NASA Advisory Council Meeting Minutes 6-7 June 2000

(Signed)                                                                                                                                                             
(Signed)

Lori B. Garver                                                                                                                               
Bradford W. Parkinson

Executive Secretary                                                                                                                                                
Chair

Appendix A Agenda

Appendix B Council Membership

Appendix C Meeting Attendees

Appendix E List of Presentation Material

Tuesday, June 6

Opening Remarks

Dr. Bradford Parkinson, Chair of the NAC, welcomed NAC members and attendees.
The next NAC meeting will be September 12-13, 2000, at Ames Research Center
(ARC), and it will focus on information technology (ARC is the Center of
Excellence for Information Technology). The final meeting of the year will
be December 7-8, 2000, in Washington, DC. Dr. Parkinson noted that there
would be a tour of Langley Research Center on the following day.

NASA and Council Items

Ms. Lori Garver highlighted some recent NASA events. The STS-101 successfully
completed its mission this month. The Service Module launch to the International
Space Station (ISS) has been moved up to July 8, 2000. The second half
of the STS-101 mission will launch in early September. In response to a
question, Ms. Garver noted that there have been two successful Proton launches
since the failure. There have been a couple of budget setbacks. The House
Appropriations Subcommittee eliminated $322 million from NASAís budget,
mostly from the new starts. However, there is anticipation that NASA will
get most of this back. There have been a number of hearings, and the Committee
has been very supportive of NASAís programs. There has been a recent reorganization
at Headquarters. The Health Affairs part of the Office of Life and Microgravity
Sciences and Applications (OLMSA) has been moved to Code A and Dr. Nicogossian
will be leading that Office; a search is underway for the OLMSA Associate
Administrator (AA) position. The OLMSA Deputy AA is moving to Code Z, and
Dr. Julie Swain is replacing her as Deputy in OLMSA. The first commercial
agreement under the Commercial Plan for Space Station has been signed;
it involves HDTV. Dreamtime has pledged a $100 million investment; in return,
NASA will be allowing Dreamtime some video rights on ISS.

Center Directorís Welcome

Dr. Jerry Creedon, Director of Langley Research Center (LaRC) welcomed
the NAC to Williamsburg and LaRC. He noted that the tour would include
some of the work in atmospheric science, the 31″ mach 10 tunnel, and the
research and test results for a 40í stitch composite wing (a product of
the Advanced Subsonic Technology Program). The X-43 vehicle will be flown
at Dryden in September. Under the budget reductions, the Capacity Program
(led by ARC) was terminated. An OPM and Headquarters team has visited all
of the Centers to address the workforce issues, e.g., the ability to attract
and retain personnel. In addition to LaRC, there are a lot of high technology
enterprises and activities in the Hampton, VA area, and the Center is losing
people to these types of companies. Dr. Parkinson noted that there has
been a lot of interest in the International Traffic in Arms Regulation
(ITAR) at Stanford.

Mars Program Independent Assessment Team (MPIAT)

Mr. Tom Young gave the NAC the presentation on the results of the MPIAT
that was given to Mr. Goldin on March 14, 2000. The Team came into being
because of the failure of Mars Climate Orbiter (MCO), Mars Polar Lander
(MPL), and Deep Space (DS)-2. NASA wanted a look at the total Mars Program,
and the group was specifically asked to look at six missions (both successes
and failures) and the relationships among the parties involved­NASA
Headquarters, Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), California Institute of
Technology (Caltech), and Lockheed Martin. The group was also asked to
identify lessons learned and review the revised Mars Surveyor Program (MSP).
A report was given to Mr. Goldin on March 14. The architecture study for
the Mars Program is still underway, and a subgroup of the team will be
asked to look at this when it is complete. In addition to Mr. Goldin (as
well as senior NASA management, including Dr. Stone, JPL Director), the
briefing has been given to OSTP and Rep. Sennsenbrenner. Dr. Creedon noted
that LaRC has a symposium series, and it will be given to that Center in
August.

Mr. Young reviewed the MPIAT membership and described the methodology
and schedule of activities. He made some general observations to put the
report in context. Mars exploration is an important national goal that
should continue and deep space exploration is a risky business. NASA, JPL,
and industry have the required capabilities to implement a successful program.
The Team concluded that Faster, Better, Cheaper (FBC) is a good approach
if properly applied. There were significant flaws in the formulation and
execution of the program, but all of the flaws are fixable in a reasonable
timeframe. Mr. Young discussed the MPIAT definition of FBC­create smaller
spacecraft with more frequent missions, reduce cycle time (get rid of non
value-added work), utilize new technology, accept prudent risk where warranted
by return, and utilize proven engineering and management practices to maximize
mission success. The last element is primarily the problem area as FBC
was implemented. Mr. Goldin basically agreed with MPIATís definition. Mr.
Young noted that what the MPIAT found was that there was willingness to
cut corners and a failure to follow a disciplined approach successfully.
Space is a “one strike and youíre out” business. A lot of the new ways
of doing things in industry are not the best way to go for the space business.
There must be a safety net for individual humans who will make mistakes.
However, NASA cannot go back to the old way of doing business (billion
dollar missions taking 15 years). In response to a question, Mr. Young
indicated that the type of contract was not a significant issue; it was
a cost-plus program, but it had an overriding fixed price nature.

