EVA Hardware Board (EHB) Minutes 19 July 2000

EVA Hardware Board (EHB)

The EHB met at JSC on July 19, 2000, in Building 1, Room 360, at 1:00 p.m. Representatives from the following organizations participated:

EVA Project Office

Hardware Development

Integration and Operations

Engineering Directorate

EVA and Spacesuit Systems

EVA, Robotics, & Crew Systems

SR&QA

Hamilton Sundstrand

Hamilton Sundstrand Management Services

USA

EHB Board members from the following organizations participated:

XA/EMU, XA/Tools and Crew Aids, XA/Integration and Operations, CB/Astronaut Office, EC5/EVA and Spacesuit Systems, and NA/Quality Assurance.

The following items were presented:

1. Hardware Integration Schedule – XA/B. Counts

Schedule changes include moves of the STS-92 Bench Review ship to 8/18/00, STS-92 flight ship to 9/14/00, and STS-92 late ship to 9/19/00.

2. PRACA Status – NS43/T. Miller

A total of 31 FIAR’s is open for EVA hardware.

The total FIAR’s open by flight is as follows:

STS-106 13

STS-92 17

STS-97 21

No FIAR’s were reported as past due. Four new FIAR’s were reported and statused as follows:

JSCEC0814 – TERA – Pedestal fitting. Configuration problem, older dash number used. Lockheed is in the process of rebuilding. The date for the new build is in the late October-early November timeframe.

JSCEC0815 – TERA (WIF) – Failure of locking collar on active of WIF. The part is being reworked to bring into spec.

JSCEC0816 – ETSD – Pip pins misalignment. Deformations in ETSD to be verified by EC5/L. Laurence.

3. Certification Status – NS22/B. Harvee

There are five open hardware certifications for STS-106. The retractable equipment tethers open certs are in the signature loop and will come off the list. There are eight open hardware certifications for STS-92. There are 10 open hardware certifications for STS-97.

STS-106 19 (3 require CCBD’s to close)

STS-92 0

STS-97 0

There is one open EMU certification for STS-106. There are two open EMU certifications for STS-92. There are five open EMU certifications for STS-97.

5. Funds Transfer Status – XA/J. Russo

This item was not presented.

6. EMU Logistics Status – XA/B. Johnson

This item was not presented.

7. H7038R1 — EMU Small Planar HUT Development and Certification — HS/T. Stankiewicz

This item will be discussed outside the EHB.




8. H7073 – EMU/LSS – Missing Alignment Pin on Sublimator Mounting Flange – HS/O. Bystrianyk

This CCBD requests a new locating pin design to be incorporated into the sublimator and harness, which will improve the interface between the pins and the sublimator to effectively eliminate pins from becoming loose and subsequently being dislodged from the assembly.

Decision: Approve

9. Current Drawing Transfer Process at USA – USA/S. Grick-Agrella

USA presented their drawing transfer process. Hardware processing responsibility is transferred via a CCBD to USA/FCE. The NASA SSM signs the 214 cards for non-electronic drawings and delivers them to the Program Office. The TMRD signs the 214 card and delivers to USA/FCE. USA/FCE retrieves drawings from Bldg. 45. No 214 cards exist at NASA for electronic drawings. USA Document Control contacts Bldg. 45 with drawing numbers to be transferred. Minor drawing changes/corrections will be made to drawings to optimize processing. Any drawing change that effects fit, form, or function will require a CCBD to the EHB with SSM concurrence. Copies of changes will be sent to the SSM upon their request.

EC5/R. Schwarz indicated that 214 Cards do not exist for training hardware. The current EC5/MV5 agreement will be reworked.

10. Rechargeable EVA Battery Assembly (REBA) – Charger EMI Issues – LOC/B. Hughes

Background: REBA charger EMI test results exceed Shuttle limits for conducted and radiated emissions. All other certification testing has passed and is complete. One cert unit and two flight units are affected. The charger was retested using an in-line filter in the Y power cable. Results of testing showed only slight improvement, and still exceeded limits.

Possible causes of the issue have been attributed to Vicor DC/DC switching converter circuits, 8 Mhz clock oscillator, pulse charging circuitry, packaging, lack of cable shielding from charger to battery, and possible component failure in the cert unit. Tests will be run to isolate causes. A susceptibility test will be run Friday, 7/21/00.

It was initially recommended to not fly the charger on 3A. The design problem or component failure in the cert unit will be established. Through testing, the component failure and design problem will be isolated. The charger will be redesigned to reduce EMI to acceptable levels for 4A. Charger redesign is based on the following:

• Vendor designing new filer based on prototype charger


• Recommendations from Vicor EMI engineer on optical filtering and layout of power supply


• Recommendations from NASA EMI engineer


• Reconsideration of circuit board layout, grounding, and cable shielding


• Will have to run tests on different configurations at JSC


• NASA will work closely with vendor to analyze and test hardware (vendor does not have testing capability)

Although not required for 3A, it was the recommendation of the Chairman and members of the Board to fly the charger on 3A and work the refurbishments on the new builds. CB/D. Tani felt it would be excellent in-flight experience for the crew as it is mission critical for 4A. A waiver will be processed and taken to the Program for approval.

11. EHB Action Status

The EHB has seven outstanding actions. Action 6/7/00-2 was closed – There is no requirement for a Russian on-orbit trainer since the Russian SAFER is on hold.

No further items were brought forward, and the EHB meeting adjourned.

Submitted by: Approved by:

(Original signed by) (Original signed by)

___________________________ ____________________________

Harriett Attaway G. Allen Flynt

EHB Secretary EHB Chairman