CRS Report: U.S. Space Programs: Civilian, Military, and Commercial (part 2)
Commercial Space Programs
Civilian communications satellites have been chiefly a private sector activity since
passage of the 1962 Communications Satellite Act (P.L. 87-624). Attempts to commercialize
other aspects of space activities have yielded mixed success. Congress has passed several
laws to facilitate the commercialization of space launch services for putting satellites into
orbit (the 1984 Commercial Space Launch Act, the 1988 Commercial Space Launch Act
Amendments, and the 1998 Commercial Space Act). The development of a U.S. commercial
launch services industry has been largely successful. DOD and NASA continue to play a
strong role in developing new launch vehicles, though private companies are partnering with
the government or developing their own. The most controversial issues are the relative roles
of the government versus the private sector in developing new systems, ensuring that U.S.
companies can compete with foreign launch services companies, and trade and missile
proliferation issues involved in exporting satellites to other countries for launch. See CRS
Issue Brief IB93062.
Congress also sought to facilitate commercialization of land remote sensing satellites
by privatizing the government’s Landsat program through the 1984 Land Remote Sensing
Commercialization Act ( P.L. 98-365). Such satellites provide imagery of the Earth that can
be used for land-use planning, environmental studies, mineral exploration, and many other
uses. After a tumultuous 8 years that saw the effort to privatize Landsat fail, Congress
repealed that Act and replaced it with the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992 (P.L.
102-555), bringing Landsat back under government sponsorship. Landsat 5 and 7, built by
and operated by the government, are now in orbit (Landsat 7’s imagery is unusable at the
moment because of a technical problem). The Act also promoted development of new
systems by the private sector. Coupled with a 1994 Clinton Administration policy, these
actions led several U.S. companies to initiate programs to build remote sensing satellites and
offer imagery on a commercial basis. Those companies must obtain an operating license from
NOAA for such systems. The first successful launch of a commercial imaging satellite,
Space Imaging’s Ikonos 2, was achieved in September 1999. The market for commercial
satellite remote sensing products continues to be limited, however, and U.S. companies
reportedly are struggling to remain in business. Partially in response to that concern,
President Bush signed a new commercial remote sensing policy on April 25, 2003
[http://www.ostp.gov/html/new.html] that is intended to maintain the nation’s leadership in
remote sensing space activities and sustain and enhance the U.S. remote sensing industry.
The Bush policy encourages companies to build and operate commercial remote sensing satellite systems that are superior to current or planned foreign systems, subject to
government regulation, and possible additional controls and safeguards if the U.S.
government is a user (e.g. satellite, ground station, and communications link protection
measures to ensure the U.S. Government can rely on the systems).
Controversy over the fact that the imagery has military as well as civilian uses
complicates this commercial space effort, however. Though not as precise as military
reconnaissance satellites, two operating U.S. private sector satellites, Ikonos 2 (owned by
Space Imaging) and QuickBird (owned by DigitalGlobe), produce imagery with 1 meter and
0.6 meter resolution (the ability to “see” an object or feature of a certain size), respectively.
Commercial satellites with even better resolution are expected. Competitors to U.S.
commercial satellite imaging companies include French, Russian, Indian, and Israeli
companies that offer imagery with 2.5-meter, 1-meter, 1-meter, and 1.8-meter resolution
respectively. One major issue is when the government can exercise “shutter control,”
forcing companies to discontinue obtaining or distributing imagery of certain parts of the
world in times of crisis. DOD took a different approach to controlling access to imagery
when the United States initiated attacks in Afghanistan. For two months, the National
Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) bought exclusive rights to Ikonos imagery of that
area from Space Imaging so that no one else could use the data without NIMA’s approval.
The practice was dubbed “checkbook shutter control” in the media. Some groups
complained that the media and relief agencies need that data, too. The government
apparently did not limit access to commercial satellite imagery during the Iraqi war. Another
issue is the government’s role in controlling to whom the imagery is sold and which
countries may invest in the U.S.-owned systems. U.S. companies want time limits on how
long the government can take to decide whether particular sales or investments will be
permitted so they can make wise business decisions. Under the 1992 Landsat Act, the
Commerce Department has 120 days to accept or reject license applications. However,
Commerce must consult with other agencies, including the Departments of State and
Defense, and those departments have no time limits. The new Bush policy states that the
government will provide a timely and responsive regulatory environment.
Special issues have arisen regarding Israel. On October 7, 1994, Senator Bingaman and
63 other Senators sent a letter to the Secretary of Commerce expressing concern that data
from Eyeglass (subsequently renamed Orbview) that could be used against Israel would be
made available to Saudi Arabia, which was providing partial financing for the system and
would be the location of a ground station. The FY1997 DOD authorization bill (P.L.
104-201) prohibits collection and release, or U.S. government declassification, of satellite
imagery of Israel unless such imagery is no more detailed or precise than what is available
from commercial sources.
