Congress, NASA, and the International Space Station: A New Civility? Part 3
A summary of hearings before the House Science Committee on Space Station Cost Overruns, 4 April 2001
Panel 2: Goldin Goes On The Record
Dan Goldin began by reading from a prepared oral statement [longer prepared testimony] wherein he began to describe the origin of the latest ISS cost: “In September, prompted by unexpectedly high monthly program spending rates, the Station Program Manager decided to reexamine the premise that the cost projections for assembly phase operations tended to be overstated. A new look at the operating costs and budgetary risks was undertaken in advance of the normal budget formulation cycle. Initial findings indicated higher FY 2001 costs and a significant FY 2002 shortfall. In November, we alerted OMB and discussed the need for an in-depth (“bottoms up”) assessment of anticipated program costs. We provided a preliminary assessment to the OMB on February 1, characterizing it as a “conservative,” probably overly cautious, estimate of a potential total program cost increase of about $4 billion over the 2002-2006 time period.
Goldin then described how the Bush Administration had directed NASA to deal with the issue: “The President’s FY 2002 Budget Blueprint is a straightforward proposal for dealing with the projected growth. First, the Administration does not break the statutory ISS cost cap. Instead, funding previously targeted for specific program content beyond the U.S. “core” is redirected to offset the growth Second, NASA is to undertake reforms and develop a plan to ensure that future costs remain within the FY 2002 budget plan. An external review is to validate our revised cost estimates. Third, we are consulting with our international partners on approaches to provide additional capabilities beyond the U.S. “core.” And, finally, we have a charter to eliminate lower-priority activities in Human Space Flight and propose the use of the funding to meet Station needs.”
“We have enthusiastically accepted the challenge of the new Administration. I do not want to minimize the seriousness of the situation. We do not have all of the answers today, but do have a plan of action. Several months of hard work are ahead of us to refine our cost estimates, to have the credibility that goes with a thorough understanding of risks and an allowance for the unknown. And, we will subject them to an external independent review, the results of which will be provided to the Committee, along with appropriate options, for your consideration and action.”
Rep. Boehlert asked Goldin for a reality check – i.e. that this is not the last of the additional costs given that various liens and threats still need to be fully costed out. Goldin replied that there are some things NASA jus doesn’t have complete control over. One example is the performance of the International Partners. In addition to the well publicized problems in Russia, Japan is having problems with the Centrifuge Facility.
When asked what solutions were being considered, Goldin said that NASA was currently in discussions with Europe about the possibility of having a European hab module provided under a barter arrangement.
With regard to the Crew Return Vehicle, Goldin said that NASA should not proceed with a CRV until the X-38 had gone through a complete demonstration phase including a return from orbit. Only then would Goldin feel that enough developmental risk had been retired to proceed with the development of a CRV. Goldin said that the CRV was also an issue under discussion with the Europeans.
Goldin spoke of other costs that have yet to be fully characterized – contingencies that might result from major inflight anomalies and pre-planned product improvement. An example of the upgrades that will need to be made is the replacement of the current 386 class processors in the ISS MDMs with Pentium class processors.
Boehlert asked if this $4 billion figure is the best that NASA could come up with. Goldin replied that he is not comfortable with it – and that he did not feel that NSA had put enough attention towards having adequate reserves in the program. He said that he was not ready to go with this – or any other number – until NASA had spent an additional 2 or 3 months going over the figures. Boehlert replied that it would be misleading for NASA to say just “$4 billion” when it thought that it might actually be “$4 billion – plus”. “That plus must be minimized” Boehlert said.
Boehlert then asked Goldin if the cost overruns could be contained within NASA’s Human Spaceflight budget. Goldin replied that “raids on other accounts were made earlier in the program. This created a terrible situation.” As such, “going to other accounts would be an inappropriate thing to do.” Boehlert reiterated the Committee’s objection to the use of other funds to meet ISS cost overruns.
Rep. Hall said that “cutting the Hab, CRV, and propulsion module would save you perhaps $2 billion. If you slash research by 40% you might get another $1 billion.” He then asked Goldin “How confident are you that you can eliminate the rest of the overrun?”
Goldin did not reply directly but said instead that he “did not see adequate resources” and that “We don’t have enough resources to handle the unknown. I can’t make any commitments right now.” Hall asked Goldin what he would do if, after the reviews were all done, if all of the $4 billion could not be covered. Goldin replied that NASA would be keeping Congress informed all along the way.
Rep. Weldon asked Goldin is he has “enough people to get the job done”. He added that “if you were a CEO who reported this kind of cost growth you’d have to decide either that the team is not competent or that they are somehow hamstrung in their ability to properly manage.” Goldin replied that there as a third possibility – “that we were not aware of – nor did we understand just what it would take to do the operations.”
With regard to having enough people to do research on ISS Goldin replied that for the next 3 years “we will have the people that we need.” Earlier in the program there was actually a concern with the ability of the ISS to do research early on. “So we changed the ISS design to add a solar array to provide enough power to support 10 racks.” After 2004, Goldin could only say that “we will need to reassess that situation.”
Goldin went on to describe some of the changes made at NASA to help cover the costs. One example was the cancellation of research programs such as human Mars exploration so as to allow people to focus on the Space Shuttle and ISS programs. Goldin also said that several hundred people were being reassigned from NASA’s aeronautics programs to the ISS program – and that they were bringing some capabilities that had been found to be lacking in the ISS program such as advanced analytical skills.
Weldon then asked Goldin again if there’d be enough manpower on the ISS to do science given that it takes 2.5 people to run it. Goldin admitted that this was an issue. Weldon asked him if any of the European partners were interested in providing a CRV. Goldin replied that NASA was in discussion with Europe and that there was some interest. France, as a nation, was also interested.
Related Links
° Statement of Daniel S. Goldin, NASA Administrator
° Oral Statement by Dan Goldin before the House Science Committee
° Testimony of Russell A. Rau, NASA Assistant Inspector General for Auditing
° Statement by Rep. Boehlert regarding Space Station Cost Overrun Hearing
Background Information
° Space Station User’s Guide, SpaceRef
° House Science Committee
° NASA Office of Congressional Affairs
°28 February 2001: Memo NASA Staff: FY 2002 Budget Blueprint Overview by NASA Associate Administrator for Space Flight Joe Rothenberg, NASA HQ
°27 February 2001: Letter from Reps Rohrabacher and Weldon to Dan Goldin Regarding JSC Center Director George Abbey’s Reassignment, House Science Committee
°23 February 2001: Letter from (former) JSC Center Director George Abbey to Senior Staff: Actions Required to Address ISS Budget Challenges
°23 February 2001: NASA Administrator Appoints Johnson Space Center Director to Senior Assistant Position, NASA PAO
