CAIB Press Conference Transcript 8 April 2003 (Part 3)

A REPORTER: Florida Today. For the admiral or anybody on the board. Mr. Blomberg today pretty much recommended, given the fact that the shuttle appears as if it’s going to be flying into the 2020s, that the United States ought to go off and build a couple of new orbiters; and I was wondering what your view on that issue is.

ADM. GEHMAN: Well, I’ll speak for myself. I seriously doubt that the board will address an issue like that. I suspect that when we write our report, the board will attempt to frame the issue. We will attempt to restate the risks and make sure we understand the costs and the benefits. We’ll try to baseline the debate, but I doubt that the board will make a recommendation like that. That’s really for the administration and the Congress to decide something like that. We probably will want, however, to characterize the issue as well as we can and put that debate in context; but I doubt seriously if we’re going to come to a flat-out recommendation like that.

A REPORTER: ABC News. I’d like an update, Admiral, on a couple of issues. What significant new debris do you have and anything new from the OEX recorder?

ADM. GEHMAN: I’ll talk about the debris. Maybe I’ll led Dr. Widnall talk about OEX things. New pieces of debris? We have found more RCC and more left-wing tile scraps, pieces, including some completely intact tiles. West of Corsicana or west of Interstate 45. It’s not shown on that map up there. Other than that, I mean, we continue to find a couple of hundred pieces a day; but I don’t think that there’s anything particularly remarkable. I mentioned that we have found main engine pieces in Louisiana — Fort Polk, Louisiana. I don’t think there’s anything else that’s particularly remarkable that comes to my mind.

As far as the OEX recorder —

DR. WIDNALL: I’d say a few things about it. My understanding that there’s this much data. If you put each sensor on a piece of paper, it would be this much. You know, I’ve seen a couple of traces particularly interesting, you know, temperature on the front spar. I think basically, you know, the group that’s doing it — in fact, they are probably meeting as we speak; and I’m missing that meeting. It’s very important to do it very systematically, to do it very carefully. The whole question of the validity of sensors is important, and in some situations we may get more information out of the fact that a sensor wire was burned through at a particular place on the vehicle than the actual measurement itself.

There are pressure measurements, but my understanding is the pressure measurements were designed for ascent and so those pressure sensors, particularly like pressure of 14.7 psi, which is sea level pressure, you get them up to almost no pressure and you don’t really get very accurate readings. Temperature measurements. There are strain measurements, but then you have to ask the question about whether those strain measurements are also sensitive to temperature.

So it’s going to take really an interdisciplinary team to sort that out, and it’s really important to do it well the first time. So I presented one piece of data just to sort of show you the kind of data that’s becoming available and how you might tie that into an analysis of the vehicle; but I think, in general, it’s just too early to say. Maybe by next week there will be some more to report.

ADM. GEHMAN: The OEX data is analyzed, and we get it kind of in three- and four-day increments. We’re not all hanging over there, waiting for the next of the 590 pieces of data. So we kind of get it in little increments after it has been looked at by professionals. So one of those report-outs is going on this afternoon.

A REPORTER: Houston Chronicle. I have a couple of RCC related questions. One, what is your thinking on this fracture pattern, center-line fracture pattern? Is that evidence of zinc oxidation, or is that a question mark? Two, during the mission itself, how much discussion was there among the engineers about impact on RCC versus tile and main gear door seal?

ADM. GEHMAN: I’ll take the first half of that, if that’s all right, and let Sally talk about who knew what when. We don’t right now have a good answer for why we seem to see this fracture pattern in which not all but most of the RCC panels which we’ve recovered seem to have broken right at that narrow neck there. It could be that they were either all put under some torsion or all put under some tension and then they all cracked that way. We don’t know that until we do some more testing. Keep in mind that part of our foam shooting that we’re going to do is we’re going to shoot foam at RCC as well as tile. So hopefully we’ll learn some more about that, but that’s one of the many items we’ve got to run to earth. So we don’t know.