Potential availability of commercial imagery also has a positive side for the military,
since the U.S. military and intelligence communities could reduce costs by acquiring imagery
commercially instead of building their own systems for some purposes. The House and
Senate Intelligence Committees have strongly encouraged NIMA to purchase commercial
imagery to augment classified imagery. The January 2001 report of the Independent
Commission on NIMA (see Military Space Issues) strongly endorsed NIMA acquisition of
commercial imagery, and supported the proposal to allow private sector companies to build
satellites with half-meter resolution. The 2003 Bush policy directs the U.S. government to
utilize U.S. commercial remote sensing space capabilities, for both civil and national security purposes, to the maximum extent practicable. Foreign commercial remote sensing space
capabilities may be used consistent with national security and foreign policy objectives. (See
below for more on NIMA’s use of commercial imagery.)
Other potential commercial space activities are microgravity materials processing
(making products such as purer pharmaceuticals by utilizing the microgravity conditions in
space), space tourism, and space facilities such as Spacehab’s modules that fly inside the
space shuttle’s cargo bay for scientific experiments or carrying cargo.
Military Space Programs
The creation of NASA was a deliberate step by President Eisenhower to separate
military and civilian space activities. Among other things, he wanted to stress that the United
States was interested in the peaceful uses of space, but recognized that space had military
applications as well. The 1958 National Aeronautics and Space Act specified that military
space activities be conducted by the Department of Defense (DOD). The intelligence
community (coordinated by the Director of Central Intelligence) makes significant use of
space-based intelligence collection capabilities, and participates in managing satellite
reconnaissance programs through the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), an agency
within DOD. NRO builds and operates intelligence collection satellites, and collects and
processes the resulting data. The data are provided to users such as NIMA and the National
Security Agency (NSA). The Undersecretary of the Air Force is the Director of NRO, the
Air Force acquisition executive for space, and DOD’s executive agent for space.
DOD and the intelligence community manage a broad array of space activities,
including launch vehicle development, communications satellites, navigation satellites (the
Global Positioning System – GPS), early warning satellites to alert the United States to
foreign missile launches, weather satellites, reconnaissance satellites, and developing
capabilities to protect U.S. satellite systems and to deny the use of space to adversaries
(called “space control” or “counterspace systems”). The 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War is
dubbed by some as the first “space war” because support from space displayed great
improvement over what was available during the previous major conflict, Vietnam. These
systems continue to play significant roles in U.S. military operations, including the 2003
Iraqi war and the war against terrorism.
The Bush Administration abolished U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM) in 2002
when it reorganized the unified command structure largely in response to the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks. USSPACECOM was created in 1985 as a unified command to
oversee space operations. The Commander of USSPACECOM was also the Commander
of the U.S.-Canadian North American Aerospace Defense long the government can take to decide whether particular sales or investments will be
permitted so they can make wise business decisions. Under the 1992 Landsat Act, the
Commerce Department has 120 days to accept or reject license applications. However,
Commerce must consult with other agencies, including the Departments of State and
Defense, and those departments have no time limits. The new Bush policy states that the
government will provide a timely and responsive regulatory environment.
Special issues have arisen regarding Israel. On October 7, 1994, Senator Bingaman and
63 other Senators sent a letter to the Secretary of Commerce expressing concern that data
from Eyeglass (subsequently renamed Orbview) that could be used against Israel would be
made available to Saudi Arabia, which was providing partial financing for the system and
would be the location of a ground station. The FY1997 DOD authorization bill (P.L.
104-201) prohibits collection and release, or U.S. government declassification, of satellite
imagery of Israel unless such imagery is no more detailed or precise than what is available
from commercial sources.
Potential availability of commercial imagery also has a positive side for the military,
since the U.S. military and intelligence communities could reduce costs by acquiring imagery
commercially instead of building their own systems for some purposes. The House and
Senate Intelligence Committees have strongly encouraged NIMA to purchase commercial
imagery to augment classified imagery. The January 2001 report of the Independent
Commission on NIMA (see Military Space Issues) strongly endorsed NIMA acquisition of
commercial imagery, and supported the proposal to allow private sector companies to build
satellites with half-meter resolution. The 2003 Bush policy directs the U.S. government to
utilize U.S. commercial remote sensing space capabilities, for both civil and national securityCommand (NORAD). On October
1, 2002, a new Northern Command was created for homeland defense, and its Commander
assumed command of NORAD. USSPACECOM was merged with U.S. Strategic Command
(USSTRATCOM), which is now responsible for early warning of, and defense against,
missile attacks and long range conventional attacks. USSTRATCOM has three space
components: Army Space Command, Naval Space Command, and Space Air Force (the 14th
Air Force, headquartered at Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA). Air Force Space Command
is a major Air Force command headquartered at Peterson AFB, CO.