Mr. Young discussed the findings of the Team in reviewing and analyzing
the Mars and deep space missions. Mars Global Surveyor (MGS) was successful;
the MPIAT did not see any systemic problems in MGS. Pathfinder was very
successful and was the first truly full FBC mission. The Project Manager
was innovative, but wasnít willing to cut corners. He used sound engineering
principles. Dr. Squyres noted that when Pathfinder was being developed,
it had other non-FBC programs at JPL (e.g., Cassini) to draw upon. Institutional
support becomes a key part of implementing FBC programs. The MPIAT felt
that Pathfinder was a reasonable standard for FBC. There are a collection
of missions associated with FBC, but not all missions can follow the FBC
mode, e.g., Space Station. DS-1 (a successful mission) was a tough job
with a complex management arrangement. This mission was on a course to
fail, but JPL management recognized the problems and applied a considerable
amount of institutional capability to get it back on track. In addition,
this mission had the advantages of schedule and scope flexibility. Had
the mission team been required to adhere to a fixed schedule, the risk
would have been excessively high. Planetary programs do not have this flexibility.
With respect to MCO, the failure was due to a navigation error, but what
really broke down was the safety net, both at Lockheed Martin Astronautics
(LMA) and JPL, and the error went undetected (e.g., due to inadequate software
testing, understaffing on the team, inadequate training of the team). On
MPL, the Failure Review Board identified four most-probable failure modes.
The most probable cause of the failure was that the lander engines shut
down prematurely due to spurious signals. Mr. Young described the landing
sequence and this particular failure mode. There was a test flaw in the
MPL system test (the sensors were not wired properly). The software design
did not include protection for spurious signals. A single human made a
bad judgment error in software design, and the safety net (system reviews
and systems test) failed. The core problem was inadequate funding. In many
instances, the project was one (or less) people deep.

Mr. Young discussed the Team findings on the implementation of the Mars
ë98 program and showed the circumstance of inadequate margins. If there
are adequate margins, risk can be managed. When there arenít adequate margins,
the only variable is risk. Mr. Young addressed the other implementation
problems, e.g., inadequate JPL Project Office staffing, LMA staffing early
in the project, applications of JPL institutional capability, analysis/testing
at LMA, and mission operations involvement and preparation during development.
The inadequate funding was caused by a number of factors. He showed the
comparison on costs among MGS, Pathfinder, MCO, and MPL to illustrate the
underfunding issue. The degree of underfunding was probably about 30% (based
on the changes need to Mars í01). In response to a question, Mr. Young
indicated that the contract type was not the problem. The MPIAT believed
that the program didnít have a chance from the beginning. There was inadequate
funding­analyses werenít complete; testing wasnít complete; staffing
was one deep in many instances; and there was a lack of application of
JPL institutional capability (a big item). A contributing problem (again,
because of cost) was a change in project management responsibility from
development to operations with inadequate missions operations involvement
and preparation during development. In response to a comment, Mr. Young
noted that given that the failures happened, NASA has obtained enormous
value from the benefits of the assessments. For example, NASA is looking
at all of the X vehicles and is implementing the Team recommendations.
DS-2 was a failure, with failure cause unknown. DS-2 was a high-risk, high-return
project. However, there were serious flaws in project implementation, e.g.,
ineffective JPL management oversight, inadequate margins, inadequate test
program, inadequate risk assessment, no flight validation of new technology,
etc.

Mr. Young discussed the lessons learned on these missions. Senior management
attention needs to be highest when new ways of doing business are being
implemented. Experienced project management or mentoring is essential.
Dr. Mulville noted that this has been recognized, and NASA is putting more
emphasis on training and mentoring across the board. As noted earlier,
the unique constraints of deep space missions demand adequate margins.
Technology projects must focus on technology objectives and requirements,
not be constrained or squeezed by science requirements. As mentioned earlier,
it is OK to accept risk to use new high-payoff technology or in quest of
high-value science; it is not OK to accept risk associated with deviating
from sound engineering and management processes. “If not ready, do not
launch” should not be discovered at the launch pad; there must be continuous
assessments throughout development.

Another element of the MPIAT charter was relationships and interfaces
and Mr. Young reviewed the Team findings in this area. The Caltech interface
was “neutral” to mission success. However, Caltech could have played a
more positive role in the communications between NASA Headquarters and
JPL. JPL and LMA worked well, but had an insular approach. The Team believed
that the Headquarters/JPL relationship was highly ineffective and the impact
on mission success was clearly negative. During this time, there were multiple
interfaces on the Mars Program. The MPIAT found fear in the JPL system­fear
of programs being canceled, missions going to competitors (APL), etc. NASA
Headquarters perceived that everything was mutually agreed to; what was
perceived at JPL was non-negotiable mandates. This type of relationship
precluded working any risk. Dr. Squyres noted that the story on Mars ë98
was a story of unreasonable expectations. One area where this occurs is
between NASA Headquarters and Congress/OMB. Mr. Young noted that this was
a good point, but it was not a part of the Teamís charter and they didnít
look at that relationship. During the review, the Team looked at a very
preliminary version of the new architecture and discovered that the ineffective
relationship/interface between Headquarters and JPL still existed. As a
result, Headquarters and JPL recognized the problem and the interface issues
are now being addressed. Dr. Venneri added that one of the legacies of
the downsizing at Headquarters is lack of competent people for an oversight
function. Mr. Young discussed the scientist involvement, which, overall,
has gone very well. However, the scientists were not always involved in
decisions that would affect the conduct of experiments. In some instances,
there has been a problem with obtaining rapid release of Mars data, and
the Team felt that public engagement with the Mars mission results should
be hallmarks of the Mars Program.

