Status Report

EVA Hardware Board (EHB) Minutes of Meeting February 7, 2001

By SpaceRef Editor
February 7, 2001
Filed under ,

The EHB met at JSC on February 7, 2001, in Building 1, Room 360, at 1:00 p.m. Representatives from the following organizations participated:

EVA Project Office

Hardware Development

Integration and Operations

Astronaut Office

Engineering Directorate

Crew & Thermal Systems Division

EVA and Spacesuit Systems

EVA, Robotics, & Crew Systems



Hamilton Sundstrand Management Services



EHB Board members from the following organizations participated:

XA/Tools and Crew Aids, XA/EMU, XA/Integration and Operations, CB/Astronaut Office, DX3/EVA, Robotics, & Crew Systems, EA/Engineering, EC5/EVA and Spacesuit Systems, MV5/FCE, and NA/SR&QA.


The following items were presented:


  1. Hardware Integration Schedule XA/B. Counts

Changes to the schedule include the addition of STS-105 (7A.1) and STS-107 (Freestar), which may cause flight slips.

  1. PRACA Status NS43/T. Miller

A total of 17 FIAR’s are open for EVA hardware and are shown by flight as follows:

STS-98 0

STS-102 0

STS-100 2

STS-104 11

Four FIAR’s were reported as past due and statused as follows:

JSCEC0796 — Active WIF Assy. Active WIF control knob appeared to have increased force to operate.

In XA signature loop.

JSCEC0841 — PFR Gimbal Assy. Roll joint buttons binding.

Change ECD to middle of March timeframe.

JSCEC0814 — TERA. TERA out of configuration.

In XA signature loop.

JSCER0033 — USA SAFER — NSI trace on oscilloscope appeared abnormal.

CR will be presented at today’s EHB.

No new FIAR’s were reported.

No FIAR’s are open for STS-98 or STS-102.

The following FIAR for STS-104 was statused:

JSCEC0781F — 5/16" Wobble Socket (HST). 5/16" Wobble Socket detaching from PGT during STS-103 EVA.

Fix in work and funded. Hardware to be DR’d and FIAR closed.

The oldest FIAR, against the Adaptive Payload Carrier, is 519 days old.

  1. Certification Status NS22/G. Wright

All hardware certifications are closed for STS-98.

There are two open hardware certifications for STS-102 — EVA Scissors and QD Cap Removal Tool. There are four different configurations for the EVA Scissors. CARD issue needs to be worked. The QD Cap Removal tool will come off the list with the STS-102 ESEL revision to demanifest.

There are four open hardware certifications for STS-100 — 11/16" Box End Wrench, USA SAFER, SAFER IVA Battery, and Equipment Tether Reel. Most of these items are pending ESEL updates.

  1. EMU RDR and Certification Status NC512/C. Sager

The total open EMU RDR’s by flight are as follows:

STS-98 0

STS-102 2

STS-100 11

STS-104 7

All certification is closed for STS-98.

There is one open certification item for STS-102 — EMU Advanced Battery. This battery is not flying on STS-102; pending ESEL revision to demanifest.

There are seven items requiring certification for STS-100 — Disposable Insuit Drink Bag, (DIDB), BSI with Toe Cap Assy, Arm Sizing Ring, Impact Shield, Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), Impact Shield, and ISS EMU Umbilical. ESEL’s are in the process of updates, which will remove these items from the open cert list.

The STS-104 (7A) Certification Status lists 24 open certification items.

  1. Funds Transfer Status XA/J. Hall

This item was not presented. EC5 will present XA a list of items requiring funding.


  1. EMU Logistics Status XA/L. Kearney

This item was not presented.

  1. EHB Action Status XA/G. Lutz
  2. The following action was assigned:

    Action 2/7/01-1: Change FEMU-R-001 to disallow reuse of CCC’s and to utilize regenerated Metox canisters. (Ref: CM Richards high CO2 run.)

    Actionee: EC5/W. Spenny

    Due Date: 3/7/01

    The following EHB action items were statused:

    Action 1/24/01-1 — EC5/R. Schwarz: Review Lockheed ROM and generate new cost impact (Ref: H-0937 — USA SAFER Launch Restraint FSE)

    Should have ROM by late next week.

    Action 12/13/00-2 — EC5/W. Spenny: IRCO2 sensor recommended levels.

    MOD can contribute to this. To add on to the weekly Spenny Tag-up.

  3. H-0949 — Change to USA SAFER NSI Self Test Specification — ER/K. Lewis
  4. During the SAFER self test performed with fired NASA Standard Initiator (NSI), SAFER 1006 did not generate "NSI Circuit Open" message (FIAR JSCER0033 written). Residue from the NSI firing resulted in electrical continuity across the NSI pins. SAFER 1006 identified this electrical continuity as an unfired NSI. The effect of this is that successful completion of a SAFER self test (no failure message) is not a sufficient indication that an NSI has not been fired. This CCBD recommends changing the SAFER IVA Checkout Procedure so that the SAFER Manual Isolation Valve is open during SAFER self test. "NSI Circuit Open" message on the Hand Controller Module display would indicate a bad firing circuit (no-go condition). Successful completion of the self test (no failure message) would indicate a good firing circuit.

    Decision: Approve.

