10 Sep 2003: Minutes from the Space and Life Sciences Directorate (SLSD) 7S Stage Operations Readiness Review (SORR) Executive Session
SUBJECT: Minutes from the Space and Life Sciences Directorate (SLSD) 7S Stage Operations Readiness Review (SORR) Executive Session
The 7S SORR Executive Session was conducted September 10, 2003 in Building 1, Conference Room 860, and began at 10:00 a.m. The meeting was chaired by Ms. Mi-Mi Lau and supported by attendees on the attached list.
The Chairman called the meeting to order stating the purpose of the Executive Session.
Ms. Lau stated that this forum would be conducted from 10-11:30 a.m. and at 11:45 a.m. with SA/J. Davis. Dr. Davis would then meet with OA/W.Gerstenmaier at 1:30 p.m. to discuss the SLSD position on the 7S launch. She opened the meeting by briefly discussing the red status of each item as it was discussed at yesterday’s SORR and included the updated Program Risk Advisory Board (PRAB) information.
SA/C. Stegemoeller’s opening comments included the objectives for today’s meeting. He stated that during this session, the SLSD needed to be clear on all the issues and that Dr. Davis would address these issues with NASA Headquarters tomorrow. The question was posed as to why the ISS crew remains on-orbit as well as why a continued launch date is still set for 7S to launch a new crew to ISS. Ms. Lau stated that based on the SORR assessment, Dr. Davis wants firm data and an outlined planned.
SM/J. Walters briefly discussed the events that had led the SLSD to the decision of a no go for 7S launch due to too many unknowns. He reviewed the SORR summary chart and noted that there was some capacity to retrieve data after the launch of Expedition 8. AC8/B. Dunbar questioned as to whether or not the data had been received from the Russians and SF/N. Packham confirmed that there had been some data retrieved, but that there was no acceptable quality control certification data.
Mr. Walters reviewed details regarding the degraded modes and use of spares for Exercise Countermeasures, and that crew health maintenance is in a best effort mode with two crewmembers. Also, an Extravehicular Activity (EVA) had been added to this increment which would be difficult to perform due to the lack of resistance training and additional crew. From an Environmental Health perspective, Mr. Walters stated that the air and water samples were good, but that there was an immense need for operative monitoring equipment on-board. Dr. Packham interjected that if the Solid Sorbent Air Sampler (SSAS) were to return on 6S, the results of the samples would be unknown for several weeks and that crew exposure limits would not be determined until the end of the increment. Get well options were discussed with the ultimate solution of getting monitoring replacements on-board, but that no capabilities exist on the allocated Progress flights. Numerous options were discussed in length to resolve these issues, but ultimately if crew health continues to degenerate, the only alternative would be to bring the crew home.
Considerable deliberation continued as to which items could be restored and to what extent the point of no return would be reached. It was noted that the ISSP was given a “heads up” for 6S and 12P. Dr. Dunbar reiterated as to whether or not more upmass would mitigate risk enough to continue manning the ISS or if the crew should be put on red alert evaluating crew health as often as possible while on-orbit. Dr. Packham stated that no amount of upmass on 7S would cure the problems, but that 5-Grab Sample Containers (GSC), 2-SSAS, and 3-Water Microbiology Kits (WMK) as priority manifest items would be a potential resolution. SF/W. Langdoc stated that this was the first increment that a visiting vehicle had not docked with ISS in a six-month period and that currently the ISSP is flying in a contingency mode and that no nominal situations exist.
Dr. Packham reviewed the current state of all monitoring capabilities as follows:
Air
Microbiological
Water
Radiation
Acoustics
Additionally, Dr. Packham reviewed the monitoring capabilities of the Russian hardware as follows:
Air
-No acceptable quality control certification data
-AK-1 samplers
-High levels of hydrocarbons in samples from Shuttle mid-deck
-Not (never) observed in GSC’s
-Indicative of Moscow air
-E.g. acetone – SM 0.70 mg/m3, FGB 0.28 mg/m3, Lab 0.80 mg/m3
-Drager tubes
-GANK
Water
-Archival samples only
Microbiological
-On-orbit air microbiology capability
-Archival samples
Radiation
-Good data transfer between US and Russian sides
Acoustics
-Similar to US technology
Dr. Packham reviewed the ISS onboard monitoring levels of all possible compounds stating that this data was originally tracked as a result of an action assigned by OA/W. Gerstenmaier. He said that SA is currently tracking 207 items on-board ISS in the Hazardous Material Summary Tables (HMST) and that the HMST is updated for each stage operation. Each HMST is classified into five toxicological levels with 4 being most toxic and 0 being the least. He also recommended development of an ISS integrated hazard analysis to include systems and payloads if one does not exist and include fault tolerance as part of the analysis. Dr. Packham stated that environmental factors and Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) have evaluated each of the 207 items individually for impacts to crew health and to the systems that support the crew, but cannot analyze the reactions between all 207 items.
Dr. Packham discussed in length the details of each evaluation regarding ECLSS items, Thermal items, and Payloads. He specifically pointed out that controls are in place to detect and respond to large releases of gases such as oxygen, nitrogen and carbon dioxide, but that no capability exist to monitor trace contaminant accumulation. He stated that there are early indications that a small leak across the external/internal thermal control system (TCS) heat exchanger exist, but controls are in place to prevent a large release of ammonia. He said the most likely failure involves the freezing/rupturing of the interface heat exchanger (IFHX) and that a watch item is in place for Node 3 regenerative ECLSS. Dr. Packham also presented details of the thermal items stating that there had already been large releases of Freon 218 from SKV compressors, but that there are no crew health impacts from Freon 218. Regarding Payload releases, it was determined that there are controls in place to prevent accidental releases from payloads.
