EVA Tools and Crew Aids Panel Minutes of Meeting October 22, 2001

The EVA Tools and Crew Aids Panel met at JSC on October 22, 2001, in Building 1, Room 360, at 1:00 p.m. Representatives from the following organizations participated:

EVA Project Office

Hardware Development

Integration and Operations

Engineering Directorate

Crew and Thermal Systems Division

FCE EVA

Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance Office

Hamilton Standard Management Services

Lockheed Martin

Panel members from the following organizations participated:

XA/Panel Chair, XA/Panel Secretary, XA/I&O, CB/Astronaut Office, DX32/EVA Systems Group, XA Integration and Operations, CB/Astronaut Office, EC5/Crew and Thermal Systems Division, USA FCE EVA and NA/SR&QA.

The following items were presented:

Fifteen A total of 11 FIAR’s are open for EVA hardware. Three FIAR’s were reported as past due. The following were statused:

JSCEC0860 — Body Restraint Tether. BRT will not stabilize after tensioning.

BFCE029F105 — PGT. PGT chatter.

Closure is in house. CB/C. Nicollier will review. PRACA requests closure in time for CoFR.

JSCEC0901 — EHIP Light. EHIP lights out of configuration because of crossover band assembly.

No new FIAR’s were reported.

The following STS-109 FIAR’s were statused:

BFCE026A027 — EVA Winch & Mount Assembly. Roll pin coming out.

Failure is unique to one unit. Closure needs to come from USA (Doug Edwards).

JSCEC0873 — MMWS Gimbal Assembly. Anchor pin found loose inside of the spool pack assembly.

An interim closure will be processed.

JSCEC0896 — CCT Kit. Alignment mark of N2 cartridge still visible when punctured/seated with CCT.

A decision needs to be made whether to leave on-orbit.

There are six CAIP FIAR’s. The following were statused:

JSCEC0886 — Top Mounted Handrail, Custom Handrail, Handrail Bracket. Discoloration found inside handrail bracket tube and powdery substance found to be aluminum oxide during PDA.

Working toward ECD date.

JSCEC0895 — Handrail Bracket. Visual inspection of the handrail stanchion through hole showed inconsistent depth of step feature below threads.

Working toward ECD date.

Preliminary closure in work. Still had chatter on 5A. Look at closing "as is".

EC5/B. Greene presented a FIAR Status on JSCEC0853F — Bayonet Receptacle.

The following STS-104 FIAR’s were statused:

JSCEC0839 — REBA Charger. REBA failed to show green LED during acceptance testing.

Going to vendor end of March to get root cause closure.

JSCEC0841 — PFR Gimbal Assembly. Roll joint buttons binding.

Need to get with EM for root cause.

JSCEC0842 — Modular MWS Gimbal Assy. Fraying of end effector cord.

In work. Cost substantial.

JSCEC0781F — 5/16" Wobble Socket (HST). Socket detaching from PGT during STS-103 EVA.

Funded. Design change complete. Close out.

JSCEC0848F — Equipment Hook. Inadvertent equipment hook release.

Should have final by next week.

JSCEC0850 — Safety Tether. Discoloration of safety tether.

Test results by 3/19/01.

The following STS-104 SAFER FIAR was statused:

JSCER0035 — USA SAFER. SAFER battery erratic current readings.

Currently on-orbit. Will not get back until 6A lands. Will need month to do assessment.

The EVA hardware oldest FIAR, opened against the USA SAFER battery erratic current readings, is 390 days old.

FIAR’s open by flight:

STS-102 0

STS-108/UF1 1

STS-109/HST 6

STS-110/8A 11

STS-111/UF2 11

2. Cert Status — NC52/Greg Wright

All certification is closed for STS-102.

There are three open SAFER hardware certifications for STS-100 — 2 on the SAFER IVA Battery (-305 and -307), and SAFER Battery upgrade. These are pending GCAR updates for closure.