As far as whether or not there’s any evidence of discussions about damage to the RCC, I’ll turn it over to Dr. Ride.

DR. RIDE: There was very little discussion of RCC. It was brought up, but there wasn’t very much discussion about it. Crater, as an analysis tool, was not intended to look at impact into RCC. So although it was discussed, the focus was very clearly on the potential of damage to the tile.

ADM. GEHMAN: I’d like to correct something. There is a record of RCC repairs and damage. Yes. There is a record, and that’s maintained by NASA in the orbiter turn-around.

A REPORTER: What does it show?

ADM. GEHMAN: What they used to do, what they did for years and years is actually take a piece of tracing paper or something like that, lay it over the RCC panel, and actually mark every little gouge and nick and pinhole. Then they make their repairs. Then the next time the orbiter flies, they come back and they take that tracing paper and lay it back over again and mark in new gouges, nicks, and pinholes. They have been keeping record.

They don’t do that anymore because I don’t know what their process is. I forgot to get back to you when you mentioned that. It doesn’t show any particular trends. That’s how we know how many pinholes —

A REPORTER: That’s not the question. Pinholes are not impact damage.

ADM. GEHMAN: Oxidation.

A REPORTER: Right. What record do they have, if any, about hits to the RCC and damage from hits to the RCC? Are they only tracking damage so they don’t know what hits were and what was by other mechanisms?

GEN. DEAL: It’s the same thing. Serious.

ADM. GEHMAN: Just like we showed those in the briefings today where we showed, they counted every nick to a tile, every nick to an RCC, too.

GEN. DEAL: Well, let me expand a little bit on his question. We’re also looking through the NDE methods that we’re looking at with the RCC to see what they can tell us about the remaining RCC. You know, the thermography, the slides that we’ve shown here in the past and maybe some other type of things, the ultrasonics we may be looking at, too, that may give us a better idea if there is some kind of breach along that leading edge, as well.

A REPORTER: CBS News. Two related questions for Dr. Ride. They’re intangible, and I guess you’re our intangible expert today.

DR. RIDE: Yeah. Great.

A REPORTER: Well, seriously, it struck me several times during this investigation that you’re dealing with an agency that has a 40-year history of focusing on the ascent phase because that’s where all the obvious tremendous energies are involved. I’m not saying it’s not during entry, but that’s where a lot of the focus is. I’m wondering if there’s a psychological factor from this agency looking at launch versus entry that lets you get into a flight like this and so easily, except this data that you were referring to is not at all comfortable data to decide this isn’t an issue. Related to that, even after 112 we heard from the tank guys yesterday that are saying here you’ve still got a top-level program requirement that says you’re not supposed to have any foam impact. Okay. That’s still there. And you also have them testify in answer to one of y’all’s questions could you lose a vehicle from this. They both said absolutely. I guess I’m trying to understand the psychology that gets you after 112 to say this is not a safety-of-flight issue. I’m utterly baffled that this not a safety-of-flight issue, and I’m wondering what your thoughts are as to how that could evolve.

DR. RIDE: Talk about the danger of falling into hindsight. We’re actually trying to understand that, too, because there is the guiding principle that nothing should hit the orbiter; and it’s written in the documentation. The other thing that’s written in the document is that the TPS system is Criticality 1. That’s on the one side.

On the other side is that through the history of the 100 flights or so, there’s been debris impacting the orbiter on virtually every flight. You’ve seen the records of it. We’ve been seeing the records of it. I think one of the things that we’re going to be particularly interested in — I mean, as you can imagine, I’m hearing a little bit of an echo here because the question is when the first damage occurred on early shuttle flights. I mean, I can tell you and I’m sure you remember tile damage was a very big concern in the early stages of the shuttle program, a huge concern. Everyone was worried about the main engines on ascent and the tile on re-entry. Those were the two leading issues in the early days of the program.

