EVA Hardware Board (EHB) Minutes of Meeting 10 Jan 2001
The EHB met at JSC on January 10, 2001, in Building 1, Room 360, at 1:00 p.m. Representatives from the following organizations participated:
EVA Project Office
Hardware Development
Integration and Operations
Engineering Directorate
EVA and Spacesuit Systems
EVA, Robotics, & Crew Systems
SR&QA
Hamilton Sundstrand
Hamilton Sundstrand Management Services
USA
Lockheed
Oceaneering
EHB Board members from the following organizations participated:
XA/Tools and Crew Aids, XA/EMU, XA/Integration and Operations, XA/Business Office, DX3/EVA, Robotics, & Crew Systems, EA/Engineering, EC5/EVA and Spacesuit Systems, MV5/FCE, and NA/SR&QA.
The following items were presented:
- Hardware Integration Schedule XA/A. Mears
Changes to the schedule include the STS-102 (5A.1) Bench Review On-Dock date slip from 1/12/01 to a date TBD and the STS-104 (7A) ISS A/L CEIT move from 1/12/01 to 3/5/01.
- PRACA Status NS43/T. Miller
Seventeen FIARs are open for EVA hardware and are shown by flight as follows:
STS-98 1
STS-102 11
STS-100 10
Seven FIARs were reported past due and statused as follows:
BFCE026A022 – Draeger Tube Hydrazine. Discoloration on Draeger Tube.
SSM in process of writing closure. Interim in place for STS-98.
JSCEC0839 REBA Charger. REBA failed to show green LED during acceptance testing.
Interim in for STS-98 only; need new ECD by next week.
JSCEC0796 Active WIF Assy. Active WIF control know appeared to have increased force to operate.
Rework completed and PDAd. SSM has requested ECD of 12/30/00 remain.
JSCEC0837F MMWS. Sticking/binding of gimbal.
Closure written. Waiting for final two gimbal assemblies to be inspected.
JSCER0034 USA SAFER. SAFER battery thermistor bad solder joints.
These solder joints have been fixed on all SAFER -305 batteries. All that remains to close FIAR is to add a note to a drawing requiring the inspection of the solder joint before installing the thermistor.
JSCER0035 USA SAFER. SAFER battery erratic current readings.
Unique to SAFER battery 1027, currently on-orbit. Troubleshooting of this battery will continue when the battery is returned to earth.
JSCER0033 USA SAFER. NSI trace on oscilloscope appeared abnormal.
This FIAR will be closed once a CR is submitted to change the PIDS requirement from verifying the condition of the bridgewire to verifying the condition of the circuit. The CR will also require future IVA checkouts to be performed with the manual isolation valve open.
No new FIARs were reported.
The oldest FIAR, against the Adaptive Payload Carrier, is 491 days old.
At the request of XA/D. Roberts, future PRACA reports will include more than the current three flights. The next report will include flights through STS-104 (7A).
- Certification Status NS22/G. Wright
There are two open hardware certifications for STS-98 the Hydrazine Detection Pad (Gold Salt), and Trace Gas Analyzer. The Gold Salt issue is to be worked, but will launch for 5A. A status will be presented on the TGA. There are two open hardware certifications for STS-102 QD Cap Removal Tool and EVA Ohmmeter. Certification is in work on both items. There are eight open hardware certifications for STS-100. The SAFER IVA battery comes open for 6A.
Update on TGA Cert EC5/R. Marak
A detailed report on the EVA battery powered ammonia leak detector was presented. A draft CCBD requesting EHB concurrence for deviations and waivers from requirements and/or verification methods outlined in CARD JSC-40058, and TGA derived Requirements Specification, JCC-40136, was also presented.
Decision: The CCBD will be reviewed and routed OSB.
- EMU RDR and Certification Status NC512/J. Fuentes
The total open EMU RDRs by flight are as follows:
STS-98 1 - Should close by 1/11/01
STS-102 6 - Interim closures on 3; 1 requires CCBD
STS-100 3 - Two in final closure; 1 with interim
Beginning next week, the report will start showing USA-responsible RDRs.
There are four SSER open certification items for STS-98. There are four open certification items for STS-102; the EMU Advanced Battery, Biomed Kit, and Signal Conditioner will be moving to 7A. There are seven items requiring certification for STS-100; most require verification of serial numbers or require ISS certification.
- Funds Transfer Status XA/J. Hall
The following funds were transferred during December and January:
H-0859R1 - QD Cap Removal Tool – .5" and .25" Cap Tool - $100K (Balance of $74K to GSFC)
H-0851R1 - Repair HST Portable Foot Restraint - $220K
H-0804R1 - Change configuration of HST Socket Assy - $112K
H-0819R1 - MFR Latch Handle Redesign - $142K
— - Trace Gas Analyzer Support - $88.5K
EC5 was requested to look into transfer of funds ($77K) to ER/E. Darcy for the Floating Potentiometer Probe effort.
- EMU Logistics Status XA/L. Kearney
This item was not presented.
- EHB Action Status XA/G. Lutz
- H7085 EMU SSA FEMU-R-001 Revision for Class IIIW Lower Arm Inspection/Use Criteria ILC/S. Ross
- H-0930 STS-100 (6A) PFR Attachment Device (PAD) Modification XA/K. OBrien
- H-0927 STS-98 Tool-to-Tool Fitcheck Open Items HSMS/M. Elder
This item was deferred.
This CCBD requests revising the FEMU-R-001 to add additional criteria for continued use of the Lower Arm Assemblies in the NBL. NBL use has been linked to an increased degradation rate of lower arm restraint lines. History indicates that degradation rates in the NBL increase after approximately 300 hours of use. Without this CCBD and associated change to the FEMU-R, there will be no mechanism to require lower arms be removed from service and returned to the manufacturer for refurbishment.
Decision: Approve.
This CCBD requests removing the PIP Pin from PAD P/N 10159-10053-01, S/N 1002, via Type A TPS and returning to print post 6A. The PAD will be used with a WIF adapter (-301), which also has a PIP pin. The 6A PADs PIP pin has no stowage location when a 301 WIF Adapter is installed. The 6A WIF Adapter is required to have a PIP Pin for SSRMS support.
Decision: Approve.
This CCBD requests EHB concurrence on accepting the risk of not performing all tool-to-tool fitchecks for STS-98. Root cause of the inability to complete the fitchecks is hardware scheduling and serial number changes, new hardware builds, and hardware logistics disconnects and planned operational use.
Decision: Approve.
- H-0848R2 Flight Support Equipment Grapple Fixture (FSEGF) Hook Links Contingency 11/16" Box End Wrench Modification of Requirements XA/T. Jochim
This CCBD requests modifying the wrench end thickness of the 11/16" Box End Wrench from 0.16" to 0.13" + 0.000/-0.005 per the recommendations from MacDonald Detwiler-Robotics. If not implemented, the current contingency plan for releasing the SSRMS hook links from the FSEGF and SLP will not be available.
Decision: Obtain ISS concurrence on CCBD to accept risk. Approve.
No further items were brought forward, and the EHB meeting adjourned.
Submitted by: Approved by:
(Original signed by) (Original signed by)
___________________________ ____________________________
Harriett Attaway Glenn C. Lutz
EHB Secretary EHB Chairman