Mr. Young discussed the history of the Mars Surveyor Program in terms
of program responsibilities, the JPL organization, and architecture. The
number of flight projects at JPL increased significantly and there has
been a loss of experienced, successful project managers through retirement.
Current project managers are competent but inexperienced, with little mentoring.
Also, at JPL the Program has been managed as a group of projects, not a
program. There is a lot of challenge in the substantial increase in flight
projects at JPL. The Team concluded that the then current JPL organization
was not appropriate to successfully implement the Mars Surveyor Program
in combination with other commitments. The Team concurred with the NASA
decision not to fly the Mars ë01 Lander in 2001; it also concurred with
the decision to fly the Orbiter in 2001 (the current plan). In response
to a comment, Mr. Young agreed that the overall goals of the Mars Program
need to be clearly stated and understood. Dr. Mulville noted that the Decadal
Planning Team (DPT) has been looking at robotic missions as precursors
to human exploration. The robotic missions should be aligned with this
objective. However, no timeframe for this goal has been identified (or
been supported by the Administration); there is a range of options. Mr.
Young added that if the architecture is not responsive to long-term goals,
it will not be stable. Finally, Mr. Young highlighted the findings (lessons
learned) of the Team and indicated that most of these findings are being
addressed or implemented. A comprehensive program can go forward. In response
to an earlier question, Mr. Young showed the “to-do” list of things that
would have to be done to the í01 Lander to make it successful.

Dr. Venneri noted that in addition to experienced program management,
NASA needs core competency in-house and this is a serious problem ($40
– $50 million). With respect to accountability, Dr. Mulville noted that
the Administrator announced that he did not intend to punish individuals;
the intent is to look at JPL and Lockheed Martin as jointly responsible,
but focus on what needs to be done to ensure future success. Dr. Squyres
noted that one of the Agencyís mistakes was lack of recognition of the
extent of visibility of some of NASAís programs, e.g., the Mars Program,
which is only a small percentage of the Agencyís budget. Mr. Sinnett added
that two of the things industry is doing is propagation of program management
“best practices” and the institution of a non-advocate review team that
comes in at critical times. These two things can go a long way to groom
and develop young program managers.

NASA Integrated Action Team

Mr. Brian Keegan, NASA Chief Engineer, provided an overview of the process
for NASAís integrated response to the Mars í98 failure and related reports.
There are three aspects: a response to specific report recommendations;
a response to generic report recommendations; and broader Agency generic
considerations. The Office of Space Science (OSS), closely coordinated
with JPL, is working a response to the MCO, MPL, and MPIAT reports; the
Office of Space Flight (OSF) is working a response to the Shuttle Independent
Assessment Team (SIAT). Those items in the various reports that have generic
applications to NASA program management are being worked through the NASA
Integrated Assessment Team (NIAT). Broader considerations include proactive
initiatives and activities that address items beyond those raised in the
reports, e.g., NASA software initiative, engineering excellence, design
for safety, core capability, etc. Overall responsibility for ensuring adequate
NASA response to all findings is the responsibility of the NASA Chief Engineer.
All recommendation actions from the NIAT will be first approved by the
Chief Engineer and then summarized to the Senior Management Council. Mr.
Keegan discussed the process flow for the NIAT. Actions were subdivided
to subteams by area of concern: personnel; process; process execution;
and support of technology and advanced tools. An integration subteam will
review the various actions to ensure compatibility and combine actions
where possible; it will provide integrated briefings to NIAT customers.
In response to a question, Mr. Keegan noted that a few key issues can be
found across the reports and a good understanding can be obtained on the
set of issues that need to be addressed. Putting the implementation in
place will be the real challenge. Dr. Carolyn Griner, Deputy Director of
Marshal Space Flight Center (MSFC), is the Chair of the NIAT. The membership
includes the Program Management Council (PMC) Working Group and other people
with special skills or in key functional areas. Dr. Parkinson indicated
that it is important to make the actions auditable (with metrics).

The subteams were given “do and donít” guidance. Mr. Young observed
that NASA management has worried too much about stifling innovation and
not enough about the rigor of the prescription. Rev. Minogue stated that
someone has to be pushing the “PR” in the organization on how important
these reports and the resulting actions are. Dr. Mulville noted that senior
management steps are being taken at Caltech, JPL, and Headquarters. He
agreed that there must be commitment from the highest levels and a follow-up
to ensure that everyone gets the message.

Mr. Keegan noted that the Center Directors and the Enterprise Associate
Administrators need to be a part of the action plan in order to get more
“buy-in” in a shorter timeframe. Mr. Keegan noted the upcoming events.
The NIAT will report to the NASA Administrator in July and the NAC at its
next meeting in September. Mr. Israel stated that he would like to see
the training implications, certification implications, and documentation
implications, e.g., a procedures manual. He suggested that it would benefit
all Program Managers to hear Mr. Youngís presentation. Mr. Keegan stated
that all of these things are on the list and will be part of the action
plan. There are some additional things that are adjunct to the recommendations
themselves that will be part of the action plan, e.g., budget stability.

Mr. Keegan highlighted some of the key areas that need to be addressed:
training and mentoring; communicating; staffing (core competency implications);
documentation (practices); a rigorous formulation phase; a rigorous risk
management process; the review processes (all aspects); and lessons learned.
Dr. Parkinson encouraged the NIAT to prioritize the action items and emphasize
those at the top of the list. All of the action items should be traceable
to the problems that they address. Mr. Young recommended that the entire
review groups be invited back to hear the NIAT report. Dr. Parkinson indicated
that the NAC might want to come up with an Appendix to the normal letter
which would contain the suggestions.

