EVA Tools and Crew Aids Panel Minutes of Meeting June 18, 2001
The EVA Tools and Crew Aids Panel met at JSC on June 18, 2001, in Building 1, Room 360, at 1:00 p.m. Representatives from the following organizations participated:
Panel members from the following organizations participated:
XA/Panel Chair, XA/Panel Secretary, XA/Integration & Operations, XA Integration and Operations, CB/Astronaut Office, EC5/Crew and Thermal Systems Division, DX32/EVATask Group, and NA/SR&QA.
The following items were presented:
Fifteen A total of fourteen (14) FIAR’s are open for EVA hardware. One FIAR was reported as past due and statused as follows:
JSCEC0851 — General Purpose Cutter. General Purpose Cutter handle does not lock within torque spec.
Per EC5/Roger Schwarz, resolution is new design. Running thermal tests. Would have to collapse thermal range to get cert (based on previous tests). New ECD 7/16/01.
No new FIAR’s were reported.
The following FIAR for 7A.1 was statused:
JSCE0880 — Top/Side Mounted WIF’s. Anodized surface is tacky and paint is flaking off.
EC5/Kim Hostetler gave an update to this FIAR detailing the following:
- Background: WIF’s were delivered by EM in early April. PDA of 30 Side-Mounted WIF’s on 4/12/01 noted no discrepancies. PDA of 10 Top-Mounted WIF’s on 4/13/01 resulted in DR’s on all for peeling paint, tacky feel, nicks in anodize, fingerprints in anodize, color variation of anodize.
- Investigation: EM production planner and materials engineer viewed WIF’s. Opinion is that color variations in anodize are common based on various criteria (pH of solution, duration of treatment, etc.). Nicks in anodize are from "racking" and should be touch-up alodined. Fingerprints probably due to handling just prior to anodize. Tackiness due to improperly cured paint.
- Action Taken: 10 Top-Mounted WIF’s sent back to EM for rework. EM Materials spoke with Nusil manufacturer to come up with re-cure process: bake at 150F for 24 hours, remove residual paint, touch up alodine applied to nicks. Cleaned with alcohol. Rework completed end of May.
- Result: WIF’s still deemed unacceptable by QA for tackiness. Since the side-Mounted WIF’s on this job were done by same vendor, EC5 went back to take a second look at those, and now all 22 available units of these have DR’s. Note: 8 Side-Mounted WIF’s have already been delivered to BNA.
- Next step: EC5 met with EM, who believes that paint was either improperly mixed prior to application, or that a bad batch of paint was used. EC5 requested that a corrective action be implemented. EM agreed to do site inspection of the vendor. For future builds, EM will do all application of Nusil paint in-house. EC5 will meet again with EM on 6/20/01 to determine the next step for these WIF’s.
All WIF’s currently on-orbit have been PDA’d and are screenable. Based on meeting with EM on 6/20/01, a final closure should be forthcoming.
The following FIAR’s for UF1 were statused:
BFCE026A024 — High Strength Bridge Clamp. Unlock push button will not extend.
USA sent broken release pin to EC5. Failure caused by overloading part. Unknown if a one-time failure or repeatable. Recommend changing material. Can roll into another CCBD (H-1005) if approved.
BFCE029F105 — PGT. PGT Chatter.
Pending test results. Taking apart and doing refurbishment. Close as "unexplained" if nothing found during refurbishment.
JSCEC0863F — Modular Gimbal. End effector is sticking/not closing (STS-98 anomaly).
Original anomaly fixed.
JSCEC0781F — 5/16" Wobble Socket. Wobble socket detaching from PGT during STS-103 EVA.
Paperwork cleanup. OSS may have released drawings not in EDCC system.
JSCEC0860 — Body restraint tether. BRT will not stabilize after tensioning.
No update. Trying to overcome grease problem.
JSCEC088874F — T-Handle. Sticky actuation of ball.
Hardware is back and appears to be operating normally. Will do thermal test Wednesday, 6/20/01. Will close as "unexplained".
Preliminary closure in work. Still had chatter on 5A. Look at closing "as is".
EC5/B. Greene presented a FIAR Status on JSCEC0853F — Bayonet Receptacle.