The early flights came back with some tile damage, but in almost every case it was turn-around issued. There were changes that were made to the tiles. There were improvements that were made in the early days of the program, reasonably continuous, actually; but as time went on, people, I think, got used to tile damage from debris off the external tank, got used to repairing that between flights, got used to thinking of it as a turn-around issue. I think we saw that in the way that problems were handled after STS 87, STS 112, and during 107. That is just the sort of thing that we’re trying to get at.

So as I said, I think I’m hearing an echo here. Of course, during the Rogers Commission, one of the things that came out early on was that the O rings were not a problem for the first time on this flight, on 51L. They had been a problem on not just one, not just two, not just three, but several shuttle flights before the Challenger accident and NASA had started to — you know, it was almost the case that if you — the famous discussion of Richard Feynman that you survived it the first time, so suddenly it becomes more normal and it happens enough and now it’s a normal occurrence. You know, we’re trying to understand whether that same thinking crept in with the foam off the tank.

A REPORTER: ABC News. I agree there’s a lot of danger in slipping into the hindsight is 20/20 vision, but I’m not clear exactly on the process of a chit. For Dr. Ride. I would like to understand how that works, who can write one, was there a thought that, did anyone try to write one on this case, what happens when one is written.

DR. RIDE: The process of a chit. Chits are used. I’ll tell you how I’m familiar with chits. Chits are often written by the flight controllers in mission control when they want to task the engineering community to look at something for them during the flight. The concept here is that the mission controllers are all experts on their system but they’re busy working, controlling the space shuttle during launch, on orbit, or re-entry. They have a lot of information at their disposal; but if a special analysis needs to be done or redone or they need to call in extra resources, they do that by calling on the engineering community that is supporting the flight but from outside the control center. That engineering community is controlled through the MER, which may stand for mission evaluation room or may stand for something else. The MER — the flight control team can write a chit to the MER, asking the MER to look into a specific problem. Then the MER will form a team to look into that problem and report back.

Now, it is possible and I think that other people can also write chit to the MER, not just the flight control team. I’m familiar with it from the point of view of the flight control team, but I believe that the program office or other people who had some concern could also write a chit to the MER. But a chit is the way you ask the engineering community to evaluate something specific for a flight that’s in progress.

A REPORTER: So a concerned engineer couldn’t have written a chit and then it would have had to have been closed before the process continued?

DR. RIDE: You know, I see what you’re asking. I think what you’re asking is could a single engineer use a chit as a way of raising the flag up the flag pole? You know, I’ll not really sure. I think that the engineers probably think that they have better ways of proceeding with their concerns. You know, there are channels that they have for their concerns; and I would suspect that it wouldn’t occur to an engineer to write a chit, it would occur to the engineer to go through these other channels that are set up specifically for that purpose.

LT. COL. WOODYARD: Okay. We’ll go to our phone bridge. Is anyone on the phone bridge?

A REPORTER: Earth news. For Dr. Ride. You talked to us about your involvement. Can you step back and give a big-picture contrast, how different this commission is from the Rogers Commission of that? Do you see any signs that NASA has slipped back into their pre-Challenger mentality in terms of safety.

For General Deal, what type of area-to-mass ratio are you thinking about for the mystery object. The people who know me know I’ll never avoid touching a statistic. Any thoughts about the fact that, in the charts you showed about the amount of time Columbia spent on the lunch pad, that a very larger percentage of it is just a handful of missions, a couple of cases where Columbia spent six months on the pad trying to get off the ground for a single flight and was that a factor.

GEN. DEAL: He asked you first.

DR. RIDE: Well, I could probably talk for hours on this subject. So I’ll refrain from my professorial tendency and not do that. Let me just say that the investigation, believe it or not, is very similar in a lot of respects. There are just obvious differences. The difference is in the accident itself.

You know, when we started looking into the Challenger accident when our commission was first formed, we actually didn’t have any idea what caused the accident; and we started a slow slog through the data. We actually thought we were going to be in trouble because the Challenger exploded 73 seconds after liftoff. There was no telemetry to the ground that was an indication of the accident. There was nothing on board that was an indication of the accident. The launch videos that we saw didn’t give any clues to what the problem was. There was no downlinked data that mission control wasn’t at the time looking at that was useful. We weren’t sure that we were going to find anything, because it exploded over the ocean. So we actually thought that we were in for a long haul.

