Letter from Senators Nelson, Graham, Breaux, and Landrieu to Senators Mikulski and Bond regarding the FY2003 VA-HUD Appropriations Bill
May 1, 2002
The Honorable Barbara A. Mikulski, Chairwoman
The Honorable Christopher S. Bond, Ranking Minority Member
Appropriations Subcommittee on Veterans Administration, Housing and Urban Development and Independent Agencies
709 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Chairwoman Mikulski and Ranking Minority Member Bond:
As you begin your deliberations on the FY2003 VA-HUD appropriations bill, we ask that you focus your attention on issues to the future of our nation’s civilian space program.
Future Space Transportation and Shuttle Sustainability. The Integrated Space Transportation Plan is NASA’s long-range investment strategy for safer, more reliable and less expensive space access. The Space Launch Initiative, together with advanced launch and in-space transportation systems, make up the far-looking programs within this plan. While these combined programs are crucial to long-term planning, NASA is more than a decade away from full development of a new vehicle. Accordingly, today’s focus should also include our only reusable space transportation system: the Space Shuttle. NASA should ensure the Shuttle is properly maintained and upgraded to keep it flying until any replacement has achieved its initial operational capability. It is also imperative that we develop a logical transition plan from the Shuttle to any replacement vehicle to make certain we do not jeopardize our nation’s access to space station.
Over the last decade, the Shuttle program has done an outstanding job of reducing costs. The program has accepted a 40% budget reduction since 1992, while continuing to operate reliably and efficiently. At the same time, the Shuttle fleet is aging and its vehicles and ground infrastructure are in desperate need of upgrades. Even so, Shuttle safety upgrade funding structure approved by Congress in FY2001 is being completely ignored. Less than inflationary growth funding levels in the Shuttle operations budget, coupled with reductions to upgrades accounts are driving the contractor community to initiate unnecessary and possibly dangerous layoffs.
In September 2001, the Senate Commerce Committee heard alarming testimony from five expert witnessesæfrom inside and outside of NASAæwho all agreed that the agency has reached the limit in its abilities to economize. Without additional funds, witnesses stated NASA would not be able to continue critically important safety upgrades to the Shuttle fleet. Nonetheless, NASA’s FY2003 request for safety and supportability upgrades is even lower: safety upgrade funding is $125 million and supportability upgrade funding is $32 million below the 2000 agreed upon levels.
The current upgrade strategy is based on the premise of flying the Shuttle until only 2012, although most experts – including all of the witnesses at last fall’s hearing – maintain that the vehicle will not be retired for another decade or more. We support a recent NASA directive to identify upgrades and supportability investments that may be required to fly the Shuttle fleet safely through 2020. This is a small step in the right direction. We are anxious for the results of this “2020 Assessment” so that its results will be reflected in next year’s budget. It is clear that whatever priority upgrades are identified, funding will need to be restored to the Shuttle upgrades program if the Shuttle is to be operated safely for at least two more decades.
We strongly suggest that the committee direct NASA to include in its 2020 Assessment a thorough system level upgrade study of the Shuttle program, identifying not only the necessary Shuttle upgrades, but also the associated cost and benefit analysis to justify each. In order to maintain the sustainability of the Shuttle, we recommend that the upgrade program be continued, as defined by the 2000 agreement, until superceded by this comprehensive plan. Finally, once the 2020 Assessment study is completed, we recommend that the committee direct NASA to submit this study to the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel for its rapid review.
Ground facilities are essential for safe and reliable operations of the Shuttle fleet. However, funding within the Shuttle program for infrastructure maintenance and repair has been adequate only to sustain the infrastructure in a launch-by-launch effort. Deteriorating ground equipment has already begun to affect Shuttle program performance and safety. Repairs to the infrastructure supporting the Shuttle program at the four human space flight centers can no longer be ignored. Last year, Congress initiated the first significant repairs to the aging Shuttle infrastructure by providing $25 million to repair the doors on the Vehicle Assembly Building at Kennedy Space Center. To begin to comprehensive solve these problems, NASA submitted a FY2003 Shuttle infrastructure request of $76.4 million, with a budget run-out of $81.5 million in FY2004, $67.2 million in FY2005, $67.9 million in FY2006 and $47.3 million in FY2007. While this is a good start, if all necessary infrastructure projects – as collectively identified in 2001 by the center directors – were funded FY2003-FY2007, the average cost would be closer to $100 million per year. We recommend that the committee provide additional funds to bring total infrastructure funds closer to $100 million in FY2003, and direct the agency to provide with its FY2004 request plans on how to meet the infrastructure needs identified last year by the center directors within the next five fiscal years.