There are 22 open hardware certifications for STS-104, all "green".There are three open hardware certification items for STS-108/UF1. Certification for the EHIP lights is pending the washer change out. Lockheed is working the swingarm assembly and modular gimbal assembly certification.

There are 12 open hardware certification items for STS-109. APC/MFR assemblies’ certification is in work.

Open for STS-110/8A is the MT energy absorber.

3. Mission Hardware Status — LM/F. BlissFred Bliss

The following Mission Hardware Status was presented:

STS-102: All hardware has been delivered for flight.

STS-100: STS-98 hardware was received from USA on 3/2/01, and is being processed for the STS-100 Bench Review on 3/16/01. Roughly 20% of Bench Review hardware has been shipped. The other hardware will be sent as it is processed.

STS-108 MPLM Shipment:

ORU transfer bags are in Bldg. 421. The transfer paperwork, along with the Form 1027 was completed 10/19/01 to ship the hardware to USA.

STS-108 Middeck Hardware:

A shipment of middeck hardware was shipped 10/17/01. The MMWS have been PIA’d and is waiting for cert to be completed. The gimbal assemblies will be shipped for Bench Review. If the cert is not completed, it will be a ship and return until cert information is completed. The EHIP lights for this mission will have the washer change out completed today. Cert paperwork is being updated. All hardware will make Bench Review.

STS-109:

Hardware modification to push button articulating sockets are in work. PIA’s are being performed on the HST payload bay hardware. A shipment of completed PIA’d hardware will go out 10/26/01. On-dock date for payload bay hardware is 11/5/01.

4. Actions Review — XA/G. LeStourgeonGreg LeStourgeon

This item was deferred.

5. Pending CR Review

Pending CR’s were distributed for concurrence at the end of the meeting.





6. HITS Status Review — XA/Jackie Manning

The weekly "stoplight" HITS Metric Report was not presented.




7. Gage Status — EC5/Kim Hostetler
   
   



The monthly Gage Status is scheduled for presentation on the first Monday of the month.

8. H-1072 — Designate Bayonet Probes for Use on Russian Tool — XA/Chuck Fulcher

This CCBD requests two Class I bayonet probes for use with the interoperable Russian ORU temporary stowage device.

Decision: Route for technical concurrence.




9. H-1074 — EVA Cuff Checklist — XA/Margaret McPhail

This CCBD requests design changes to the existing EVA cuff checklist flight and trainer inventory to address failures identified under FIAR’s JSCDO0001F and B-FCE-026-A025 (band failure, checklist retaining screw). EC5 is requested to develop a plan, ROM cost and schedule to make minor design improvements to the existing EVA cuff checklist to allow for efficient fabrication.

EC5 will assume SSM responsibility for the cuff checklist band and associated drawings. MOD will assume SSM responsibility for the checklist itself and associated drawings, updates and revisions. MV/USA will transfer hardware and drawings to EC5.

Decision: Route for technical concurrence.

This CCBD requests adding a 2" wide band of Velcro wrapped around the handle of the inspection mirror for STS-109/HST. This band will provide a restraint of the inspection mirror on a tool caddy during the power control unit task.

Decision: Route for technical concurrence.

10. STS-108/UF1 Tool-to-Tool Fitcheck Status for EVA CoFR2 — HSMS/Mark Elder

All required mission-specific fitchecks are 100 percent complete. Intermission fitcheck analysis will be completed by 11/5/01.

11. High Strength Bridge Clamp Thermal Issues — EC5/Kim Hostetler

An informational briefing on the thermal issue for the high strength bridge clamp was presented as follows:

• Cold Temperature Issues

• Previously, HSBC was certified to -200 to +250 degrees F per CARD; however the low temperature limit of Custom 455 Steel is -150 degrees F (-301 and -303 configurations).


• New materials cert memo limits range to -150 degrees F.


• HSBC is not expected to ever see temperatures below -150 in the payload bay.


• CARD change is required to update the thermal range.