Now, we quickly came upon — we got luck. We got lucky because when we started through the slog of all the data, some of the data that was available to us was the launch photos, the high-resolution photographs taken on the launch pad. One of those photographs, if you remember, just showed the famous puff of smoke. Well, the orbiter was still on the launch pad, less than one second after ignition. The puff coming out of the aft solid rocket. So as soon as we saw that, we said, okay, let’s try following these puffs; and, of course, we could.

Just as an interesting aside, the launch cameras didn’t work well then either; and we didn’t have access to the cameras that would have shown us exactly where the problem was. But with that clue we were able to really kind of hone in and put together the story, not from the photos but using the photos kind of as the first clue. We were able to put together the story from the debris that was gradually found, to track down the flow path; and the telemetry that we slowly analyzed just to look at, you know, where were the shear and how were the control systems responding and put together the story pretty quickly, much more quickly than we’ve been able to do here. But it all started because we got pretty lucky by having that photographic evidence of the initiation of the problem. But it was detective work.

Now, what you’re seeing here is very similar detective work that requires a use of essentially all the available evidence. The photography is really crucial. Would that we had high-resolution good launch video of this accident or this flight just to see, you know, how big was that piece of debris, where did it hit. Then we’d have much better justification of honing on that. We haven’t pinned that one down yet. We still are not certain. You know, we’re going through the debris, collecting the debris, probably at about the rate that we were collecting it after the Challenger accident, and going through the real details of the telemetry. So the investigative work is actually rather similar but harder in this case.

You know, you asked a question about comparing the commissions. I would say that the talent on the two commissions is actually very, very comparable. I mean, this is a board that started with a lot of expertise in the details of investigations, accident investigations. The Rogers Commission brought that talent onto the staff; but, you know, basically my impression is that the two teams looking into the investigation are really very, very similar and have a very similar approach to the accident and to the investigation.

I guess just maybe the final thing to say here that’s also, I think, fairly obvious is that because of the speed with which we were able to home in on what the root cause of the Challenger accident was, we were able to get rather quickly into some of the other related issues — decision-making, the role of the safety structure of NASA, the role of management. We were able to look at maintenance records and just a variety of different things more quickly; but I think that you’ve got the sense that this investigation is leading into many of those areas, too, in some cases somewhat the same way as it did on the Challenger. You know, the times are different, NASA is different, the accidents were different, the details are different, but a lot of the questions that we’re asking are the same and we’ll just see what we come up with here.

GEN. DEAL: To answer your questions about the mass and area and the RCS, I don’t have that data in front of me. So I would rather not tell you wrong, but I can tell you that that’s one of the reasons why we’re doing additional tests at the Air Force research lab. When we even did the carrier panel that people have glommed in on as a good candidate, depending on the orientation, it may not show you the particular band that you’re looking for. So that’s why we’re adding in the brackets to it and also the substructure and looking at different tile structure so that you can try to do that.

When they do the tests, they take a carrier panel, for example, and they orient it different ways because as you’ve got this radar data, it shows it starting to tumble as it heads back into the earth’s atmosphere and when you look at it in different orientations, you can tell which one of those. So again, hopefully next week with the portion of the RCC, the different carrier panels and also the T seal we’ll be able to give you better data.

On the exposure to the environment, I think you hit the nail on the head and that’s the reason that we’re drilling down even farther. It’s fairly conclusive right now that the exposure to the salt atmosphere and also the zinc could be causing these pinholes and as likely has done that. What is less determinative right now is the effect of these pinholes, and that’s why we’re doing additional NDE and that’s why Dr. Widnall’s group will be doing the foam tests not only against a strong RCC but also against allegedly what you could probably characterize as being weakened from flight. We’ll check out the integrity of it before we fire foam at it and then see how that responds to foam hitting it.

