NASA OIG: Final Memorandum on Audit of NASA’s Global Precipitation Measurement Project
We found that NASA was taking steps to mitigate risks of further schedule delays to the GPM Project. However, funding shortfalls in fiscal years (FYs) 2005 through 2007 caused delays to the delivery schedule of the Project’s only prime contract, the GPM Microwave Imager (GMI). Those schedule delays have resulted in increasing GPM Project costs. Additionally, NASA’s partnership with JAXA could be negatively impacted if the Project incurs any further delays.
On April 25, 2007, the GPM contracting officer at Goddard Space Flight Center exercised a launch delay provision and requested that the contractor, Ball Aerospace and Technologies Corporation (Ball), submit an updated cost proposal for completing the GMI. Ball’s revised proposal, dated July 24, 2007, stated that NASA’s funding constraints had disrupted the original performance plan, causing inefficiencies and time extensions, which Ball projected would result in cost growth of more than 50 percent, about $– million. To validate the proposal’s reasonableness, the GPM contracting officer requested that the GPM Project Office perform technical and cost reviews. As of February 2008, the Project Office had completed the technical review, but not the cost review.
We believe the funding shortfalls and the ensuing delays have resulted in a dramatic alteration in planning for GPM Project execution, at substantially increased cost. In April 2005, the Chair of the National Academy of Sciences’ Committee on Earth Science and Applications from Space: A Community Assessment and Strategy for the Future, warned the House Science Committee that repeated budget cuts threatened many Earth Science programs that are being downsized, delayed, or canceled. NASA’s decision to delay GPM to meet other Agency priorities impacted the Project’s planning and execution.
The Project’s highest ranked risk in July 2007 was securing launch services for the first satellite for the Project, the GPM Core, which will carry the primary precipitation measurement instruments. One of JAXA’s roles in the GPM partnership was to provide the launch vehicle for the first satellite; therefore, NASA had not budgeted for a launch vehicle. Because of the GPM Project schedule delays, the planned JAXA launch vehicle was no longer available.
During the course of our audit, it became evident that a successor launch vehicle had not been made available to the GPM Project. As a result, we made several inquiries of various Headquarters officials as to how NASA planned to resolve this matter with JAXA. Subsequently, the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate, the Science Mission Directorate, the Space Operations Mission Directorate, and the Office of External Relations completed and signed an internal Memorandum of Agreement designating a launch vehicle for the first satellite. The designated launch vehicle is from a previously unrelated barter agreement with JAXA connected with the International Space Station (ISS).
In January 2008, NASA and JAXA completed an agreement that provides an H-IIA launch vehicle for the GPM Core. An Implementation Memorandum of Understanding still needed to be completed to specify the launch arrangements. The launch date and arrangements continue to be an area of risk.
Our March 7, 2008, draft of this memorandum recommended that the Goddard Chief Financial Officer, in accordance with Goddard Procedural Requirements (GPR) 5100.5A, “Government Cost Estimates for Acquisitions Exceeding the Micro-Purchase Threshold,” April 28, 2005, either conduct an independent assessment of the cost estimate or request a third-party review to validate the estimate. Management’s comments on the draft of this memorandum are responsive (see Enclosure 2). We consider the recommendation resolved and will close the recommendation upon completion and verification of management’s action.