NASA Intelligent Synthesis Environment (ISE) Program

Dr. John Malone showed an eight-minute tape on Mr. Goldinís vision of
ISE. The long-term goal is to develop the capability for personnel at dispersed
locations to work together in a virtual environment, using computer simulations
to model the complete life cycle of a product/mission with near real-time
response time before commitments are made to produce physical products.
Missions can be designed and operated in virtual space before bending any
metal. Through use of analytical tools, design knowledge is shifted to
early in the project where most of the cost are committed. The five-year
mission is to research, develop, and evaluate an advanced life-cycle design
capability to enable integrated end-to-end life-cycle design on selected
NASA application cases, geographically distributed. Specific activities
are focused on smart tools, smart models and simulation tools, and smart
interfaces. In response to a question, Dr. Malone indicated that there
will be a variety of products and services, e.g., physics-based models,
security-based products, etc. There are five large scale applications:
Station, Shuttle, Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV), integration of science
and exploration, and Earth observation. Dr. Squyres noted that these are
broad based; he encouraged selecting a specific project or projects to
beta test. Dr. Malone stated that several Shuttle payloads and ISS missions
are candidates. A small but important element of the program is training,
education, and transition into practice. This is a 10-20 year program;
OMB has funded the first five years and NASA is in the formulation phase.
The ISE Program is led by LaRC but involves all ten Centers. In addition
to the 18 people in the “virtual office”, there are about 100 people Agency-wide
who are working on the program. The funding this year is $23 million. Mr.
Sinnett noted that although ISE appears overwhelming, the payoff will be
significant; it will pay for itself on the first large project. He cited
several examples from his industry experience. In response to a question,
Dr. Malone indicated that work will be done through a coordinated plan
from the requirements process. No one entity will do the entire picture.
There are interactions or partnerships with DARPA, NRO, Army, Navy, Air
Force, etc. The non-advocate review recommended funding of long lead items,
and accomplishments are already being realized. Dr. Mulville noted that
there is a near-term focus that puts capabilities in place at the NASA
field Centers, and a parallel program that focuses on information infrastructure.
Dr. Bras expressed concern about managing the expectations of all of the
items on the list; the vision should be maintained but NASA should begin
leveraging activities very soon to start producing results. Dr. Parkinson
observed that the NAC is looking for near-term milestones that have a lot
of content.

NASA Strategic Plan

Mr. Matthew Crouch provided an overview of the NASA Strategic Management
System. The Office of Policy and Plans has the responsibility for this
system and the process. The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA)
requires strategic plans, performance plans, and performance reports. NASAís
Strategic Management System integrates these activities. The system features
a hierarchy of documents and processes. GPRA had a phased implementation
schedule. The first strategic plan was required in September 1997; the
next full update will be released in September 2000. The performance plans
are annual plans, tied to a fiscal year. They may be revised once, if necessary,
in conjunction with release of the budget. Although there is consultation
with Congress on the Strategic Plan, there is no consultation with Congress
required for the Performance Plan. There is about a three-year delay in
the Agencyís ability to implement lessons learned from the performance
report back to the Strategic Plan. Mr. Crouch explained the planning, budget,
and evaluation schedule. The first year that the 2000 plan will have an
opportunity to affect is the FY 2002 fiscal year. At any given time, NASA
is working three fiscal years. The Strategic Framework has not changed
for 2002, i.e., the vision, the mission, the Strategic Enterprises, and
the Crosscutting Processes are the same. Mr. Crouch described the Agencyís
planning and management activities by level of the organization and type
of process.

The improvements for the 2000 Strategic plan fall into three categories:
communications attributes, strategic attributes, and responses to external
guidance. The communication improvements include: dramatically improving
readability and the use of plain language; and increasing and improving
the use of art and graphics. The improvement in strategic attributes includes:
better representation of the core content of the Enterprise programs; improvement
and clarification of the overall architecture and role of the Roadmaps;
improvement in integration with Enterprise plans; further development of
long-range planning to fill in the five to 20-out-year detail; and improvement
in the use of external factors analysis. The 2000 Plan more fully addresses
interagency cooperation, and, at the request of Congress, some long-standing
management challenges. Mr. Crouch highlighted some of the improvements
in the Enterprise plans. Mr. Crouch invited NAC comments on the draft 2000
Strategic Plan that he distributed at the meeting.

Dr. Parkinson noted that significant strides had been made on the new
Plan, but the Plan should be clear on the top five or six priorities, e.g.,
Shuttle safety, Space Station, launch vehicles, etc. Mr. Crouch indicated
that this was a good point and that the Administratorís introductory statement
would be modified to include a statement of priorities. Dr. Canizares noted
that many of the improvements are good, but the Plan still has a parochial,
introspective viewpoint, e.g., the mission of fostering and encouraging
research is absent. Mr. Young observed that the Strategic Plan is primarily
a political document, rather than an operations document for how NASA will
be managed. Mr. Crouch indicated that NASA tries to meet both public relations
and management needs. Mr. Young also noted that the issues of core competency
and institutional capability are missing. Mr. Jacobs observed that there
are some excellent parts, e.g., the space science, and some that need a
lot of work. Several of the members noted that measures (e.g., what NASA
is going to do when) do not appear in the Plan. Mr. Crouch noted that NASA
is not supposed to put the measures in the Strategic Plan; measures go
in the Performance Plan. The Roadmap charts show the five-year milestones.
The Annual Performance Plan targets track back to the objectives. Mr. Kennel
stated that more energy should be put into the strategic management area
(a cross-cutting function). Dr. Parkinson observed that some of the Enterprise
goals and objectives are very specific and others are not. Dr. Mulville
clarified that the Centers do not have their own strategic plans; they
have implementation plans. These reflect each Centerís role in achievement
of NASA objectives and performance targets. Mr. Young observed that responsibility
for performance targets should reside with the Centers, rather than the
Enterprises, since the Centers are the implementing organizations.