This gets back to the early-on issue we’ve had of an ageing spacecraft in an R&D environment. You’ve got a wing that’s been exposed to multiple re-entries. You’ve got a wing that’s been sitting out on a pad. You’ve got a wing that’s been exposed to zinc on the support structure and also to salt. What are the chemical effects on that? That’s what we’re continuing to analyze.

A REPORTER: During the mission, after observing the foam debris falling off the tank from the orbiter, NASA asked Boeing to evaluate whether there was damage to the thermal protection system that could be a safety-of-flight issue; and Boeing came back and said there could be damage but they turned to crater and some other analysis. In conclusion now, you judged that conclusion as being wrong. Regardless of whether the foam did contribute to the accident, was it an incorrect conclusion and, second, do you know what role that recommendation played in NASA’s decision that the foam event could be disregarded?

ADM. GEHMAN: I would not necessarily start the answer to my question by agreeing with your premise. That is, we have not come to the conclusion that the analysis was incorrectly arrived at. I mean obviously it was wrong, but that’s hindsight. We have not concluded that the analysis and the decision-making was wrong. I mean, they may have done everything they could with the information that they had available. They may have had all the right people in the room and asked all the right questions and considered all the right factors and just come up with the wrong answer. So I would caveat my reply by that entry statement.

Then that decision, then, I think it’s pretty clear, did flavor all the rest of the decisions. That is, once NASA had it in their heads that foam striking the TPS was not a safety-of-flight issue, it clearly flavored other decisions such as how high a priority they should put on on-orbit photography and things like that. So, yes, it has a cascading effect.

LT. COL. WOODYARD: Anyone else on the phone bridge?

THE REPORTER: I just wanted to indicate that I wasn’t trying to determine whether it was arrived at improperly or properly. So, in hindsight, it was the wrong recommendation.

LT. COL. WOODYARD: That’s your statement.

A REPORTER: No, it’s a question.

ADM. GEHMAN: Well, in hindsight it would have been better to do some other things. Sure. We know that now, but we’re not ready to make a judgment that that conclusion could have reasonably been reached at that time.

LT. COL. WOODYARD: Thank you. Anyone else on the phone bridge?

A REPORTER: Discovery Channel. I have a further clarification for Admiral Gehman and then a question. When you said that you and NASA and the board were basically uncomfortable with the crater analysis, were there any concerns during the flight or is this purely a post-flight look-back and saying, yeah, this wasn’t really a good piece of data to base an analysis on? And my question concerns a comment that you made in conversation with Dr. Blomberg this morning when you said that NASA needs to have an aggressive program to look for the unknown unknowns, to really look for trouble. That sounds very reasonable when you look at it in hindsight, but do you have any examples on how you exactly go about putting into a program like what NASA operates such a thing that embeds this perspective in it?

ADM. GEHMAN: Let me answer the second question first. I don’t know that I am prepared to answer the question about whether or not anyone questioned the crater model during the flight. Let me think about that for second. I don’t recollect about not — you know, I don’t have all the details in front of me. The board is making itself more knowledgeable, just as we have in plasma physics, aerodynamics, thermodynamics, and a lot of other things. The board is making itself more knowledgeable in safety theory and my understanding from the people that have been consulted — and we’re going to consult more people — that there are ways to assess your assessment program. That’s essentially what we’re saying here. In other words, there are ways to be constantly on the lookout for what you don’t know.

NASA already has initiated a program some number of months ago in which they are benchmarking their assessment programs with the Navy nuclear power program. Naval nuclear power, like any nuclear power, but particularly power in submarines, is also a fairly unforgiving environment for which mistakes are not easily overlooked and the dangers can be pretty catastrophic and errors are not very forgiven. So they are already comparing how they look for unknowns and how they look for risks and things like that.

So the board is getting itself smart before we make any kind of judgment on that fact; but based on what I know to date, I believe that there are ways to question, assess, investigate, measure risks and even ask questions about whether or not you’re asking the right questions. And the board will make a judgment as to whether that program is robust enough.

