EVA EVA Tools and Crew Aids Panel Minutes of Meeting October 1, 2001
The EVA Tools and Crew Aids Panel met at JSC on October 1, 2001, in Building 1, Room 360, at 1:00 p.m. Representatives from the following organizations participated:
EVA Project Office
Hardware Development
Integration and Operations
Engineering Directorate
Crew and Thermal Systems Division
FCE EVA
Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance Office
Hamilton Standard Management Services
Lockheed Martin
Panel members from the following organizations participated:
XA/Panel Chair, XA/Panel Secretary, XA/I&O, CB/Astronaut Office, DX32/EVA Systems Group, XA Integration and Operations, CB/Astronaut Office, EC5/Crew and Thermal Systems Division, and NA/SR&QA.
The following items were presented:
- PRACA Status NS43NS43/G. WrightTerry Miller
Fifteen A total of 15 FIARs are open for EVA hardware. Four FIARs were reported as past due. The following were statused:
BFCE029F105 Pistol Grip Tool. PGT chatter.
EC5/Gary Nickel will rewrite the closure rationale to close as "unexplained" and route to USA for signature. A new ECD of 10/15/01 was assigned.
JSCEC0873 Retracting End Effector. Anchor pin found loose inside of the spool pack assembly.
The hardware is being readied for modification. An interim will be written for STS-108. A new ECD of 11/5/01 was assigned.
JSCEC0893 Right/Left-Hand MMWS Swing Arm. During initial PDA swing arm failed interface check with modular base plate assembly.
Failure has been isolated to new build units at Lockheed. A sample from the existing inventory will be inspected. A new ECD of 10/15/01 was assigned.
JSCEC0781F 5/16" Wobble Socket (HST). Wobble socket detaching from PGT during STS-103 EVA.
DCNs are in the signature loop and a CR has been written. A CAIP closure will be written.
JSCEC0892 HST Portable Foot Restraint. Pivot joint latch would not return under spring tension at the -150deg. F test point.
JSCEC0896 Connector Cleaner Tool Kit. Alignment mark of N2 cartridge still visible when punctured/seated with CCT.
A CR to change drawing and roll dash number will be written. A CAIP closure will be submitted.
No new FIARs were reported.
The following STS-108 (UF1) FIARs were statused:
JSCEC0884 Tether Assembly, Crew Lock. Slip ring on tether assembly failed 45-lb load test.
A CR to update the short form will be submitted.
Preliminary closure in work. Still had chatter on 5A. Look at closing "as is".
EC5/B. Greene presented a FIAR Status on JSCEC0853F Bayonet Receptacle.
STS-92 and STS-98 crew experienced excessive loads required to remove hardware from Bayonet Receptacles on the Modular Mini-workstation T-Bar and Swing Arms.
The following STS-104 FIARs were statused:
JSCEC0839 REBA Charger. REBA failed to show green LED during acceptance testing.
Going to vendor end of March to get root cause closure.
JSCEC0841 PFR Gimbal Assembly. Roll joint buttons binding.
Need to get with EM for root cause.
JSCEC0842 Modular MWS Gimbal Assy. Fraying of end effector cord.
In work. Cost substantial.
JSCEC0781F 5/16" Wobble Socket (HST). Socket detaching from PGT during STS-103 EVA.
Funded. Design change complete. Close out.
JSCEC0848F Equipment Hook. Inadvertent equipment hook release.
Should have final by next week.
JSCEC0850 Safety Tether. Discoloration of safety tether.
Test results by 3/19/01.
The following STS-104 SAFER FIAR was statused:
JSCER0035 USA SAFER. SAFER battery erratic current readings.
Currently on-orbit. Will not get back until 6A lands. Will need month to do assessment.
The EVA hardware oldest FIAR, opened against the 5/16" hex wobble socket, is 649 days old.
FIARs open by flight:
STS-102 0
STS-108 (UF1) 7
STS-109 (HST) 11
STS-110 (8A) 14
STS-111 (UF2) 14
- Cert Status NC52/Greg Wright
All certification is closed for STS-102.
There are three open SAFER hardware certifications for STS-100 2 on the SAFER IVA Battery (-305 and -307), and SAFER Battery upgrade. These are pending GCAR updates for closure.
There are 22 open hardware certifications for STS-104, all "green".There are six open hardware certification items for STS-108 (UF1). The PFR bridge clamp will be coming off the list. Cert for the EHIP lights is pending the washer change.
There are 12 open hardware certification items for STS-109. APC/MFR cert if pending XA signature on the Safety paper.
There are two open hardware certification items for STS-110 (8A). These include the TERA base assembly and MT energy absorber. TERA testing is complete; paperwork will follow.
- EVA Cuff Checklist XA/Greg LeStourgeon
- Mission Hardware Status LM/F. BlissFred Bliss
The Chairman requested XA/Margaret McPhail have a status ready by STS-108 on the EVA cuff checklist anomaly whether to use as is, change material, or implement a new design. Presentation to the EHB is pending discussion with XA/Glenn Lutz.
The following Mission Hardware Status was presented:
STS-102: All hardware has been delivered for flight.
STS-100: STS-98 hardware was received from USA on 3/2/01, and is being processed for the STS-100 Bench Review on 3/16/01. Roughly 20% of Bench Review hardware has been shipped. The other hardware will be sent as it is processed.
STS-108 MPLM hardware is at USA, with the exception of the ORU transfer bags. All payload bay and CEIT hardware have been shipped.
All items for the STS-109 PSA pull test were delivered to Boeing. They will be processed for payload bay ship upon return from pull test.
- Actions Review XA/G. LeStourgeonGreg LeStourgeon
This item was deferred.
