Expedition III Crew Debriefing – Minutes of the Meeting – January 31, 2002

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

A meeting of the International Space Station (ISS) Program and Space Shuttle Program (SSP) Safety Review Panel (SRP), co-chaired by OE/Gregg Baumer and MA2/Jeffrey Williams, was held in the Building 4-South, Room 6600, at the Johnson Space Center. The purpose was to discuss compiled questions submitted by the SRP to the Expedition 3 Crew Commander, CB/Frank Culbertson, prior to the debrief. The submitted safety questions relate to the operational and habitability experiences of the Expedition 3 crew. In some cases the submitted questions, as documented in the minutes, have been combined for subject commonality. Code QE/Richard Patrican and Mr. David Lengyel, Executive Director of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, attended via teleconference from NASA Headquarters.

1.0 CB/Gil Bonse and NE/Mark Wiese: “Was acoustic noise a problem for your crew? On the average, how many hours per day did you feel the need to wear hearing protection? Was the hearing protection uncomfortable during sleep periods? Were Caution and Warning (C&W) tones loud enough to be heard within a given module? How did the C&W alarms compare in the RS segment and US segment? Did the acoustic environment on ISS seem to dampen out the C&W’s enough that you felt you would be in danger of not hearing an annunciation? Do you feel that you would be alerted enough while in the Temporary Sleep Station (TeSS)? What suggestions do you have to make this environment safer?”

Mr. Culbertson reported that he did not have specific concerns or issues with regard to the nominal acoustic levels in the ISS. He indicated that the noise level in some areas of a module are higher than what the crew would like, but this did not affect crew performance. The higher noise levels are typically in areas such as the Russian Functional Cargo Block (FGB), where the crew does not nominally work for extended periods of time. The crew did not consider noise in nominal work areas to be a significant problem, but there is room for improvement.

The SRP was advised that acoustic levels in the United States On-Orbit Segment (USOS) are lower than the Russian Segment. Crew conversations in some areas of the Service Module (SM) were difficult, but still manageable. The crew wore headsets or foam ear plugs occasionally during normal working hours, particularly when noisy equipment was operating for a short period of time. Some crewmembers elected to also wear headsets during sleep (i.e., crew option). Covering the opening to the sleep quarters also reduced the ambient noise level about six decibels (dB).

Mr. Culbertson reported that the C&W tones are loud enough to be heard by the crew in all modules. Minor changes in the tones were recommended to the Environmental Control and Life Support (ECLS) Team because the intent or difference in some tones was not easily recognized during early mission transition.

Mr. Culbertson reported that he experienced a slight loss of hearing following the conclusion of the Expedition 3 mission, but the loss was temporary. He agreed with the SRP position that efforts to reduce the nominal ambient acoustic levels should be pursued to protect for hearing loss and reduce the impact to crew hearing during nominal operations.

2.0 CB/Gil Bonse and OE/Nathan Vassberg: “Do you have any comments on the Cycle Ergometer with Vibration Isolation & Stabilization System (CEVIS) repair activity?”

Mr. Culbertson advised that the CEVIS repair activities were successful. There were no problems or issues that affected safety.

3.0 NE/Mark Wiese: “What is your opinion of the contamination concern on the exterior of the Russian segment? What actual “decontamination” procedures were performed upon EVA ingress? i.e., suit inspection, glove bagging (single, double, triple, airtight bags), and suit wipe down? What was the detail of the thruster contamination information that was forwarded to the crew via the Russian controllers? Where you made aware of the US concerns regarding this contamination? Did you feel comfortable that no contaminants were brought into the habitable environment (sight, smell, scent)?”

The SRP was advised that there were no internal contamination problems or issues associated with extravehicular activity (EVA) operations. The EVA suit gloves were wiped off with towels. The towels were double bagged for storage. There were no residual stains identified on the suit (i.e., post EVA inspection). Mr. Culbertson stated that he detected an odor following an EVA (i.e., “the smell of space”) that could be attributed to atomic oxygen, and that there were no thruster contaminant odors detected.