How to organize DOD and the intelligence community to work effectively on space
matters has been an issue for several years. In three separate FY2000 funding bills, Congress
established commissions to review the NRO (in the FY2000 intelligence authorization act,
P.L. 106-120); NIMA (in the classified annex to the FY2000 DOD appropriations act, P.L.
106-79); and overall U.S. national security space management and organization (in the
FY2000 DOD authorization act, P.L. 106-65). The NRO, NIMA, and “Space Commission”
reports are discussed below.
Although U.S. military and civilian space programs are separated organizationally, the
functions performed by satellites and the vehicles that launch them are not easily divided.
Both sectors use communications, navigation, weather, and remote sensing/reconnaissance
satellites, which may operate at different frequencies or have different capabilities, but have
similar technology. The same launch vehicles can be used to launch any type of military,
civilian, or commercial satellite. DOD uses some civilian satellites and vice versa.
DOD and NASA both develop space launch vehicles. The Delta, Atlas, and Titan
launch vehicles were all initially developed by DOD, while NASA developed Scout and
Saturn (both no longer produced), and the space shuttle. All except the shuttle are
“expendable launch vehicles” (ELVs) that can only be used once (the shuttle is reusable).
An August 1994 Clinton Administration policy gave DOD responsibility for maintaining and
upgrading the ELV fleet, while NASA maintains the shuttle and develops new reusable
launch technology. Some expect that a space policy review now underway (see below) will
modify that policy.
After the Cold War ended, DOD and congressional interest in space weapons, both
those to attack other satellites (antisatellite, or ASAT, weapons) and weapons based in space
to attack ballistic missiles, declined initially, but was rekindled beginning with the 104th
Congress. Using satellites to attack ballistic missiles has been controversial since President
Reagan’s 1983 announcement of a Strategic Defense Initiative to study the viability of
building a ballistic missile defense system to protect the United States and its allies. The
Clinton Administration changed the name of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization
to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) to reflect a new focus on theater
missile defense in the wake of the Persian Gulf War, rather than national missile defense.
The Bush Administration changed the name to the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to reflect
its interest in broad missile defense goals (see CRS Report RL31111). The concept of
placing weapons in space as part of a missile defense system remains controversial. Whether
missile defense weapons ultimately are based in space or on the ground, a missile defense
system would require satellites for early warning, communications, and other functions.
Interagency Coordination
Several mechanisms have been tried since 1958 to coordinate interagency space policy.
Dissatisfied with the Reagan Administration’s approach of using a Senior Interagency Group
(SIG/Space) under the National Security Council (NSC), in the FY1989 NASA authorization
act (P.L. 100-685), Congress re-created the National Space Council. The original council,
which included aeronautics, was created in the 1958 Space Act, and abolished by President
Nixon in 1973. Under President George H. W. Bush, the Space Council was headed by Vice
President Quayle. President Clinton decided to merge the Space Council functions into a
National Science and Technology Council, administered through the Office of Science and
Technology Policy. It oversaw civil and commercial space policy; while military space
activities were overseen by the National Security Council. The Space Council still exists in
law, but it is not staffed or funded. Some space advocates hoped President George W. Bush
would reactivate the Space Council, but a mechanism called a Policy Coordinating
Committee under the National Security Council (similar to SIG/Space) was chosen instead.
On July 28, 2002, in NSPD-15, President Bush directed the NSC to chair a review of
national space policies. The first, on commercial remote sensing, was signed April 25,
2003. Two others, on launch vehicles and overall national space policy, are pending.
According to press reports and discussion at a House Science Committee hearing on
September 10, 2003, an interagency process also is underway to develop long term plans for
the space program.
International Cooperation and Competition
Virtually every country in the world uses satellites for communications and obtaining
weather data, but the usual measure of whether a country is a member of the “space-faring”
club is its ability to launch satellites. By that criterion, Russia, the United States, China,
Japan, India, Israel, Ukraine, and the European Space Agency (ESA) are members. ESA
developed the Ariane launch vehicle; Ariane launches are conducted by the French company
Arianespace. These countries, including many of the individual members of ESA, present
opportunities for cooperation in space, as well as competition. The 15 members of ESA are
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
The NASA Act specifically states that NASA may conduct international space
activities. Most NASA programs today have an international component. One of the major
cooperative projects today is the space station (see CRS Issue Brief IB93017). European
countries, both individually and through ESA, Canada, and Japan, in particular, have
participated in many cooperative space programs with NASA. They also compete with U.S.
companies in some space areas. Europe, India, Ukraine, and Russia compete in launch
services for placing satellites into orbit. France, Russia, India and Israel compete in satellite
remote sensing, and Europe competes in communications satellite manufacturing.
