of contact for informal discussions.

    Action 576: Develop schedule/plan for providing EVA worksite analysis for the SSAS contingency bolt tasks for the S0, S1, P1, S3 and P3 tasks.
    Actionee: PG1/Larry Price

    Due Date: February 20, 2001

    Method for Closure: Report to EVA AIT

    Action 577: Determine torque and torque tolerance required for SSAS contingency bolt installation. Provide information on the number of contingency bolts required at each nominal bolt location, and the allowed activities if a single nominal bolt is not engaged.

    Actionee: ES/George Gafka

    Due Date: February 20, 2001

    Method for Closure: Report to EVA AIT

    5. 1.5″ Fluid Lines & Connectors Pressurized PG1/Roger Larsen
    Test Results

    Mr. Larsen reported on the remaining open issues associated with pressurized fluid lines and the remaining open work and test issues. Mr. Larson requested EVA AIT guidance on the issues and open work remaining. Mr. Larson indicated which PG1 hardware changes were in work and which ones required a formal change to program requirements. Mr. Larson also outlined the NASA GFE participation in the issue resolution process, including new tools required and in work. Many of the items were covered by the previous discussion on the TRRJ Flex Line CDR Issue (T1-067) and were not addressed again.

    Unfortunately none of the XA representatives responsible for the NASA participation in the testing and issue resolution process were present. The EVA AIT briefly discussed some of the points in Mr. Larsen’s presentation, but decided that additional off-line discussions are required to determine whether there is enough program oversight on all the issues and whether they are coming to closure. Ms. Patrick stated that she intended to work within XA to coordinate with the XA leads for various pieces of the global issue to better understand how all the individual issues are being resolved. Those leads include Beth Stubbings, the overall lead for fluid line and QD issues; Amy Heartsill, the pressurized line and HTV test, and new tool requirements lead; Greg LeStourgeon, the QD bale drive tool lead; Chris Counts, the safety lead for FID control. The following points were brought out specifically during Mr. Larsen’s presentation:

  • The main areas of concern for fluid line handling are for the Segment-to-Segment fluid jumpers, the TRRJ, and the Pump Module lines.

  • The TRRJ stinger lines will be tested, with lubrication in, HTV 10

  • New tools requested from the most recent test include a soft-dock collar release tool and a tool to provide indication of good soft-dock when direct visual inspection is not possible. XA/Amy Heartsill agreed to pursue GFE development of these tools

  • Changes to the MLI and the thermal booties suggested in the Crew Consensus Report for the last pressurized line test may not be required. CB and XA will provide a recommendation and submit the CR if required

  • A KC-135 evaluation of the TRRJ and Segment-to-Segment jumpers was suggested in the Crew Consensus report for the last test – this may not be required and is in discussion between PG1 and NASA

    Subsequent to the EVA AIT, Ms. Patrick spoke with XA/Beth Stubbings, who reported that she is working on a presentation for the EVA CCB, intended for February 2, that outlines the open work related to fluid lines and QDs and how that work is progressing. Ms. Patrick encourages all those with a stake in the issue resolution to attend the EVA CCB discussion.

    6. Upcoming Events/Future Agenda Review XA/Nancy Patrick, All

    Ms. Patrick reviewed the preliminary EVA AIT agenda for January 30, 2000. Presenters are requested to confirm agenda topics by COB Thursday, January 25.

    PG1/Scott Boller reported that the Early Ammonia Servicer would be at KSC next week for On-Orbit Constraints Testing.

    The following action was assigned at the Crew Consensus Report Issue Review held on January 23, however it will be tracked through the normal EVA AIT, so it is included here.

    Action 578: Provide inputs on generic carriers and interfaces (i.e. SLP, FRAM, LMC, ESP) for items that need flight specific/cargo specific evaluation when the flight/cargo configuration is defined. These items have been raised in NBL and 1-g evaluations.

    Actionee: CA/Fernando Ramos, PG3/Tom Hagale, PG3/Steve Burks, XA/Tara Jochim, B-Hou/Matt Mickle

    Due Date: February 20, 2001

    Method for Closure: Provide list to EVA AIT

    The Following topic was deferred indefinitely

    S3/P3 ULCAS/UMA Deployment Interference Status PG1/George Osorio

    Present current status of PG1’s efforts to address the ULCAS deployment problem with the UMA interference identified in NBL testing. (Previously, PG1 reported that they were pursuing operational workarounds involving removing the UMA prior to ULCAS deploy, then re-installing after the deploy, or as a fallback, launching UMAs separately. Recent indications are that PG1 is looking at a design fix)

    Decision Required: None – information only at this time

    Required Attendees: XA, Boeing-Houston, DX32, CB, NC, KSC/SSHIO, PG1, SLP, OB

    Huntington Beach requested deferral until issue resolution plans are better defined

  • SpaceRef staff editor.