Mr. Culbertson reported that the leading edges (i.e., ram) of the ISS and other external surfaces are showing tan stains. In his opinion, the stains are attributable to environmental dust and atomic oxygen effects, and are not considered a concern. He stated that the Expedition 3 crew was well advised of the concerns associated with thruster contamination, and the EVA crew had no problems in avoiding the designated contamination areas around Service Module thrusters.

4.0 QE/Richard Patrican: “Elevated methanol levels in the FGB were unexpectedly found in samples returned August 6, 2001. Additional air samples were to be taken, but can you offer any thoughts as to the source of the methanol and why the elevated levels were only found in the FGB given the ventilation and scrubbing provided.”

Mr. Culbertson advised that the methanol concern is based on on-orbit samples taken prior to the Expedition 3 mission. The Expedition 3 crew did not identify anything, other than cargo, that could be attributed to this contaminant. New samples were taken during the Expedition 3 mission and returned to ground; however, the test results on the have not been reported at this time.

5.0 CB/Gil Bonse and OE/Nathan Vassberg: “Could you tell whether or not sleep shifting affected the performance of the Expedition 3 crew?”

Mr. Culbertson reported that sleep shifting did not affect the overall performance of the crew, and the slam shift is not considered a problem provided the crew has adequate recovery time following the sleep shift and ensuing activities. He advised that sleep/slam shifting did have some physiological effects on the crew with respect to insufficient rest time; however, this did not impair crew performance during the EVA. He reported that the mission operations and health communities have been advised to pay particular attention to crew performance and physiological affects associated with sleep/slam shifting to assure future crews are protected.

6.0 NA/Gary Johnson: “Any concerns from the Expedition 3 crew safety briefings given to the Shuttle crew or visiting crew?”

Mr. Culbertson stated that the visiting crew safety briefings are considered very helpful. He recommended that future briefings have a little more structure, and that a briefing guide be developed. In general, the briefings include tours of the ISS to emphasize the location of safety equipment, familiarization with C&W alarms, identification of translation hazards and aids, and emergency response instructions.

7.0 OE/Nathan Vassberg: “Are there any ISS habitability features that did not work well as designed? Are there areas that we should consider changing or enhancing for elements not yet launched (i.e., Node 2/3, JEM, etc)?”

Mr. Culbertson reported that there are several habitability features, from a human factors perspective, that could have be done better on the USOS side. He cited the stowage of personal hygiene items and emergency lighting as examples of areas requiring frequent access but not designed to be easily accessible. He also noted that crew bathing in an open area requires partially closing FGB hatches when we have a mixed crew, since that is the area currently used for crew hygiene.

The SRP was advised of an entrapment/injury safety concern associated with the USOS Intravehicular Activity (IVA) handrails. In addition, he advised that there are a number of “head and knee knockers” in the IVA environment that each expedition crew must be cautious of while working or translating; however, this affects the visiting vehicle crew more than the expedition crew.

Mr. Culbertson advised that the food water injector needles could cause an injury if not used or stored correctly. Training and safety briefings should address this.

He noted that there was no practical way to design out either of these potential hazards, and that ensuring that Expedition and visiting crews were aware of them was sufficient but important.

8.0 CB/Gil Bonse: “Did you have any problem with the Dzus quarter-turn fasteners?”

Mr. Culbertson advised that he had continuous problems with Dzus fastener failures. The crewÕs response was to use gray tape or Velcro to secure a panel, and the oncoming crew was briefed on this. He indicated that the on-orbit crew could remove Dzus fasteners from future USOS modules and use Velcro to secure panels if the fasteners are needed to meet launch loads.

9.0 NE/Mark Wiese: “Can you see the Emergency Egress Lighting System (EELS) properly, and would their current configuration be sufficient in the event of an emergency, or is another modification warranted (i.e., brighter light system)?”

Mr. Culbertson reported that the crew did not identify any safety concerns associated with the EELS; however, since the EELS must be tested periodically, crew interfaces should be improved with respect to human factors (e.g., access to the EELS batteries is difficult, and it is not intuitive whether the test stitches are in the ÔnominalÕ or ÔtestÕ position).