STS-92 and STS-98 crew experienced excessive loads required to remove hardware from Bayonet Receptacles on the Modular Mini-workstation T-Bar and Swing Arms.
The following STS-104 FIAR’s were statused:
JSCEC0839 — REBA Charger. REBA failed to show green LED during acceptance testing.
Going to vendor end of March to get root cause closure.
JSCEC0841 — PFR Gimbal Assembly. Roll joint buttons binding.
Need to get with EM for root cause.
JSCEC0842 — Modular MWS Gimbal Assy. Fraying of end effector cord.
In work. Cost substantial.
JSCEC0781F — 5/16" Wobble Socket (HST). Socket detaching from PGT during STS-103 EVA.
Funded. Design change complete. Close out.
JSCEC0848F — Equipment Hook. Inadvertent equipment hook release.
Should have final by next week.
JSCEC0850 — Safety Tether. Discoloration of safety tether.
Test results by 3/19/01.
The following STS-104 SAFER FIAR was statused:
JSCER0035 — USA SAFER. SAFER battery erratic current readings.
Currently on-orbit. Will not get back until 6A lands. Will need month to do assessment.
The EVA hardware oldest FIAR, opened against the 5/16" Hex Wobble Socket, is 544 days old.
FIAR’s open by flight:
STS-102 0
STS-104 (7A) 101
STS-105 (7A.1) 131
STS-108 (UF1) 12
STS-109 (HST) 14
- Cert Status — NC52/Greg Wright
All certification is closed for STS-102.
There are three open SAFER hardware certifications for STS-100 — 2 on the SAFER IVA Battery (-305 and -307), and SAFER Battery upgrade. These are pending GCAR updates for closure.
There are 22 open hardware certifications for STS-104, all "green".All certification is closed for STS-104 (7A). There are three open certification items for STS-105 (7A.1). The EVA Winch & Mount Assy cert package is with MA2/Dave Whittle, who has requested additional information. This package is to go to a special SSRP, date TBD. The BMRRM Vice Clamp Tool short form is in XA for review and signature. There are four open hardware certification items for STS-108 (UF1). New dates are to be provided for SAFER, UIA Contingency Cover, and Cooling Loop Flushing Fixture. Due date for the BRT is 10/21/01.
- Mission Hardware Status — LM/F. BlissKevin Thomas
The following Mission Hardware Status was presented:
STS-102: All hardware has been delivered for flight.
STS-100: STS-98 hardware was received from USA on 3/2/01, and is being processed for the STS-100 Bench Review on 3/16/01. Roughly 20% of Bench Review hardware has been shipped. The other hardware will be sent as it is processed.
The following STS-105 Bench Review hardware needs to be returned to USA:
- Modular MWS Gimbal Assy (2) and Modular MWS RH Swingarms (2). Items are going into thermal Wednesday, 6/20/01, and should ship to USA on Thursday, 6/21/01, if no problems occur.
- EHIP Lights and Associated Hardware. Batteries have been sent to Bldg. 354 for charging. The EHIP Lights themselves need to be cleared so a PIA can be performed after the batteries are charged.
- Waist Tethers (4). Paperwork is being closed out so the waist tethers can be shipped to USA by Wednesday, 6/20/01.
- Actions Review — XA/G. LeStourgeonGreg LeStourgeon
- Pending CR Review — XA/G. LeStourgeonGreg LeStourgeon
This item was deferred.
Pending CR’s were distributed for concurrence.
This item was deferred.
- HITS Status Review — XA/Jackie Manning
The weekly "stoplight" HITS Metric Report was presented. This report shows hardware and/or service/support delivered, on schedule, and not meeting planned delivery date or program need date. Showing "Red" for hardware deliveries for STS-104 (7A) is one Shuttle Generic Tool Caddy, which is no longer needed for flight 7A. Four flight units have been delivered. Delivery date for the last unit is unknown. This is pending an ECD from EC5/David Glebe. Also showing late for delivery are the General Purpose Cutter Replacement Unit, EHIP PGT Cable, PGT/EHIP Y-Power Charger Cable, Battery Pack Assembly, and EHIP Light Assembly. Anticipated delivery date is 6/29/01. Four of the 14 helmet light batteries have been delivered for 7A. The rest should be delivered by 6/21/01.