• Hot Temperature Issues


• Previous certification package includes thermal analysis for STS-76 only, which shows no violations of cert temperature range.


• Highly likely that HSBC will get hotter than certified max temperature of +250 degrees F.


• Steel housing of HSBC will get hot enough in certain attitudes to become an issue for incidental contact with the EMU suit.

• Options

• Flight-by-flight thermal analysis


• Operational constraint


• Hardware change

A thermal analysis is performed for each flight. The EVA thermal analysis is presented at each CoFR by Grant Bue (LMCO).

The following actions were assigned:

Action 10/22/01-1: Direct LMCO/Grant Bue to include the sill stack in flight-specific thermal analyses.

Actionee: EC5/Kim Hostetler

Due Date: 11/5/01

Action 10/22/01-2: Review CARD non-operational thermal range.

Actionee: EC5/Kim Hostetler

Due Date: 11/5/01

11. Response to H-1034 — Long Duration Tie Down Tether Evaluation — EC5/Chris Tracy

H-1034 requested EC5 perform an evaluation on the use of long duration tie down tethers (LDTDT’s) for possible use to tie down the service module debris panels (SMDP’s) on UF2. Six SMDP’s will be stowed as one bundle, with the individual shields tied together with Russian wire ties.

Issue

• ISS Program needs a contingency stowage plan for Russian SMDP’s


• Primary plan is to temporarily stow panels with a Russian-provided ball/socket connected to an APFR

Problem Definition and Options

• Mount panels on handrails

• Handrail structure provides reaction forces


• Tethers are secured to handrail tether points


• Mount panels on Node 1

• Node 1 MMOD shield provides reaction forces


• Tethers are secured to handrail tether points


• Implementation need date: ASAP for NBL training and UF2 procedure development


• Consequences of not implementing change


• Lack of contingency stowage option

• COTS stainless tensioning buckle, beta glass strap, ISS equipment hook


• Load certification — 170 lbs


• 4 currently on orbit, 4 more certified in Bldg. 7 Bond


• Certified for 1 year of continuous use in the ISS low Earth orbit environment

Stowage Procedure — Initial Installation

• 2-person task


• 1 crewmember holds the bundle while the other secures it with wire ties


• Quickly and easily constrains the SMDP’s for LDTDT installation

Stowage Procedure — Tether Installation

• 1-person task


• 2 LDTDT’s are routed from the handrails around the central post

Stowage Procedure — Tether Routing

• Tethers folded around central post


• Reduced possibility of chafing tether


• Reduced bending moment of post

Analysis

• With 0.2g acceleration vector from any direction, 46 lb max acceleration load


• Combined with 100 lb preload, 146 lb max tensile load on tethers (worst case CM load)


• Handrail tether points are certified to take 200 lb load in any direction


• 2.5 inches of slack in tethers necessary to remove tethers from panel stack


• During NBL test run, when tethers were tightened, vigorous shaking was necessary to move the stack


• When the tethers were intentionally loosened, the stack could wiggle, but it could not be removed from the handrails or contact the exterior of the Station.

EC recommends the following:

• Use 4 LDTDT’s (2 primary, 2 redundant) with 4 to 8 wire ties.


• Route 1 LDTDT through SMDP handrails to eliminate the float away hazard.


• Contact Assessment


• Load carried by 4 regions on ends of handrails


• Only 22 lb max acceleration forces


• Static friction between handrails and panels probably sufficient to prevent motion of panels relative to handrails

• EC assessment: Concept is feasible. No risk of damage beyond cosmetic to hardware due to interface.

No further items were brought forward, and the EVA Tools and Crew Aids Panel adjourned.

Submitted by: Approved by:

(Original signed by) (Original signed by)

________________________________ ________________________________

Harriett A. Attaway D. G. LeStourgeonD. G. LeStourgeon

Secretary, EVA Tools & Crew Aids Panel Chairman, Acting EVA Tools & Crew Aids Panel