  5. H-0945 — Certify Shuttle Tools for ISS On-Orbit Stowage and Use — XA/L. Crocker

This CCBD requests certification of the following tools to be left on-orbit on 7A:

  • EHIP/PGT Cable, PGT-1001

  • Hydrazine Detection System, SED39116311-301

  • Hydrazine Detection Tube (N204), SED39117159-302

  • PGT EHIP Y-Power Charger Cable, SED39134852-301

Decision: Approve.

  1. Orbital Replacement Unit (ORU) Transfer Device (OTD) Tether Task — XA/T. Jochim
  2. XA has requested swap out on 6A for the Equipment Reel Tether, which expires in May 2001, and the ORU Tether Equipment Hook old configuration without the slide lock feature. Although there is no planned use of the OTD in the near-term, contingency use is planned for on-orbit critical spare maintenance tasks and possible use for Plasma Contactor Units. The Shuttle Program will not incorporate the OTD task into the Mission Integration Plan (MIP). They question replacing the life-limited tether with another life-limited tether with no planned use of OTD and repeating this task every 2 years.

    XA asked if we could fly tethers as on-orbit spares and require tether swap when critical spares are changed out. This option would require an ISS on-orbit stowage agreement and update to the MOD/EVA Maintenance Procedures.

    The following actions were assigned:

    Action 2/7/01-2: Obtain Increment 2 buy-in to manifest tether hardware.

    Actionee: XA/T. Jochim

    Due Date: 2/28/01

    Action 2/7/01-3: Revise Increment IDRD requirement.

    Actionee: XA/T. Jochim

    Due Date: 2/28/01

  3. Safety Tether Inadvertent Release Issue: Options for Resolution — XA/L. Crocker

A Safety Tether Team was formed as a result of the EVA CCB Action 01/05/01-02 to assess all hardware used during safety tether protocol operations. The action also requested the team consider redesigning the safety tether hook with a locking feature, redesigning the tether point on the tether extender redesigning the crew hook lock assembly disabling the slap-on feature, and/or any other hardware modification, including fabrication of new hardware. The team was comprised of members of EC5/Crew and Thermal Systems Division, Mission Operations Directorate, the Astronaut Office, SR&QA, and XA. The team was tasked to solidify issues with the inadvertent release of safety tethers, to propose a list of options for resolution of issues, provide a rough cost and schedule impact for all options identified, and provide team recommendations of which option(s) to pursue.

Options defined in the CCB action were evaluated and six additional options were added as follows:

  • Lengthen Tether Extender and add Crew Hook Lock to suit side of safety tether when using a Tether Extender

  • Return to exclusive use of Shuttle version (push-button) hooks

  • Total redesign of hook

  • Modify a COTS carabiner and use as Safety Tether Hook

  • Add a carabiner tether instead of Crew Hook Lock

  • Decertify Tether Extender and no longer use

Each option was evaluated in terms of pros and cons, and ranked using the following criteria:

  • Operationally

  • By technical risk and design complexity

  • By cost

The top three options by operational ranking are:

  • Redesign Safety Tether Hook with lock or remove slap-on feature

  • Total hook redesign

  • Go back to use of Shuttle (push-button) hooks

The top three options by design complexity and technical risk ranking are:

  • Decertify Tether Extender

  • Use current system

  • Lengthen the Tether Extender and add a Crew Hook Lock

The top three options by cost ranking are:

  • Decertify Tether Extender’

  • Use current system

  • Redesign tether point on Tether Extender

Backup information was provided on hardware inventory of the ISS Safety Tether, Shuttle ERCM Safety Tether, ISS Waist Tether, Tether Extension, Crew Hook Lock, and Crew Hook Lock Lanyard. Only the ISS Waist Tether has additional units approved to be built.

The team is scheduled to go back to the EVA CCB on 2/23/01. The EHB Chairman requested the team concentrate on two to three options or combinations to be phased out over the next two fiscal years and report back to him before going to the EVA CCB. Once the option(s) are chosen, a set of requirements will be provided to EC5.

  1. Extend MMWS Allowable Moment Arm — Roll Dash Numbers (H-0808R3) — EC5/R. Schwarz

This CCBD was disapproved.

  1. Standard ISS Tools Required Post-ISS A/L — XA/B. Counts

A comparison of standard SSP and ISS core tools vs. Post 7A ISS airlock quantities was presented and reflects a lack of agreement by the EVA and ISS communities. Strawman quantities for the ISS core only were issued in April 1999 as part of the Standard Tools ESEL, Rev. 14 (pre-ELD) and was intended to give the ISS program a ROM for weight and volume for post 7A ISS manifests. Since that time, types and quantities of tools considered required or standard have changed considerably. Added have been ERCA, REBA’s, REBA Extension Cable, REBA Charger, Hydrazine Detection Kit, Tether Extenders, and EMU Middeck Charger. A request for community comments, redlines, and concurrence to the proposed core quantities was made last year. In spite of additional requests during stowage and IPT splinters and deadline extension to after the holidays, only one reply was received (EVA Systems). Impact to SSP core quantities needs to be addressed. Finalizing post-airlock hardware allocations is needed prior to 7A.1 CCCD. A meeting will be scheduled with XA I&O, MOD, Increment crew, Payload Integration Manager, Flight Integration Manager, SSP Manifest and Flight Integration, and others as required, to review and reach agreement on the post 7A ISS airlock quantities.





No further items were brought forward, and the EHB meeting adjourned.



Submitted by: Approved by:

(Original signed by) (Original signed by)

___________________________ ____________________________

Harriett Attaway Glenn C. Lutz

EHB Secretary EHB Chairman

SpaceRef staff editor.