Service/support items showing "Red" for 7A include the ROM and schedule to update the OIH CARD, analysis for the 18" translation work envelope for the MMWS Allowable Moment Arm, and replacing the end effector cords on the MMWS Gimbal Assy and Retracting End Effector Assy
- Gage Status — EC5/Kim Hostetler
The monthly Gage Status was presented on 6/4/01 at its regularly scheduled date (first Monday of the month).
This CCBD requests a new configuration of the HSBC Shaft Assembly to eliminate tolerance stack-up issues at the top assembly level. During manufacture of HSBC S/N 1013 at EM, the shaft drawing was redlined to change certain dimensions. Before release of the DCN, two functional HSBC’s were disassembled to determine the dimensions of the shafts for comparison; results showed that these shafts were per existing print. The shaft for S/N 1013 was built to existing print and assembled at EM. S/N 1013 was sent to LM for acceptance testing, where it was noted that the EVA knob did not fully seat on the locking pin in the locked state. It was determined that the shaft nominally should not physically fit, which forces the knob to not seat fully. It is believed that during initial assembly, a thicker washer may have been used to offset the shaft; this results in a slight gap between the fixed housing and traveler housing in the fully closed configuration. S/N 1003 has a DR for this condition; gap has been observed on other units, but not yet measured. The gap will cause a slightly looser fit on the bridge rail than intended, but no issues have been noted to date with this gap. Current builds include S/N 1013 from EM, two units in manufacture at HSMS, and one unit in manufacture at LM. Existing units may not be per print and exhibit gap when closed.
Options for resolving this issue include a DCN to the current configuration of the shaft, a new configuration of the shaft, or rework/repair units via MRB DR one at a time. No units are scheduled on 7A or 7A.1; therefore, no existing units will be affected.
Decision: Hold pending cost impacts to include HSMS units. EC5/Kim Hostetler and XA/Kristin O’Brien will assess impact for taking one unit apart and format a resolution plan.
H-858R1 — Update STS-102 Tool-to-Tool Fitcheck Matrix — HSMS/J. Case
This CCBD updates the STS-102 Tool-to-Tool Fitcheck Matrix to reflect the STS-102 Rev 7 Tools ESEL.
Decision: Route for technical concurrence.
- H-0960 — STS-102 Open Tool-to-Tool Fitchecks — HSMS/J. Case
This CCBD requests EHB concurrence on accepting the risk of not performing all tool-to-tool fitchecks for STS-102. Root cause of the inability to complete the fitchecks is late addition of tools to the flight, new hardware builds, and hardware logistics disconnects and planned operational use. Fitcheck status was presented to the STS-102 EVA FRR, held 2/27/01. In the future, all fitcheck status is to be documented prior to FRR.
Decision: Forward to 3/7/01 EHB.
- Extension of USA SAFER Sliders — ER/K. Lewis
Background: Due to the design of the Small EMU and EMU Planar HUT, some crewmembers may be unable to operate the manual isolation valve or deploy the HCM to initiate a self-rescue without extending the sliders forward.
This presentation is in response to action requirements contained in H-0906 – Extension of USA SAFER Sliders. The action called for ER to provide cost and schedule estimates for the following:
- Developing a viable design concept for moving the SAFER slider mechanisms forward 2 inches.
- Developing the detailed design, fabrication, and certification plan for the new concept.
- Retrofitting the Class I SAFER fleet and the Class III SAFER Engineering Unit with the modifications.
- Updating the required documents as appropriate.
A review of the SAFER drawing list has identified 49 drawings that will require modification or replacement to implement the change, with a possibility of more being identified during the design process. The structural redesign will require new stress and thermal analyses and a repeat of development and certification test programs.
Several issues were also brought forward. Modifications will require change of HCM deployment, causing SAFER to violate PRD stowed volume requirements, increasing weight, and increasing risk of inadvertent HCM deployment and Manual Nitrogen Isolation Valve closure.
At the ROM estimate of $4.130K, and the 2.5 years required to build and certify, ER has recommended not implementing this change.