As far as did anybody question the crater model, during the flight, I don’t recollect.

DR. RIDE: You know, I think a better way to characterize that was that people were generally unfamiliar with crater. It hadn’t really been used, as I said, as a during-flight decision-making tool, and it was just one piece of this long chain of the analysis which had uncertainties at several different locations. So one of the reasons for the desire for imagery from the engineering team, you know, this large group of engineers, was basically to try to bound the uncertainties and see whether you could see, you know, is there tile damage and, if so, how much.

LT. COL. WOODYARD: While we’re on the phone bridge, anyone else?

A REPORTER: SpaceFlightNow.com. A question for Dr. Ride. Jim Halsell told the board yesterday that following two moments, the 112 and 107 event, that it had now become a major issue that would have to be dealt with. I think he said before that the next orbiter was rolled out, much less flown. However, Atlantis was rolled over from the OPS to the VAB, mated to its tank, and was about to go out to the pad during the Columbia’s mission. I wonder if you’ve seen any evidence that NASA was actually considering the long-term flight safety issue following the foam incident on 107.

DR. RIDE: Are you talking about whether, during the flight, they were starting to think about that as a long-term problem for future flights? Is that the question?

THE REPORTER: Yes. Jim Halsell yesterday seemed to imply that the mission would have been on hold, pending resolution of the foam. And I’m wondering if you’ve seen any evidence that they were slowing things up.

DR. RIDE: I think it’s too early for us to say on that right ow. That’s one of the things that we’re really trying to get into when we look into what was the disposition and discussion around the disposition of the foam impacts after 112, leading up to 113 and 107; and, you know, we’re not ready to characterize that yet. We’re just not sure.

ADM. GEHMAN: Besides that, it’s just one person’s opinion, may not be NASA’s.

GEN. DEAL: Let me add that they had been looking into this for quite a while. As a matter of fact, they were already removing the ablator material on tanks, starting with Tank No. 129, and they already had a redesign effort going for the bipod ramp, but it had been deemed an acceptable risk. Up to that point in time, they had never had a piece of bipod ramp come off and strike the orbiter before this. So they were in the process of already changing this bipod ramp, but had not accelerated it to the point that you’ve got to do it before the next flight.

LT. COL. WOODYARD: Anyone else on the phone bridge?

Okay. Thank you. We’ve got time for one short question here.

A REPORTER: General Deal, I’m trying to understand what you were saying about a carrier panel in light of the impression that we got last week that the carrier panel was it. We seemed to be told last week that the carrier panel was the only remaining candidate on these tests. What is the situation with that? It’s very late in the system, right? That hasn’t changed. The question is which part of it.

GEN. DEAL: It’s pretty much the most likely candidate that we had in last week’s results. It would have been something that fit the carrier panel’s dimensions, what they had. However, it was not the full carrier panel they looked at. You’ve got a band here, and what we had in the carrier panel last week was it was in and out of that band. We’re trying to see if adding brackets onto it is going to give you better reflectivity and you can pinpoint it being in that band at different orientations so you could say, yes, we were still getting that type of return.

The same thing with the RCC again. You know, not to repeat myself to you but the full RCC panel was really out of band. The partial might be. The T seal might be. So that’s why we’re still going further; and last week I think what we tried to convey — and you may have interpreted it differently or it may have been conveyed differently — was that was the leading candidate at that point in time, based upon the data they had. Now that they’ve already analyzed all 30, we’re going back and looking at a few more to see what fits in that band and all the different orientations.

A REPORTER: Is it still there?

GEN. DEAL: It is still one of the likely candidates, and adding additional panels and the brackets to it will help really define whether or not that is a good candidate.

ADM. GEHMAN: I think the exact words that General Barry used last week was that the only candidate left on the table was the carrier panel, but that didn’t prove that it was the carrier panel. Of our samples, that was the only one left on the table.

LT. COL. WOODYARD: Thank you very much for joining us today. As always is our practice, the board members will be here to answer a few questions.