- HITS Status Review XA/Jackie Manning
- Gage Status EC5/Kim Hostetler
- H-1049 Add Increased Tensile Loading Capability to Mobile Transport Energy Absorber EC5/Lora Bailey.
- H-0925R3 Update STS-109 (HST-03B) Tools ESEL XA/Barbara Counts
This item was deferred.
The monthly Gage Status was presented. This status shows gages that are new and in calibration, gages that will expire in 4 months, in for calibration (none), gages that will expire in 4 months, not in for calibration, expired gages in for calibration, expired gages not in for calibration, and gages with TBD or no calibration.
This item was deferred to the 10/15/01 Tools Panel.
Revision 3 to the STS-109 (HST-03B) Tools ESEL incorporates the latest HSBC, winch, EHP and middeck charger configurations, updates serial numbers and finalizes the middeck stowage.
Decision: Route for technical concurrence.
10. H-1055 Baseline STS-113 (11A) Tools ESEL XA/Barbara Counts
This CCBD baselines the STS-113 (11A) Tools ESEL. It contains post-ISS airlock tools quantities, the Tether Shuttle, CETA cart and passive/active CETA couplers as mission specific items, and the lightweight port TSA.
Decision: Route for technical concurrence.
11. H-1026 Baseline Russian Launch ESEL for Progress 6P XA/Chuck Fulcher
This CCBD baselines the Russian Progress 6P ESEL. It contains Orlan suit components, joint airlock components, experiment components, and miscellaneous hardware.
Decision: Route for technical concurrence.
- H-1042R1 Update Certification of Modular Mini-Workstation for Translation with PGT and Short Adjustable Extension Single Mission Cert for STS-109 XA/Jeff Dutton
- H-0983R1 Update STS-112 (9A) Tools ESEL HSMS/Anthony Hall
- H-1057 BRT Ball Stack Unlubricated Unit Life cycle Test XA/Margaret McPhail
- H-0457R5 Update CARD JSC-38725A and ICD 5-148, BRT 300 Lb. ORU Translation Aid XA/Margaret McPhail
- H-0749R2 SAFER On-Orbit Trainer ER/P. McCartney
- Fastener Locking Requirements and Practices ES4/Rajib Dasgupta
This CCBD requests single mission certification of the MMWS to allow translation with the PGT and HST short adjustable extension on the swing arm for STS-109.
Decision: Route for technical concurrence.
Revision 1 to the STS-112 (9A) Tools ESEL contains required updates to add the Shuttle Tether to the middeck.
Decision: Route for technical concurrence.
This CCBD requests conducting a life cycle test to determine if the BRT ball stack can provide nominal operation without the inclusion of cable lube. This is in response to JSC FIAR 0860, written because two BRTs did not stabilize after tensioning during PIA.
Decision: Route for technical concurrence.
This CCBD requests updating the CARD and ICD for the BRT to specify the acceptability of attachment of a 300 lb. ORU to the ISS EMU using a BRT via the modular baseplate assembly.
Decision: Route for technical concurrence.
H-1058 SM Debris Panel Temp Stowage Device Provide ROM and Schedule XA/Tara Jochim
This CCBD requests EC5 to provide a ROM and schedule to build and certify a device to temporarily stow the service module debris panel (SMDP) bundle on the U.S. segment. The stowage method will be similar to the current temporary stowage of STRELA on an APFR on PMA1. The new hardware will be a combination of U.S. and Russian built hardware. The Russians will provide a magnetic socket to interface with the U.S. built section. The U.S. built section must interface with an APFR tool stanchion socket. The mass of the SMDP bundle will be 150 lbs, with the assumption that the bundle will be subjected to acceleration loads of 0.2g.
A question of who would certify this hardware was raised. It was the decision of the Tools Panel to provide the TS probe from 2A FSE with certification and ship to Russia.
Decision: Route for technical concurrence.
This item was deferred.
ES4 presented fastener locking requirements for JSC flight hardware. These requirements will be incorporated into JSC-28484, Program Requirements Document for Johnson Space Center (JSC) Non-Critical Government Furnished Equipment (GFE), currently undergoing revision. Specific requirements are as follows:
- Fasteners shall have two separate verifiable locking features. At least one shall be positive locking and vibration rated.
- Joints subject to rotation shall use at least one non-friction locking device.
- Installation procedures shall require functional verification of locking feature, such as measurement of running torque or visual inspection of lockwire integrity.
- Preload and running torque shall be specified on the drawing. Exceptions shall be documented via GCAR.
- Locking compounds (Vibratite or Locktite) shall not be used without prior approval from JSC Structural Engineering Division.
Safety critical fasteners were defined as those fasteners, which if a failure occurs could result in a critical or catastrophic hazard due to joint separation or release of debris (that causes contamination, crew injury electrical short or a fire hazard).
Recommended methods of locking and examples of positive locking devices were also presented, as well as requirements for non-safety critical fasteners and secondary locking methods.
These requirements are for new hardware only. ES4/Materials Branch has requested prior approval be obtained before Vibratite or Locktite (or other non-verifiable locking compound) is used.
No further items were brought forward, and the EVA Tools and Crew Aids Panel adjourned.
Submitted by: Approved by:
(Original signed by) (Original signed by)
________________________________ ________________________________
Harriett A. Attaway D. G. LeStourgeonD. G. LeStourgeon
Secretary, EVA Tools & Crew Aids Panel Acting Chairman, Acting EVA Tools & Crew Aids Panel
Note: CARD changes are normally routed for concurrence after the Panel adjourns. Initiators are requested to be present or have representation for discussion of the change.