10.0 NA/Gary Johnson and OE/Nathan Vassberg: “Any concerns with ISS emergency equipment in regard to operation & training?”

Mr. Culbertson expressed a concern that there is no consistency between modules regarding how panels are secured or accessed. He cited the Portable Fire Extinguisher (PFE) door as an example. Mr. Baumer stated that the SRP is aware of this variance and has made recommendations to the design community for future modules.

Mr. Culbertson stated that he did not receive training on the new Russian PFE located in DC-1; however, the new PFE is a fairly simple design from an operability perspective and should not be considered a safety concern. He noted that access and handling of the PFE and Portable Breathing Apparatus (PBA) in each of the modules is different, but does not represent a significant problem or issue. He reported that the oxygen cylinder in on the U.S. Lab Module PBAs indicates the pressure is at the bottom of the green range. The Expedition 4 crew has been advised of this condition.

11.0 CB/Gil Bonse and NE/Mark Wiese: “Was any protective equipment worn during new module ingress (eye protection for MPLM, Progress)? Did you feel comfortable with the environment inside new modules (progress, MPLM)? Was the crew trained to use goggles for first entry into a new module?”

The SRP was advised that the crew did wear goggles and rubber gloves for initial ingress of the Multipurpose Logistics Module (MPLM) and Progress. Due the corrective actions taken following Flight 7A.1, the MPLM brought up on UF-1 was very clean. The crew did not identify any visible metal particles floating in the MPLM, and the system filters were relatively clean when inspected. He also noted that there were no contaminant problems identified with the Progress.

12.0 SD2/John James: “Was the air clean? Did the modules have distinct odors? Did you see any leaks from systems or payloads?”

Mr. Culbertson reported that the ISS air quality is very good, and all ventilation system air filters are working well; however, some filters are difficult to access from a maintenance perspective. He advised that he was aware of the Freon leak in the Service Module, but did not detect any odors.

Mr. Baumer asked what quantity of water leaking into the internal environment would be considered a problem or hazard to the crew. He noted that the SRP considers any leakage above one gallon to be a safety hazard and should be controlled by a failure tolerant design approach. Mr. Culbertson responded that small amounts of water leaked or spilled into the environment do not represent a significant problem for the crew to clean up, and are not considered a hazard. He agreed that one gallon of water leaked into the environment is a reasonable quantity or boundary for safe crew clean-up. He also agreed that greater quantities could be considered hazardous, depending on amount and location, and that a failure tolerance design approach is appropriate.

13.0 NA/Gary Johnson: “Are EVA safety training/procedures adequate for the tasks assigned?”

Mr. Culbertson advised that training with the Russian Orlan EVA suit and Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) is excellent. The EVA crew was walked through the procedures prior to each operation, and there were no problems identified during EVA operations that required safety attention.

14.0 NE/Mark Wiese: “Were there any specific situations when you felt you needed specific safety requirements to assist in safing hardware in the event of an anomaly (i.e.: when handling hardware and/or payloads)?”

Mr. Culbertson advised that he did not believe this was a concern from a safety perspective, and that no problems were identified during the mission.

15.0 NE/Mark Wiese: “Regarding the Micro Particles Capturer (MPAC) and Space Environment Exposure Device (SEED) Payload hardware anomaly, what type of lock wire was used to secure the bolts – was it braided synthetic cord or metal wire? If metal wire was used, what measures were taken to control EVA puncture hazards? How was the lock wire configured? Were any pictures taken of the final assembly to show the modifications? Did all the bolts used to attach the sample holder and handrail clamps require modification? If not, which ones were modified?”

Mr. Culbertson reported that the maintenance operations associated with these payloads went smoothly and that no problems were indicated during installation of the lock wire. The lock wire was wrapped to protect the crew from handling hazards. He also noted that all bolts used to attach the sample holder and handrail clamps were modified.

16.0 NE/Mark Wiese: “Did you receive adequate information regarding the Russian hardware status, specifically the constant maintenance associated with the Elektron, Air Conditioning Unit (SKV), and Block Micro Para-Functional (BMP) Unit? Do you feel any safety concerns should be addressed from the US side regarding these activities? Do you feel that the plug-in plan provided you with adequate information when setting up hardware?”