In summary, NASA is projecting a flat-line budget for the Shuttle program through FY2008 – this is a virtual going out of business plan. We believe that keeping the Shuttle program – upgrades, operations and infrastructure – to such a starvation diet will result in compromising the safety of our astronauts, reducing science returns, and risking the future of our human space program. We ask the committee to direct NASA to report to Congress with its FY2004 request its Shuttle program plans for FY2004-FY2008. The report should include, but not be limited to: flight rate, industrial base impacts, maintenance requirements for critical skills, status of development and integration of safety and supportability upgrades, and a plans for infrastructure revitalization projects at all four human space flight centers.
International Space Station. Relationships with America’s sixteen partner countries are important to leveraging our nation’s future science and technology investments. Fulfilling the commitments this country has made to the International Space Station (ISS) program is vital to our effective leadership and continued opportunities with the international community. However, the international partners may only launch their elements when they are satisfied that the U.S. will meet its international obligations, including providing any prerequisite systems for supporting six or seven astronaut crewmembers to operate the ISS and conduct research onboard. Deferral of the ISS elements and systems, made in the name of staying within the project’s budget ceiling, are causing the termination of long-lead developments necessary for life support systems to sustain a full crew of six or seven astronauts.
We recommend that the committee direct NASA to deploy all ISS capabilities – including a crew size of six or seven – according to the schedule agreed upon by all international partners in the June 2001 assembly sequence. In order to maintain the option for a full crew complement onboard the ISS, we recommend that the committee appropriate an additional $35 million in FY2003 to fund advanced environmental life support development and Node 3 outfitting for related crew and internal storage needs.
Microgravity and Life Sciences Research. Microgravity and life science research activities in space have been reduced dramatically since the Administration’s decision to limit Space Shuttle flights to only those related to assembly and maintenance of the ISS. For several years, a share of resources originally intended for outfitting laboratories and developing research facilities aboard the ISS were instead allocated to the development of the platform itself. In fiscal years 1996, 1997, 1998, and 2002, NASA transferred nearly a billion dollars from the ISS science accounts into construction. NASA has insisted that these transfers do not affect the ability to use the ISS for science objectives; the agency said that it is simply “rephasing” the expenditure of the science funds, delaying them until the ISS is capable of supporting science. In order to absorb such significant cuts, ISS research programs have decreased the complexity of research to be conducted. This could ultimately lead to the removal of entire science disciplines from the overall ISS research complement. We are concerned that such cuts and transfers undermine the science community’s ability to maximize the scientific potential of the ISS and endanger the viability of taxpayers’ investment in the project as a whole. While we understand that NASA has been directed to undertake yet another review of its ISS research program, that review has been driven in large part by continuing cuts to the research budget. We believe that funding will need to be restored to the ISS research accounts if it is to house a fully productive research facility, no matter what priorities are finally identified by the current research task force.
Accordingly, we recommend the committee direct NASA to fly research aboard the Shuttle on an interim basis, before the ISS laboratories are fully outfitted for research, in order to maintain viable research programs in these scientific areas, as it is doing in 2002 with the STS-107 mission. We recommend the committee restore $48 million, which was reprogrammed in FY2002 from ISS research to ISS construction, back to the ISS research program. We also recommend that the committee direct NASA to develop a plan to restore all past cuts to and transfers from the ISS research account within the next five fiscal years, and present this plan to the committee with the agency’s FY2004 budget request.
In closing, we understand that there are other programs in NASA’s science enterprises that are also deserving of attention, such as Pluto Kuiper Express and the Europa Orbiter. We are supportive of both projects, understand the crucial timing of each and ask the committee to give special attention to these projects as well as the aforementioned human space flight priorities during the FY2003 appropriations cycle. Finally, we further understand that it is virtually impossible to accommodate all of these projects within a flat-lined NASA budget. For this reason, we support the committee’s efforts to increase NASA’s top line.
Thank you for your careful consideration of these requests. If you have any questions, please contact Erin Hatch in Senator Bill Nelson’s office at 224-1641.
Sincerely,
[signed]
Bill Nelson
Bob Graham
John Breaux
Mary Landrieu
BN/ech
