NASA OIG: Final Memorandum on Government Mandatory Inspections for Solid Rocket Booster Bolt Catchers Assignment Number A-04-003-00 Number IG-04-024
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The Office of Inspector General is reviewing NASA’s plans for implementing the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) recommendation to test and qualify flight hardware bolt catchers (Recommendation 4.2-1). The CAIB concluded that the bolt catchers on the Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) could not be definitively excluded or included as a potential cause of left wing damage to the Space Shuttle Columbia during STS-107. The CAIB investigation also identified problems with certification, quality assurance, and safety margins. Failure to fully implement the recommendation of the CAIB regarding the bolt catchers could prevent NASA from safely returning the Space Shuttle to flight.
Executive Summary
As part of our ongoing review, we are evaluating the Agency’s quality assurance plans for the bolt catcher to determine whether those plans will ensure product compliance for the redesigned bolt catcher. To date, the SRB Project Office and its prime contractor, United Space Alliance (USA), have made significant progress toward redesigning, testing, and flight certifying a redesigned bolt catcher. However, our review of records for bolt catchers manufactured from 1995 through 1998 identified several deficiencies in addition to those identified by the CAIB.
We found that the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) did not perform mandatory hardware inspections on bolt catchers used in Space Shuttle operations. Specifically, we found that DCMA Quality Assurance Representatives (QAR) either (a) removed the requirement for mandatory inspections without obtaining NASA’s authorization or approval, or (b) gave final approval for manufactured bolt catchers although not all inspections required throughout the bolt catcher manufacturing process were performed. When inspections were performed, however, we found that DCMA QARs were not always adequately trained to perform the types of inspections delegated. We also found that NASA relied entirely on DCMA to provide surveillance of bolt catcher manufacturing without the oversight that NASA regulations required.
Because of the flawed inspection process, DCMA should have rejected all of the bolt catchers manufactured from 1995 to 1998, including those used on Columbia during STS-107. We made recommendations to management to improve the redesigned bolt catcher quality assurance process as well as NASA oversight of functions delegated to DCMA. Management concurred with each recommendation and has either taken or planned responsive corrective actions.