Mr. Culbertson advised that the maintenance information provided to the expedition crew was very good and no problems were indicated during the performance of the tasks. He reported no safety issues or problems with plug-in plan.

17.0 NE/Mark Wiese: “What is your opinion of yellow tags on orbit? Do you understand their purpose; would the tags make you question the use of the hardware prior to using it?”

Mr. Culbertson reported no issue with the yellow tag approach. The crew did not have any specific cases where use of a yellow-tagged item was required. He indicated that the Program should not consider yellow tag approach a viable long-term process for ISS hardware. He emphasized the certification of all hardware prior to launch is the correct approach.

18.0 NE/Mark Wiese: “Do you have any comments on the problems related to the closing of the Docking Compartment one (DC-1) hatch? Do you feel that there is a possibility that it will become a challenge to properly seal this hatch?”

Mr. Culbertson reported the EVA crew did not experience any problems associated with the removal or reinstallation of the DC-1 EVA hatch.

19.0 NE/Mark Wiese and CB/Gil Bonse: “Could hatch drag-through’s ever become a hassle in the event of an emergency on the ISS? Do you think that any of the hatches would slow you down when preparing the Station for an emergency departure? Did the number of hatch drag-through’s seem to be excessive? Were hatch drag-through’s any problem?”

The SRP was advised that drag-through’s are not considered a problem as currently implemented in the ISS, nor do they represent a risk in responding to an emergency (e.g., three minute emergency egress requirement) since all quick-disconnects and cable cutters are located near the hatchways. The average number of drag-through’s is one per hatchway. With respect to the Orbiter Docking System (ODS) hatchway, Mr. Culbertson recommended that the number of drag-through’s to the ISS be limited or controlled.

20.0 QE/Richard Patrican: “ISS EVA Hatch Configuration – In the protocol from the Stafford Task Force (November 5-9,2001) a concern expressed by Commander Culbertson was briefly discussed regarding the Service Module hatch closure configuration during EVA that isolated the lone crewmember from the control system of one of the segments depending on where the crewperson was located during the EVA. Adequate detail is not provided in the protocol to fully understand the concern, can additional detail be provided?”

Mr. Culbertson advised that the Russian hatch configuration during an EVA is acceptable and that the hatches are well designed. However, to increase operational efficiency and provide access to critical Russian segment command and control functions, the crew preference is to not close the FGB hatches and have full access to the full ISS.

21.0 NE/Mark Wiese: “Did you find that procedures adequately provided you with safety pre-cautions during maintenance and remove and replace (R&R) tasks?”

Mr. Culbertson reported that the maintenance procedures are adequate, but they could be made more usable with regard to length and content. As an example for improvement, he recommended that only important safety caution notes be included in the procedure.

22.0 NE/Mark Wiese: “Do the terms “High Risk”, “Medium Risk”, “Low Risk” impact crew behavior during procedure implementation or activity participation, or, is there a single level of routine crew caution regardless of so called “risk” level? Are there planned activities where the crew absolutely needs to know risk level?”

Mr. Culbertson expressed no issues or concerns with the current approach.

23.0 NE/Mark Wiese: “Did you feel that any issues related to your personal safety were addressed in a timely and efficient manner? Did you feel that more information should have been provided regarding any safety concerns?”

The SRP was advised that the expedition crew had no issues or concerns with regard to personal safety, and that safety related information provided to the crew was timely and efficient.

24.0 QE/Richard Patrican: “Solid Fuel Oxygen Generator (SFOG) Certification – The SFOG cartridges on-orbit reached their certification limit at the end of December. MCC-M proposed activating a number of these devices on-orbit to measure burn time to rule out moisture intrusion and therefore extend the certification life. Performance of this test was not performed during Expedition 3 but may occur later. Can you discuss this event and any concerns you may have?”