Dr. Packham reviewed a list of off-nominal conditions detected by CHeCS hardware as follows:
Air Quality Monitoring
-Freon leaks
-Formaldehyde issue
-Resolution of METOX regeneration issue
-Elevated atmospheric volatile organics
Water Quality Monitoring
-Cadmium in potable water above requirement (Exp 2)
-Elevated lead in water processing system
-Volatile organic loading in condensate exceeding Russian guideline
Microbiological Monitoring
-Several occurrences of SVO-ZV contamination above the current detection limit
-Several occurrences of contamination of surfaces
Radiation Monitoring
-Input to IMMT moved the start of one EVA
Acoustics Monitoring
-Continued exceedances in Russian segment
-Some increases observed in US Lab
In summation, Dr. Packham reiterated the current “squawks”, what has changed from 6S to 7S, and what was required to maintain “go”status for Expedition 8 Environmental Monitoring.
Ms. Lau asked Mr. Stegemoeller, Dr. Dunbar, and Dr. Stansbery if they were comfortable moving forward with the recommendation to no go for launch. Dr. Dunbar stated that she felt additional rationale, background and the best recommendation for corrective action were necessary. She stated that when she sees a no go for launch, it typically indicates that there is a problem with the spacecraft. Dr. Stansbery surmised that she only understood the seriousness of the issues based on today’s discussions.
Mr. Stegemoeller proceeded to draft up preliminary thought processes regarding the
present state as follows:
-Already contingency operations; existing degraded environment-acoustics
-Crew systems
-Loss of environmental monitoring
-No assurance for sample return
-Degraded vehicle, equipment, and tools to support crew
-Not meeting requirements for crew health and safety
-Recommend designation of contingency operations with return plan of attack
-Longest mission ever without a visiting vehicle nor sample return
-No prospect of restoring on-orbit capabilities or requirements.
He emphasized, “What is required to be acceptable?” Further discussion ensued regarding the processes that were in place to remove the crew from the ISS and who would be responsible for making the ultimate decision. Additionally, it was noted the hardware for environmental hardware had been inaccurately classified. In conclusion of this part of the meeting, it was determined that the following items from Dr. Packham’s presentation would be reviewed when Dr. Davis arrived:
Hardware description US/Russian
MORD requirements/Traceability
Environment & trending
Exercise solution/strategy
Contingency plan/products
Chain of command for medical decisions
Hardware status: on-orbit, fabrication, certification and mean time between failures (MTBF) processes
Environmental specifications/source
Toxicology tables and focus areas
Monitoring tools/solutions
Options:
Operate Carbon Dioxide Removal Assembly (CDRA) more often
Re-supply/return samples
Flight rules/procedures
ENTER JEFF DAVIS MEETING
Mr. Stegemoeller and Ms. Lau briefly described the chain of events that has led the SLSD to this point of the Executive Session and discussed the intent of this particular meeting. Mr. Stegemoeller also reviewed the summary charts regarding the current situation as discussed previously and the state of the 7S Launch of Expedition 8. Additionally, he noted that there are 47 Medical Operation Requirements not being met.
SA/S. Pool stated that it was very obvious that ISS was in a contingency mode of operation. However, when the SLSD stated a no go for launch, specific underlying principles must be addressed. Dr. Davis questioned as to whether this issue could be resolved with re-supply or strictly de-manning the spacecraft.
Atmospheric sampling, additional EVA issues, current flight rules and procedures were discussed in length. Dr. Davis asked, “How much risk have we already accrued and how much more can we handle?” It was noted that the situation was very different for this increment because not all the equipment was functioning nominally and that this was the longest increment. He stated that a contingency plan must be put into effect whether or not the crew remains on-board or de-manning takes place within 45-days. Additionally, the criticality regarding the lack of samples received and countermeasures available was reiterated.
Dr. Davis stated that the ISSP had asked the directorate for scenario planning and that
a Tiger team with multi-disciplines needed to be formed. Crew symptoms were briefly discussed as well as certifying the hardware for criticality 3 versus 1.
Dr. Packham reviewed his charts once more for Dr. Davis. Ms. Lau restated the go for launch position for 12P, but that too many constraints exist now for 7S. Dr. Packham stated that, yes things were operating according to specification, but nothing could be validated. Discussion ensued regarding the CoFR process for stage to stage and not Expedition. Again, Dr. David asked the Board, if they were telling him that the crew needed to come home today. The consensus was that no one wanted to leave the ISS unmanned, but that, but Dr. Cintron stated that she felt uncomfortable with the potential of surmounting risks with no monitoring capabilities. Several options were discussed regarding driving the downmass to include the SSAS or boost the altitude and fly the ISS during solar min until all the problems can be fixed. Furthermore, it was discussed as to how many re-supply missions were needed to get the ISS back to full capacity.
In conclusion, Ms. Lau stated that the objective here was to let all parties know exactly what the concerns, issues and options were and that a follow-on meeting would be held as to determine the approach for the 7S ISS SORR.
/s/A. C. Bond___________
A. C. Bond
FACB Executive Secretary
acbond@ems.jsc.nasa.gov
281-483-8767
7S SORR Executive Meeting
7S SORR
Attendees
September 10, 2003
Chairman: Mr. Charles Stegemoeller
Alfaro, Karen
Barratt, M.
Bond, Arthur
Brekke, Michele
Caradec, Paul
Cintron, Nitza
Davis, J.
Dunbar, B.
Duncan, James
Hollman, Martha
Kaplan, D.
Langdoc, W.
Lau, C.
McCullough, J.
Ochoa, E.
Packham, Nigel
Pool, S.
Roden, S.
Rummel, J.
Seitz, Bill
Stansbery, Eileen
Tilley, Vanessa
Walters, J.
West, Eula