Aerospace System Concepts and Analysis

Mr. Bill Gilbert discussed the LaRC work on systems analysis for “state
changes” in future systems concepts and technology. The focus of the work
is early conceptual design to preliminary design. The scope includes feasibility,
program assessments against goals, technology evaluations, and maintaining
proper tools and methods. Mr. Gilbert showed examples of the results of
systems analysis: Single-Stage-To-Orbit (SSTO), the potential benefit of
nanotube composites, and launch vehicles. NASA/LaRC is developing an Integrated
Aerospace Analysis Team than encompasses aeronautical, space transportation
and planetary, on-orbit vehicle systems, and advanced multi-disciplinary
methods and computing. Mr. Gilbert discussed the work in each of these
areas. The Intercenter Systems Analysis Team (ISAT) is expanding its role
to the AeroSpace mission, particularly in the areas of space access and
in-space transportation. Mr. Gilbert showed the typical set of discipline
teams for ISAT space transportation. As the ISAT capability has expanded,
it has kept up with the AeroSpace Three Pillars assessment. One of the
things the ISAT did was an assessment of the Aviation Safety Program. The
ISAT also did an assessment of the UEET scope. One of the new roles for
ISAT is the Revolutionary Aerospace Systems Concepts (RASC) Team. RASC
will identify and analyze aerospace concepts with paradigm shifting potential
and identify and develop enabling technologies for these concepts. The
initiation of the RASC team will help develop a strong NASA R&T Program
to enable future mission goals.

Dr. Parkinson noted that the NAC would be interested in hearing the
results of the Two Stage To Orbit analysis at a future meeting. Dr. Crawley
observed that the “middle-up” part of the “middle-out” strategy has worked
very well; more focus needs to be put on the “middle-down” part of the
strategy.

Space Studies Board (SSB) and International Traffic in Arms Regulation
(ITAR) Update

Dr. Claude Canizares noted that the next SSB meeting would be his last
meeting; his replacement will be Dr. John McElroy from the University of
Texas. Dr. Canizares provided an update on the ITAR, which was discussed
at some length at the last meeting. The issue was the change in the law
dealing with export control of any information or hardware related to satellites
and launch vehicles. An unintended consequence has been a significant adverse
impact on universities (a tightening of regulation and lack of clarity
over the research exemption). At the last meeting, Mr. Goldin asked Gen.
Armstrong to be the point person on this subject. Since the last meeting,
there has been a lot of focus by university associations on this issue.
A letter was written to the Presidentís Science Advisor; there was also
a proposed amendment to the Defense Authorization Bill (which was not passed),
and language in the HUD, Independent Agencies House Committee Report regarding
the “unfortunate consequences” of this regulation. OSTP was requested to
take the leadership with the Department of State to resolve the issue.
There has been a total absence of the Department of State in any of these
interactions. Gen. Armstrong has made repeated phone calls to the office
in the Department of State, but to no avail. There needs to be some higher
level of action (the Administrator or the Deputy of OSTP) to encourage
participation by the Department of State. Dr. Kennel emphasized the importance
of this issue and noted that the University of California intends to seek
legislative remedy through their Congressional representative. Dr. Parkinson
noted that there was an open meeting at Stanford on this issue, and he
emphasized the seriousness of the penalties for violation of Section 15.
Gen. Hoover noted that the ITAR is also having onerous consequences in
industry and the Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board is focusing attention
on this issue.

Dr. Canizares noted that there was a report from the Inspector General
(IG) of State/Commerce that dealt with this issue. The regulations in this
area are ambiguous, but the thrust of the IG report was that the regulations
need to be tightened up. It states that if technical data is released to
foreign nationals within the U.S., it should be deemed to be export. It
is not yet clear that the Agency yet considers this its problem; it still
is being handled like it is industry/academiaís problem. The SSB is now
trying to get to the science people at the State Department. After the
presentation concluded, Dr. Parkinson formally recognized Dr. Canizaresí
contributions to the NAC.

Aero-Space Technology Advisory Committee (ASTAC)

Mr. Sinnett discussed the results of the ASTAC meeting on April 12-13.
The first day was a joint meeting with Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA), and there were a number of topics of joint interest­icing research,
exchange of safety data with internationals, and the small aircraft transportation
system. An effort will be initiated by NASA to help relieve “hub-lock.”
NASAís role is to establish the role of automation and create a collaborative
environment with FAA; FAAís role is integration. An executive committee
has signed an agreement to work together. Another joint issue was air traffic
management. A number of tools have been accepted for implementation and
several others are in the planning stages. One of the significant concerns
of both Committees was the effort required to transition technology­it
is taking away from long-range research. There will be a joint task force
to look at national R&D priorities and develop a recommended investment
plan. Communication at all levels between NASA and FAA is better than it
has ever been, and the positive results are being seen. Dr. Parkinson noted
that there should be a commendation in the letter to Mr. Goldin. Mr. McRuer
suggested that pressure from NASA (for FAA participation/interaction) should
be continued.