Mr. Culbertson reported that the SFOG was not installed when the Expedition 3 crew arrived, and that the crew was directed to reinstall the unit during the mission to, among other things, support the SFOG cartridge test. It was (and is not) clear to the crew why it was necessary to do on orbit verification testing of the SFOG cartridges, and it was recommended that this process by carefully questioned. The SRP was advised that the SFOG cover, when installed in the operational location, restricts or blocks access to several panels. SFOG installation also makes the crewÕs daily dining area very crowded. In addition, the use of the SFOG is not considered a primary or secondary response to low oxygen situation, so it is unclear why the SFOG must remain nominally installed.

25.0 NA/Gary Johnson, OE/Nathan Vassberg, CB/Gil Bonse: “Do ISS procedures adequately cover fluid spills or leakage? Did you see any leaks from systems or payloads?”

Mr. Culbertson advised that the crew is trained to respond to fluid spills or leakage. No leaks were detected during the Expedition 3 mission.

26.0 NA/Gary Johnson and NE/Mark Wiese: “Did crew have any safety concerns about ISS cargo stowage, as analysis indicates a potential problem with UF1/Progress 6 cargo plus existing ISS cargo? Did the excess stowage on-orbit slow you down during an emergency? When cargo was “staged” for pre-pack or post-unpack did you feel it hindered your translation paths? Would this excess stowage become hazardous in the event you had to safe the station and egress to the Soyuz during an emergency?”

Mr. Culbertson reported that the stowage of cargo was considered a real problem for the expedition crew, but was manageable during the mission. The stowed cargo did not represent a problem for crew translation and would not affect the response to an emergency; however, this could potentially be a problem for future crews as stowage racks are displaced by experiment racks and more cargo is delivered. He advised that stowed cargo in certain locations does represent a concern to the crew with regard to gaining access to the hull (i.e., area behind a panel) to search for a penetration; in the response to a fire (i.e., access to PFE port); or isolating a fluid line leak.

He recommended that the ISS Program consider the development of a life cycle plan for all cargo brought up and stowed for an indefinite period of time.

He indicated support of a proposal to ISS Program Management to consider leaving an MPLM on-orbit to accommodate cargo transfer management and stowage during and between Shuttle missions.

27. NE/Mark Wiese: “Would the stowed Contingency Water Containers (CWCs) in the Cupola vestibule hinder your ability to access a PBA and/or PFE? Were you informed that these CWCs were blocking access to the Node PBA and PFE? Were any of the stowed CWCs moved to provide easy access to this equipment in the event of an emergency?”

The SRP was advised that the CWCs are stowed out of the way and are not considered a concern. The crew did not identify any condensation problems during the mission.

28.0 NE/Mark Wiese: “Do you think excess stowage in the Airlock would hinder your ability to fight a fire or quickly prepare for a contingency EVA?”

Mr. Culbertson reported that most of the cargo stowed in the Airlock is placed in the Crew Lock area and is not considered a problem since there is no fire source in this area. There is sufficient time to remove cargo to prepare for an EVA.

29.0 CB/Gil Bonse: “Are there any safety concerns or issues we should work for future crews?”

Mr. Culbertson advised that time/information management, cargo stowage, and communications are considered the top three issues by the Expedition 3 crew, with degraded or lost communications representing the most serious concern. He indicated that the SRP could be of assistance in refining elements of crew training, from a safety perspective, since the crew cannot train for everything in mock-ups. This is particularly evident where the crew is very dependent on procedures when responding to a contingency. He cited the crew response to fighting a fire as an example where use of an actual fire extinguisher to suppress a fire and – separately – exposing the integrated crew to a smoky, limited lighting environment (like what is done in submarine training) is needed to train the crew on appropriate emergency responses. The SRP agreed with the crew position that the Program should to do whatever is necessary to improve crew situational awareness. As an example of this position, Mr. Culbertson stated that the crew had very good situational awareness for EVAs, including use of the Space Station Remote Manipulator System (SSRMS). He also expressed that the ISS Program needs to emphasize an integrated operations approach when the Shuttle is present. The current method for mission planning emphasizes a Shuttle approach that is not always the best approach for the ISS.

Prepared by:

NE42/Richard E. Smith

Reviewed by:

OC/Melissa Gard

Crew Office Review Coordinator