CB/C. Nicollier requested data on reach evaluations and further evaluation or existing spreadsheet on length of time taken to reach sliders. The chairman suggested ER provide (to the EHB) the data on the negative loads margin due to the extension of the sliders.
Decision: Forward to 3/7/01 EHB.
10. H-1006 — SSRMS Joint Protection — XA/Maria Tullar
This CCBD requests an EVA transfer bag/shroud for the SSRMS joint to provide protection for the ORU while transferred through the airlock to/from the worksite.
Decision: Redline to add additional requirements for ROM to include either an additional EVA transfer bag or a new joint specific bag. Redline task description to include that the crew installs the bag/shroud on ORU on-orbit prior to EVA instead of on ORU prelaunch. Add to shroud requirements that the bag/shroud will be installable on failed joint while EVA.
11. EVA Tool Limited Life Team Status Briefing — XA/Aaron Mears
A status on the EVA Tool Limited Life requirements and team findings was presented. The team has been tasked to:
- Verify hardware limited life requirements are accurately documented
- Verify current processes are accurately tracking the limited life of the hardware
- Investigate and implement process improvements
- Better accommodate an increased flight rate
- Limited hardware inventory
- Leaving TSA hardware at KSC between flights if tools were not used during an EVA
Documents and processes being reviewed are JSC-24937 Rev H, Limited Life Time Cycle Items Program Requirements Document, USA FCE/EVA processes, KSC FCE processes, Certification and Requirements Document (CARD), and JSC-26626A, EVA Hardware Generic Design Requirements Document (GDRD). NA/Greg Wright requested that the Government Certification Approval Request (GCAR) be included in this review.
The team is also reviewing duplication of work/efforts, i.e., EHB Actions, EMU Logistics, Safety and Mission Assurance.
JSC-24937 is in the process of being updated to Revision 1, with an expected July 2001 release. This document is maintained by MV and was last revised July 1999. So far, approximately 18 items are being deleted. These are items that are not included in a standard TSA, items that are out of configuration, and items that do not belong in JSC-24937 and are tracked by a different document. Also being reviewed are CARD’s, FCE and KSC tracking processes, and KSC’s process of hardware handling. The team is also reviewing duplication of work/efforts, i.e., EHB Actions, EMU Logistics, Safety and Mission Assurance.
Current requirements of JSC-24937 indicate that most tools require a PIA every 3 years from date of installation in orbiter or after one use in an EVA. The GDRD (paragraph 4.2.4.1.2.2) states: "The PIA is a test performed prior to shipment of the flight hardware for installation. Whereas the PDA is performed once on each flight item, the PIA is performed on flight items prior to each flight use." CARD’s are also being reviewed; however, most of the TSA hardware is old and many items do not have CARD’s.
The following options for TSA tool processing were outlined:
Maintain at KSC between flights and send back to FCE only when PIA is required.
Utilize FCE personnel to process all TSA tools, including PIA, at KSC
Transfer all TSA tools to KSC for processing
The EVA Tool Limited Life Team meets every 2 weeks, with the next meeting scheduled for 6/21/01. Mr. Mears requested the Panel members and EVA community review the documents and processes currently in use and report any updates, discrepancies, duplication, etc., to the team.
- H-0893R4 — Update STS-105(7A.1) Tools ESEL — XA/Rich Fair
This Revision 4 to the STS-105 (7A.1) Tools ESEL contains required hardware additions to the MPLM and deletes exercise tubing and the PCMCIA Card Kit for prebreathe protocol. These changes are required since 7A.1 will not be using the ISS Airlock. If 7A and 7A.1 change places, these additions would fly up and down.
Decision: Route for technical concurrence.
No further items were brought forward, and the EVA Tools and Crew Aids Panel was adjourned.
Submitted by: Approved by:
(Original signed by) (Original signed by)
________________________________ ________________________________
Harriett A. Attaway D. G. LeStourgeonD. G. LeStourgeon
EVA Tools & Crew Aids Panel Secretary Acting Acting EVA Tools & Crew Aids Panel Chairman
Note: CARD changes are normally routed for concurrence after the Panel adjourns. Initiators are requested to be present or have representation for discussion of the change.