Earth System Science and Applications Advisory Committee (ESSAAC)

Dr. Raphael Bras reported on the ESAAC meeting on May 8-9. The Committee
has focused on the Enterpriseís Strategic Plan. Dr. Bras expressed concern
that NASA is trying to do a very important exercise with too few people
and too little expertise. The Strategic Plan of the Earth Sciences Enterprise
(ESE) has progressed tremendously. It has been difficult to articulate
the transition from the Earth Observing System (EOS) era to a new era.
There has been a lot of pressure from OMB to draft the Plan so that OMB
can understand it. A preliminary second draft of a science implementation
plan was presented to ESSAAC. Dr. Bras discussed the goals, objectives,
and some of the science questions in the latest version of the Plan. He
noted that about two years ago, the NAC accepted a finding and recommendation
relative to long-term observations. This led to a letter from Mr. Goldin
to Dr. Neal Lane, which has not been responded to.

Dr. Bras presented a finding and recommendation to the NAC:

ESSAC recommends that NASA take the initiative to ensure the availability
of long-term data sets for the study of global change. Specifically, we
recommend that NASA identify and implement processes to:

1. Identify and rank, carefully and rigorously, the most important long-term
   data sets needed for global change science, together with their required
   measurement properties, including accuracy, sampling, and spatial and temporal
   scales.
2. Allocate sufficient resources to providing these data sets, through a sustained
   effort including:

• Design and fly some dedicated missions to obtain these long-term data.
• Develop programs to improve operational missions to meet the long-term
  data needs. These include improved calibration and the effort needed to
  reprocess and revalidate old data.
• Utilize NASAís advanced technology capabilities to develop cheaper and
  lighter instruments and platforms to measure the needed variables at resolutions
  and accuracies that are currently feasible, but with expensive technologies.

Dr. Parkinson indicated that this should be an appendix to the letter;
the letter should contain a commendation to Mr. Goldin for writing to Dr.
Lane, but note that a response was never received.

Space Science/Planetary Protection Discussion

Dr. Steven Squyres reported that Space Science Advisory Committee (SScAC)
had not met since the last NAC meeting; the next meeting will be July 10-12
at NASA Headquarters. Dr. Squyres reviewed the key findings and recommendations
of the SScAC Task Force on Planetary Protection. One of the recommendations
was that a Planetary Protection Advisory Committee (PPAC) be established
by the NASA Administrator under the auspices of the NAC. A majority of
the SScAC members felt that PPAC should report directly to the Associate
Administrator for Space Science, rather than the SScAC, in order to maintain
its independence and to minimize perceptions of conflict of interest. However,
there was a minority of SScAC who disagreed with this position. There was
strong agreement that there were some issues with the draft charter of
a PPAC. If this shortcoming can be corrected, some of the concerns of the
SScAC members who objected to the reporting recommendation would be addressed.
The PPAC should address policy issues related to planetary protection,
and avoid issues that are purely scientific in nature. PPAC should address
forward contamination and back contamination; it should not address science
contamination. The timing for establishment of the PPAC is appropriate.
There are a number of sample return missions­one is presently in flight,
a couple are in development, and several are in the Solar System Exploration
Roadmap.

Dr. John Rummel, NASAís Planetary Protection Officer, continued the
presentation on the proposed PPAC. The OSS agrees that a PPAC should be
established by the NASA Administrator under the auspices of the NAC. The
PPAC should delineate a focus on policy issues and should give advice on
definitions, i.e., forward contamination and back contamination. The membership
should include industry, government, and academic individuals. It is expected
that there would be non-voting members from other agencies and organizations.
There should be some cross-membership with SScAC to allow effective communications.
Dr. Rummel noted that there is an international agreement on planetary
protection in the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. He described the current
NASA Planetary Protection Policy (NPD 8020.7E).

The NAC formally advocated and supported the establishment of a PPAC
by unanimous vote. Dr. Parkinson noted that the Charter needs further study
and comments, and the ratification of the charter (by the NAC) should be
deferred until the next meeting. Dr. Squyres asked that the NAC delegate
review of the draft charter to the SScAC. The SScAC would like to review
and comment on the definition of planetary protection. Dr. Parkinson agreed,
but indicated that any recommendation/comment on the charter by the SScAC
must be brought back to the NAC and that NAC would determine the action
on the comments. The NAC did not want to see a “screened” product, but
would like to receive SScACís comments distinct from the proposed document
(e.g., redline) and understand the rationale behind the suggested changes.
In addition, the NAC members could provide direct comments to Dr. Squyres.
In response to a question, Dr. Rummel indicated that the PPAC would supplement
the ongoing SSB advisory role. The SSB provides broad outlines. Dr. Parkinson
stated that as a matter of courtesy and prudence, the draft charter should
be sent to the Center for Disease Control (CDC) for comment.

 

 

Wednesday, June 7

Aviation Safety Program Update

Mr. Michael Lewis discussed technology strategies for aviation safety.
The Aviation Safety Program was a major outcome of the Gore commission.
The national goal of the program is to reduce the fatal aviation accident
rate by 80 percent within 10 years. The targeted application is both commercial
and general aviation (GA). The focused program is led out of the Aviation
Safety Program Office at LaRC; it is a $500 million program over 1998-2004.
There is close coordination with FAA and industry. In addition to the Aviation
Safety Program activities, there are also safety applications that are
part of the Research and Technology (R&T) Base Programs. The total
funding for both is about $100 million per year. Mr. Lewis described the
eight technology strategies: (1) eliminate the #1 factor (controlled flight
into terrain) in fatal commercial and GA accidents; (2) eliminate the #1
cause (turbulence) of non-fatal accidents and injuries; (3) improve the
single highest GA safety risk factor (weather decision-making); (4) look
after the accident chainís most frequent link (people); (5) prevent and/or
manage aircraft system failures; (6) quantifiably and continually assess
aviation system operations; (7) increase survivability when accidents do
occur; and (8) plan for the future.