Cooperation and competition between the United States and the former Soviet Union
attracted much attention. Competition with the Soviet Union was measured less in economic
terms than in prestige and national defense. The main area of competition today seems to
be on the economic front, although Russian and Ukrainian companies have joint ventures
with U.S. firms to provide launch services, so economic cooperation also exists.
NASA and DOD Space Budgets
The majority of U.S. government space funding goes to NASA and DOD. This table
shows NASA and DOD space funding, but must be used cautiously. Tracking the DOD space
budget is difficult since space is not specifically identified as a line item in the DOD budget.
OMB and GAO provided CRS with DOD space funding figures through FY1995 including
funding for both unclassified and classified DOD space programs. However, in 1996, the
Director of Central Intelligence decided for the first time to classify the NRO funding figure so total figures for DOD
space spending were not
available for more than a
year. In the summer of
1997, the Administration
finally released a number for
the total DOD FY1996
space budget, $11.5 billion,
but at the same time revised
numbers downward for
FY1992-1995 without
explanation. This table uses
data in the FY2000
Aeronautics and Space
Report of the President
(released in 2002), with
additional data from
NASA’s FY2004 budget
estimate (including out-year projections), and from DOD for FY2000-2003 DOD space
spending figures and out-year projections. DOD’s space budget for FY2002 was $15.7
billion, for FY2003 is $18.4 billion, and the FY2004 request is $20.4 billion. NASA
received $14.9 billion in FY2002; $15.3 billion in FY2003; and the FY2004 request is $15.5
billion. All NASA figures include aeronautics funding ($400 million-$1 billion annually in
recent years).
[GRAPHIC Does not include Transition Quarter. See text for other notes.]
Space Program Issues
NASA Issues
The space shuttle Columbia accident on February 1, 2003 undoubtedly will be the focus
of attention at NASA for some time. Apart from the human tragedy, there are practical
aspects of grounding the shuttle fleet that affect the space station and the Hubble Space
Telescope programs. The shuttle is used to service Hubble (the next servicing mission was
scheduled for 2004), and takes crews and cargo to and from the International Space Station
(ISS), which is under construction in orbit. The Columbia tragedy and questions arising from
it are discussed in CRS Report RS21408, CRS Issue Brief IB93017, and CRS Issue Brief
IB93062, and will not be repeated here. The key question from a NASA-wide standpoint is
what impact the Columbia tragedy may have on the agency, and on the space program
overall, as the public and policy makers debate the benefits of human space exploration
versus its risks and costs. Some may argue that more emphasis should be placed on robotic
exploration instead of risking human lives, while others may view the tragedy as the time to
recommit to the vision of human space exploration as humanity’s destiny. H.R. 3057
(Lampson) would establish long-term space goals.
NASA conducts many other activities separate from human spaceflight, and issues may
arise with some of those programs, too. For example, NASA is requesting $279 million in
FY2004 for Project Prometheus, which is the combination of NASA’s Nuclear System
Initiative (NSI) and a Jupiter Icy Moons Orbiter (JIMO). The 5-year (FY2004-2008) budget projection for Project Prometheus is $3 billion. NASA estimates that JIMO would be
launched in 2012 to 2013, and the total estimated program cost through 2012 is $8-9 billion,
although NASA stresses that the estimate is very preliminary. The NSI portion of Project
Prometheus was approved in the FY2003 budget, and will develop space nuclear power and
propulsion for planetary spacecraft. JIMO, a new request in the FY2004 budget, is a
spacecraft designed to successively orbit three of Jupiter’s moons (Europa, Callisto, and
Ganymede) to determine if liquid water is present beneath their surfaces. Water is essential
to life, and the discovery of liquid water would suggest the possibility of life. NASA had
been planning a mission to Europa, which was supported by the planetary science community
and Congress. In the FY2003 budget, however, NASA canceled the Europa mission because
it was too expensive. The decision to initiate an even more expensive mission may raise
questions. Congress did appropriate $20 million for JIMO in the FY2003 Consolidated
Appropriations Resolution (P.L. 108-7), however, even though NASA did not request
funding for it in FY2003. Congress approved NASA’s request to initiate the NSI, but cut
$19 million from the $125 million request. The House approved full funding for Project
Prometheus in the FY2004 VA-HUD-IA appropriations bill (H.R. 2861). The Senate
Appropriations Committee (S. 1584) recommended a $20 million cut since the program
received an unrequested $20 million in FY2003.
In addition to programmatic issues, NASA also is seeking to address human capital
challenges stemming from its aging workforce. Human capital is a government-wide issue
addressed in the President’s Management Agenda, and NASA is seeking legislation that will
provide the agency with more flexibility in hiring and retaining workers. H.R. 1085
(Boehlert) and S. 610 (Voinovich) address NASA specifically. H.R. 1836 (Davis) addresses
NASA, DOD, and the Security and Exchange Commission. See CRS Report RL31991 for
a comparison of those bills.