The solution on the primary factor in fatal aviation accidents is to
digitally provide visibility (clear day operations all the time) by means
of a digitized, intuitive cockpit display of the terrain. The technology
to do this is not the big issue; the issues are operations, human factors,
and certification. The solutions in the past (radar/IR sensors) have always
run into resolution problems. The benefit of the database-driven system,
integrated with some radar/IR sensors, is that it is inexpensive. However,
there is still a two or three year challenge to lower the certification
and operation risks. The attack on turbulence is the same that NASA took
on wind shear a few years ago, i.e., through technology, eliminate the
turbulence hazard through hazard characterization, on-board detection,
and early warning. One of the more mature applications is cockpit weather
presentation; the effort is underway to get the system connection going
for data transmission on weather. Health management (to prevent loss-of-control
accidents) for commercial aircraft is another activity of the LaRC Office.
Taking advantage of all of the available information is a challenge. There
are three sources­people, the aircraft, and the system. LaRC has or
is developing tools in each of these areas: the Aviation Safety Reporting
System and the National Aviation Operations Monitoring Service; the Aviation
Performance Measurement System; and the Performance Data Analysis and Reporting
System. One of the issues is the cost of analyzing the data. NASA is not
in the business of analyzing the data, but is providing the tools. The
survivability efforts underway include: crashworthy fuel systems; fuel
tank inerting; fire sensing/suppression; and integrated design of seat,
advanced restraints, and energy absorbing structure. The future issues
include proliferating software, digital systems, capacity growth, GA high
flyers, and aging aircraft.

Mr. Lewis discussed the technology implementation paths for near term
actions (1-3 years), retrofitable technologies (2-5 years), and new technology
aircraft (beyond five years). In response to a comment, he noted that his
Office would like to get into the business of doing research on the best
way to use the tools in addition to providing the tools. If one operator
and one supplier can become interested in applying the tools, they will
be able to push the FAA along. The biggest challenge is to turn the tool
from a R&D demo into a routine operation.

Technology and Commercialization Advisory Committee (TCAC)

Dr. Thomas Brackey raised the issue of the status of the TCAC. There
has not been a TCAC meeting since September 1999, primarily due to the
reorganization and change in roles of Dr. Venneri. Currently, there are
two committees under the Associate Administratorís purview. One possibility
is to combine the two. However, there is a fair disparity between the technology,
the skill mix, the companies affected, and the issues. There is a commitment
by all parties to meet with Dr. Venneri to lay out a strategy for how to
structure the advisory committees. The NAC had several comments. Dr. Canizares
noted that it might make sense to go into a “standdown” mode for about
nine months. Mr. McRuer indicated that the ASTAC has the Space Transportation
systems as a major element, although most of the members are aviation-oriented.
There is a current mismatch on the Committee and this is another factor
that needs to be taken into account. Going to one Committee might be stretching
the span too far. Dr. Brackey noted that Admiral Monroeís function was
originally part of the TCAC. Dr. Venneri has a dual role and it would make
sense to have two Committees. The central focus of the TCAC has been looking
at core competencies. Dr. Parkinson observed that it might not be wise
to combine the two functions since technology appears to be getting short
shrift already. Mr. Sinnett noted that the questions are: Where does the
new organization of Dr. Venneriís want to go? What are the objectives?
This will set the requirements for the advisory groups. The NAC felt that
there must be a focus on technology; the issue is balance and emphasis.
Mr. Israel raised the issue of an effective avenue for small business to
introduce new ideas (e.g., an unsolicited proposal) to NASA. The current
system is the Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) Program, which
is a more formal structure where NASA identifies the areas of interest
and proposals are solicited. There is not an avenue for unsolicited, innovative
areas.

In the area of technology, the NAC was not comfortable with the current
emphasis; it is not acceptable for the TCAC not to meet for seven months.
The NAC recommended that a higher priority be given to this and that a
meeting be held in August.

In response to a question, Dr. Mulville stated that NASA is currently
in negotiations with Lockheed Martin on the restructuring of the X-33 program.
NASA hopes that Lockheed Martin will continue with its activity and that
the X-33 will be flown. The NAC should get an update on this topic at the
next meeting. The flight activities of the X-34 have received a lot of
scrutiny. There may be an additional requirement on the two programs to
have some redundancy and a human in the loop in the flight control process.
Dryden Flight Research Center is looking closely at what is an appropriate
approach to ensure high confidence in flight demonstration. The budget
issues will be decided in Congressional conference. Mr. Jacobs noted that
even if the funding becomes available, we are looking at a three year delay.
The X-33 flight demonstration is not targeted for the 2002-2003 timeframe.
Mr. Israel noted that the NAC needs to be updated on this issue, and should
also see what is going on in the commercial side in the display area. Dr.
Parkinson asked Mr. Sinnett to look into this. Mr. Israel indicated that
another area of interest is high speed technology and general aviation.
Dr. Parkinson noted that the NAC has consistently supported the need for
emphasis on technology in NASA. The NAC did not suggest any precipitous
change in the TCAC status, and indicated that NASA should continue on that
course. If there is a recommendation for any changes as a result of the
four-hour meeting with Dr. Venneri, the NAC requested a report at the next
meeting.

Dr. Brackey noted that a second topic of interest to the TCAC was two
recent conferences in Ohio on the Advance Communications Technology satellite
and Ka band communications. There was very high international interest
and participation. There was a focus on the benefits of ACTS to industry
and the government.

Discussion of Findings and Recommendations

The NAC reviewed the statements/findings to be included in the letter:

• MPIAT presentation and NIAT­With respect to the NIAT, the NAC would
  like to see a list of action items to be taken by NASA and who is responsible
  for each of the actions. The NAC developed a list of items that the presentation
  in September should address. With respect to the MPIAT, the NAC felt that
  the MPIAT did an exceptional job, and recommended that Mr. Young and Dr.
  Casani brief the people at JPL on the Teamís report.
• ISE­The ISE is a very ambitious program. NASA should manage expectations
  and break it into digestible pieces. NASAís role to develop tools and processes
  is appropriate. Many tools already exist in industry, and ISE is building
  on top of where industry is today. It does not appear that the program
  is filtered and focused to avoid dissipating resources.
• Strategic Plan­The NAC acknowledged NASAís efforts in pursuing a good
  Strategic Plan. At the next level down, the performance review may need
  to be shifted to the Centers. Although technology is mentioned, it is not
  receiving the emphasis that it should. Human resources is another important
  aspect. It appears that NASA has forgotten the university partnerships;
  this element should be recognized. The NAC members were requested to send
  comments to Matthew Crouch or Mike Green within three weeks. Each of the
  Enterprise Plans should be reviewed by its respective advisory committee.

In response to a comment, Dr. Mulville noted that the health of the aeronautics
program is a concern; however, there is a revitalization activity at LaRC.
The challenge is to get the commitment from OMB to support that in a continuing
way.

At the next NAC meeting at ARC, the Council will hear a presentation
on the Air Traffic Management System and closer connections with the FAA
to support the downstream tools. The NAC is still concerned about Shuttle
replacement and requested a major presentation on status and time for in-depth
discussion.

At the conclusion of the discussions on actions, findings and recommendations,
the NAC departed for a tour of LaRC.

8:00 Council Convenes

8:00 ó 8:10 Opening Remarks Dr. Bradford Parkinson

8:10 ó 8:20 NASA and Council Items Ms. Lori Garver

8:20 ó 8:45 Center Directorís Welcome Dr. Jerry Creedon

8:45 ó 10:45 Mars Program Indep. Assessment Team Mr. Tom Young

10:50 ó 11:00 Break

11:00 ó 11:30 NASA Integrated Action Team Mr. Brian Keegan

11:30 ó 12:30 NASA ISE Program Dr. John Malone

12:30 ó 1:30 Lunch

1:30 ó 2:30 NASA Strategic Plan Mr. Matthew Crouch

2:30 ó 3:15 Aerospace System Concepts & Analysis Mr. Bill Gilbert

3:15 ó 3:30 Break

Committee Reports

3:30 ó 3:45 SSB and ITAR Update Dr. Claude Canizares

3:45 ó 4:00 Aero-Space Technology Mr. Jim Sinnett

4:00 ó 4:15 Earth Sciences Dr. Rafael Bras

4:15 ó 5:00 Space Science/Planetary Protection Discussion
Dr. Steven Squyres/John Rummel

6:30 Dinner

 

 

June 7

8:00 Council Reconvenes

Committee Reports

8:00 ó 9:00 Aviation Safety Program Update Mr. Michael
Lewis

9:00 ó 9:15 Technology and Commercialization Dr. Tom Brackey

9:15 ó 9:30 TBD Cmte Report TBD

9:30 ó 10:00 Discussion of Findings and Recommendations

10:00 ó 12:15 Depart for Tour of LaRC via bus TBD

12:15 ó 1:00 Lunch with Jerry Creedon

1:15 ó 1:45 Return to Hotel and Adjournment

Council Members:

Parkinson, Bradford W. (Chair) Stanford University

Brackey, Thomas A. Hughes Space and Communications Co.

Bras, Rafael L. Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Canizares, Claude R. Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Crawley, Edward F. Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Duke, Charles M. Charlie Duke Enterprises

Garver, Lori B. (Executive Secretary) NASA Headquarters

Green, Mike (Staff Director, NAC) NASA Headquarters

Guadarrama, Belinda CG Micro Corporation

Hoover, William W. National Research Council

Israel, Fred [not affiliated]

Jacobs, Donald B. Boeing

Kennel, Charles F. Scripps Institution of Oceanography

McRuer, Duane T. Systems Technology, Inc.

Metters, Samuel Metters Industries, Inc.

Mulville, Daniel R. NASA Headquarters

Minogue, John P. DePaul University

Sinnett, James M. The Boeing Company

Squyres, Steven W. Cornell University

Young, A. Thomas [not affiliated]

NASA Attendees:

Creedon, Jerry NASA/LaRC

Dakon, Kathy NASA Headquarters

Erickson, Kristen NASA Headquarters

Gilbert, Bill NASA/LaRC

Keegan, W. B. NASA Headquarters

Lewis, Michael NASA/LaRC

Malone, John NASA/LaRC

Petersen, Kevin NASA/DFRC

Rummel, John D. NASA Headquarters

Other Attendees:

Creighton, Barry LMC-Hampton

Levin, George NRC

McKenzie, Patrick LMA-Denver

Spitzer, Cary Arionilon

1. Mars Program Independent Assessment Team Report [Young]
2. Overview of Process for NASA Integrated Response to Mars í98 Failure and
   Related Reports [Keegan]
3. Intelligent Synthesis Environment: A New NASA Program [Malone]
4. Brief Overview of the NASA Strategic Management System [Crouch]
5. Technology Strategies for Aviation Safety [Lewis]
6. Systems Analysis for “State Changes” in Future Systems Concepts and Technology
   [Gilbert]
7. Earth Science Enterprise Mission [Bras]
8. Space Science Report [Squyres]
9. Perspe